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
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


George Bancroft





George Bancroft





E. Ward

THE
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O F
N A T U R E
P U R S U E D.

BY

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INTRODUCTION,

RELIGION and Morality, being of universal concern to persons of all conditions and denominations, as well with regard to their present happiness as their future expectations, have always engaged the thoughts of such as were disposed to think seriously upon anything: and the minds of men being variously turned, that natural fondness which attaches every one to the decisions of his own judgement, especially in matters nearly affecting his interest, has given birth to innumerable disputes among the learned in all ages; from whence great disorders and mischiefs have frequently arisen among the rest of mankind. But

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though contention has never ceased, nor is ever likely to cease, yet the particular subjects exciting it from time to time have often changed: one set having divided the ancient philosophers, another the doctors in the reign of school divinity, and another the several sects of Christians at and after the reformation.

All these old topics of litigation are now happily laid aside, or lie dormant in the closets of the studious; where they are treated of as matters of speculation, giving no disturbance to the world in general. The principal, or perhaps only question agitated with any degree of warmth and earnestness in these times and countries, seems to be, Whether Reason alone be sufficient to direct us in all parts of our conduct, or Whether Revelation and supernatural aids be necessary. For upon this hinge the merit

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gious disputes chiefly turn, rather than upon external evidence, which one may observe always carries more or less weight with men, according as they are prepossessed either in favour or prejudice of the doctrines enforced thereby ; nor indeed would deserve regard at all without prospect of some advantage to accrue from the result. For were a Revelation proposed which should offer nothing more than we could discover by our own sagacity or attain by common industry, nobody would think it worth while to be at any trouble either in recommending or entring upon an examination of its authenticity.

Upon this question, concerning the sufficiency of Reason, many treatises are written and much thrown out in the pulpits and in private conversation : nor would means be neglected of interesting the populace in the

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the dispute, which from a dispute would then become a quarrel and occasion of civil commotions, did not our laws wisely provide for the maintenance of peace and good order by restraining the fiery zeal of some and wanton licentiousness of others. While the contest stands thus confined within the limits of argumentation, no very mischievous consequences can ensue. We need not fear truth should lie long overwhelmed under the sophisms of falsehood : it will always rise at last triumphant over the strongest opposition ; or rather like gold, which comes brighter and purer out of the furnace, will get clear of that rust and dross that gathers upon the soundest doctrine by too long quiet. When men are all of a mind they grow careless, seldom giving themselves the trouble to enter into the grounds of what passes current by universal consent : or else graft
their

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their own airy imaginations upon the solid substance. But the vigilance of an adversary suffers no foreign mixtures that will not stand the strictest scrutiny: and his misrepresentations give occasion for what remains, to be more fully explained and more clearly understood.

But how great advantages soever may accrue from controversy, it is attended by no less inconvenience. It draws off men's attention from the main end of Religion, which is to make them better, by leading them insensibly into a persuasion that orthodoxy on one hand, and freedom from bigotry on the other, is to stand in lieu of all the practical duties of life: it destroys that mutual goodwill and esteem from whence the benefits of society chiefly result: and it cuts off half the means of improvement by shutting

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ting our eyes against the clearest truths and most shining examples presented by those of whom we have received an ill impression. For it is no uncommon thing to combat an opinion or vilify an action of the person we dislike, meerly because they are his, without once considering the merits of either.

Wherefore the worst kind of disputing is that which proceeds solely in the spirit of opposition, tending to overthrow but not to establish: for there is scarce any system so bad as not to be better than none at all. He that pulls down his neighbours house does him a diskindness, how inconvenient a dwelling soever it were, unless he furnishes him with a plan and materials for building one more commodious. Let every man by my consent offer whatever he thinks beneficial to the public; we stand obliged to him for his

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his good intentions however ineffectual they may prove, or how much soever we may perceive him mistaken ; provided he does not meddle with the opinions of others until he finds them standing directly athwart his way ; then indeed disputation becomes necessary, but it is never desirable, nor perhaps ever excusable, unless when absolutely necessary.

In order to avoid this disagreeable necessity as long as possible, it seems advisable to begin with building upon ground that nobody claims or that we all possess in common ; I mean, by working upon principles universally agreed to, and gathering all the conclusions they will afford that may be serviceable to the world, and wherein every body may acquiesce without prejudice to his favourite tenets. For there are many inducements to prudence, to honesty,

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ty, to benevolence, to industry, acknowledged by persons of all persuasions ; and if these were improved to the utmost, much good might be done to mankind, both towards advancing their knowledge and regulating their behaviour, before we need touch upon any controversial matters.

This method appears likely to render the benefit of our endeavours more extensive, because being looked upon as a common friend, we shall be heard favourably by all ; nor is it impossible that our interposition may bring the contending parties into better humour with one another, rendering them more candid, more open to conviction, by showing they agree already in many respects themselves were not aware of. If we can trace out a resemblance of each others features in their own, they may consider them as marks of a relation-

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relationship, and abate of that shyness which makes every one averse to whatever comes from a stranger or an alien. Perhaps too it may tend considerably towards shortening disputes ; for as no difference can be voided unless by premisses whereto both sides will assent, the more of these can be collected, the firmer they are established, and the readier they lie at hand, there will remain the less to do afterwards towards determining matters in debate.

Now there is one track^e of ground claimed by none as his peculiar property, namely, so much as lies within the province of reason. Both believer and unbeliever will admit that there are certain truths and certain duties discoverable by our own care and sagacity, that our reason is of some use to us, and that we ought to make the best use of it in our power. This therefore is what I

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purpose to attempt, to try what may be done by the exercise of our reason, either for the advancement of knowledge or guidance of our conduct, without pretending to determine beforehand whether we may furnish ourselves this way with every thing for which we have occasion, without embracing or rejecting what other helps may be afforded us from elsewhere. Since it is allowed on all hands that reason may do something for us, let us avail ourselves of that something she is capable of, be it little or be it much; this surely will not indispose us against receiving further benefits from supernatural assistance, if any such are to be had. Such an attempt cannot justly offend either party: for if reason be sufficient, what can we do better than listen attentively to her voice? and if she be not sufficient, how can this be better

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better evidenced than by putting her upon the trial in order to see what she contains? If we shall find her anywhere at a nonplus, or her stores exhausted and our wants still remaining unsupplied, we shall the more readily recur to supplies afforded from another treasury.

But who is able to ransack all the stores of reason or compute the exact amount of the riches she possesses? For my part I am far from fancying myself equal to the task; nor do I imagine it can be performed by any single person, but must be compleated, if ever, by the successive endeavours of many: and on this very plea I found my justification. For although what can be managed by a few, we choose to entrust only with consummate masters in the business, yet in works requiring numbers to execute them, an indifferent workman may be admitted

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ted to give a helping hand. It is the duty of every one to serve the public in such way for which he is best fitted, how slender soever his ability may be; and this is the only way wherein I have any chance of making myself usefull. I have neither constitution nor talents for active life, neither strength nor fund of spirits for hard study; nor been bred to any profession: but my thoughts have taken a turn from my earliest youth towards searching into the foundations and measures of right and wrong; whatever nature gave me has been cultivated by a carefull education, and improved further by as much application as I could bear the fatigue of; my love of retirement has furnished me with continual leisure, and the exercise of my reason has been my daily employment: the service therefore I am to do must flow from this exercise or not at all.

And

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And it must arise from the exercise not the strength of my reason : I pretend to no sagacity capable of striking out uncommon discoveries, my dependence must rest solely upon my care and vigilance, which keep me constantly upon the watch for such sparks of light as occur from time to time spontaneously : the coldness of my natural temperament inclines me to caution and suspicion, so I do not hastily embrace the most striking ideas until having turned them again and again in my thoughts in order to discern the genuine rays of truth from the flashy meteors of delusion : whatever of the former I can gather, I preserve diligently, laying them by in store against any further use that may be made of them. For I am a kind of miser in knowledge, attentive to every little opportunity of gain: tho' my income be small, I lose nothing of what comes to hand ; all
I can

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I can scrape, I place out at interest, still accumulating the interest upon the principal, as well knowing that this is the only way for one of moderate talents to raise a fortune.

Let not any man expect extraordinary strokes of penetration from me: I shall present him with nothing but what he may have had within his view before; I pretend only to remind him of things that may have slipped his memory or point out to him objects that may have escaped his notice: if I shall offer him anything new, it will be no more than he would have found naturally resulting from things he knows already, had he held them as steadily under contemplation, or placed them together in the same situation as I do. Therefore I do not presume to dictate or impose my notions upon others, nor desire any more regard or attention than one would readily
give

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give to any common person, upon matters wherein he has been constantly conversant from his childhood ; nor even here do I wish my word might be taken any further than shall appear reasonable in the judgement of the hearer.

Many efforts have been made, as well by ancients as moderns, for investigating the principles of reason and establishing a solid structure of morality ; and tho' they have all fallen short of the end proposed, yet have they not entirely failed of success. The foundations indeed have not yet been discovered or laid open to the view and satisfaction of all men : but much of the covering that obscured them has been from time to time removed, and the hollowness of many spots whereon great labour used to be wasted has been made appear. Mr. Locke in particular has contributed not a little to facilitate

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the encrease of knowledge, by pointing out the sources and channels from whence it must be derived, and clearing away that incumbrance of innate ideas, real essences, and such like rubbish, that obstructed the searches of the studious formerly: so that the reasonings of men are become more accurate, more solid, and if one may so say, more reasonable than they were before. I cannot expect to run such lengths as he has done: but if I may advance one little step further in the way that he leads, or suggest a single hint that may be improved by some abler hand for the real benefit of mankind, I shall not think that I have laboured in vain nor lived in vain. Whatever I may be able to do, I stand indebted to Mr. Locke for, having learned from him which way to direct my observation and how to make use of what I observe. I should

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should be proud of being thought to resemble him, not as a copy but an imitation, endeavouring to catch the spirit of my original, and then letting that spirit operate in its own manner. Every one has something in his air and gait peculiar to himself, and if he goes to tread scrupulously in the steps or assume the gestures of another, he will move awkwardly and make very little progress.

But how high a veneration soever I may have for Mr. Locke, it does not rise to an implicit faith, leaving me at liberty to dissent from him in some few instances; and as this happens very seldom, I am not sorry it does happen at all, because it assures me that in other particulars I am not drawn by the influence of a great name but by the force of conviction. In matters of science another may prepare the evidences and

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place them in their proper light and order, but the decision ought always to be a man's own. But I am never better pleased than when a difference, seemingly wide at first, lessens by degrees and at length vanishes upon a nearer inspection and entering more thoroughly into his ideas, because then I find my judgement tallied with his even before I knew of it myself.

And I receive the like proportionable satisfaction upon the like occasion with respect to the opinions of others : for I have so little the spirit of contradiction that I do not willingly disagree with anybody even in points of speculation, but endeavour at all possible means of reconciliation. I have too great a deference for the understandings of others, to believe they ever embrace naked error uncovered by truth : therefore presume the worst set of tenets must
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contain a mixture of something that is right, or else they would not have gained credit. The business then is to separate the sterling from the dross, or rather restore it to its original purity. For however chimerical the transmutation of metals may have proved, there is a transmutation of truth into falsehood: many propositions by expositions, qualifications or restrictions, may be made either true or false: and perhaps most of the impositions upon mankind have been introduced into the world by the perverse use of this art. If then I can transmute a mischievous opinion back again into its primitive innocence, and I have sometimes succeeded beyond expectation, I may lawfully use it as current coin, and reckon it as a part of my stock in knowledge. My door stands open to receive whatever valuable comes in from all quarters,
and

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and as different wares are deemed contraband by different powers, I am forced in defence of my property to fight by turns on opposite sides of the same question, not as a Draw-cansir hewing down both ~~his~~ friend and foe, but as a mediator labouring to reconcile jarring interests. By this practice of joining in alliance with various parties, I take a tincture of those among whom I converse ; so that it will be no wonder if I shall be found hereafter adopting the sentiments or talking in the strain of an enthusiast, a bigot, a visionary, a sensualist, a freethinker, a sceptic ; yet I hope, without inconsistency or wavering of opinion.

Nor can anybody justly take scandal hereat. Those who place all in a freedom of thought, will not surely blame me for giving a latitude to my thoughts and following whithersoever my judgement shall lead me :

I will

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I will not trouble them with anything I shall judge trifling, or of no use, or that has not stood the test of my own examination. If I shall sometimes seem to shake the main pillars of morality as well as religion, it will be only when I conceive them slid off their proper basis upon the loose earth, in order to restore them: in this case it is necessary to undermine the ground whereon they stand, to make room for the levers whereby they may be raised to a bottom where they may remain for ever firm and immovable; nor shall I attempt to remove any until I have found a place fitter for their reception and support. Those who maintain an established form of doctrine can receive no injury from me. For whenever I consort with them, as they may expect from my conformable temper will frequently happen, they will have in me a competent witness

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witness to the reasonableness of their doctrines, against whom no exception can be taken for prejudice or partiality. And if I shall run into extravagances, they may draw an argument from thence to show the danger of trusting to our natural strength alone : for if one who has constantly paid his court to reason, from his childhood, has had a liberal education and continual leisure, and examined every thing with coolness, care and impartiality, yet misses of his aim and bewilders himself in mazes or lies entangled in absurdities ; how can it be expected, that the common herd of mankind, without preparation, without thirst of knowledge, without command of their time, immersed in business, pleasures or passions, and driven forcibly along by the torrent of example, should ever strike out a complete rule of conduct or system of opinion

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opinion, without some better guidance than that of their own sagacity? }

Since then my attempt can draw no ill consequences, and should it do no good will do no hurt, I may proceed without fear or scruple to such exercise of my reason as I am capable of making. But reason cannot work without materials, which must be fetched from nature: and not all nature neither, for the greatest part of her stores lie beyond our reach. Of what stand within our ken, some we discern by immediate intuition, others we gather by inference and long deductions of reasoning. It seems expedient then to begin with the things lying nearest to us, these being the premisses which must help us to investigate others more remote. Now what is nearer to a man than himself, his sensations, thoughts and actions? These therefore I purpose to examine in
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the first place rather than hunt after abstract notions or essences of good or evil ; which can only be discovered, if ever, from a carefull observation of the former. In natural philosophy, the experimental method is now universally preferred before the hypothetic, as the surer and more effectual : the like method may be practised in morality, with this only difference, that here is no occasion to make experiments on purpose ; for every thing we see or hear or feel or do in our ordinary converse and common occurrences of life, are so many experiments whereon to build our conclusions. From hence we may best discover our own nature, as we can best discover the nature of bodies from their operation ; and by diligently observing what we do, how we come to act in such or such manner, together with the consequences and effects of our actions

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actions, we shall be likely to lay the surest measures for our conduct and attain the clearest knowledge of what we ought to do.

Some have supposed with Plato that moral and other qualities have an existence of their own, distinct from that of the substances whereto they belong; that they may be clearly apprehended independently of the subject possessing them; that they are eternal and immutable, whereas all other things fluctuate and vary, changing their forms perpetually: therefore that science must stand firmest which is built upon such an immovable foundation. I shall not stay now to examine the truth of this assertion: it is enough to observe that whatever independent existence may belong to qualities, we can only come to the knowledge of them by the substances wherein they inhere: nature

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exhibits nothing abstracted to our view, the abstract must be learned from the concrete. We should never have known what whiteness was had we not seen something white, nor hardness had we not felt something hard. So neither could we have known what justice or goodness were, had we not seen the actions of men and observed how their sentiments influence their behaviour. Besides, how solid a science soever may be erected on ideal qualities, it rests in speculation only, and contributes nothing to our better accommodation, unless relating to such qualities wherein mankind has some concern; and what are of this kind can only be ascertained by experience and observation.

From these sources therefore we must fetch our materials, and when we have gotten competent store of them, I am so far from being an
enemy

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enemy to abstract reasonings, that I shall pursue them as far as can be desired, keeping an eye all along upon use, and correcting my theory from time to time by a reference to facts. I am rather apprehensive of incurring censure by pursuing them too far, or seeming to have forgotten or lost sight of the main subject proposed: for I may probably spend a great deal of time in metaphysical disquisitions before I mention a word either of morality or religion. But the knowledge of religion and morality arises from the knowledge of ourselves: at least in my own private meditations I have always found, that whenever I have endeavoured to trace them to their first principles, they have led me to consider the nature of the mind. This then we may look upon as the groundwork and foundation; and he that would have a firm superstructure, must allow

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low sufficient time for laying the foundation well. While this is doing we work underground : you see we are very busy, but to what purpose is not so readily visible : nothing appears usefull, nothing convenient, nothing serviceable for the purposes of life. Have but patience until we come above ground, and then perhaps you will see a plan arising that promises something habitable and commodious, and which could not have stood secure without the pains we have been taking underneath. Let it be observed further that-my architecture partakes of the military as well as the civil kind: I am not only to build houses, churches and markets, for the accommodation of life, but fortifications too for repelling the attacks of an invader: and this must be done substantially and began early, for it will be too late to think of making
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ing our outworks after the assailants have opened their trenches.

Perhaps I may enter deeper into metaphysical niceties than I should have deemed requisite or allowable had not others done the like before me; not that the authority of example justifies whatever we can find a precedent for, but the practice of others renders some things indispensable which ^{ere} ~~was~~ needless in themselves. The profession of arms is an honourable, usefull and necessary profession; yet if all the world would agree to live without soldiers, there would be no occasion for soldiers in the world at all: but since neighbouring nations will keep their standing armies, we must do the like or shall lie liable to perpetual insults and invasions. So likewise the common notions of our understanding might sufficiently answer all the purposes we could expect from them,

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would all men agree to follow them attentively: but since we shall meet with persons every now and then who will be drawing us aside from the plain road of common sense into the wilds of abstraction, it is expedient for us to get acquainted with the country beforehand, to examine the turnings and windings of the labyrinth, or else they will mislead and perplex us strangely. We have but one of these two ways to secure ourselves against their artifices: either by resolving never to meddle with any subtilties at all, or by going thro' with them. The same rule holds good here as we find given in poetry, Drink deep or taste not the Castalian spring; for a large draught will often allay the intoxication brought on by a small one. Wherefore your dabblers in metaphysics are the most dangerous creatures breathing: they have just abstraction enough
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to raise doubts that never would have entered into another's head, but not enough to resolve them.

The science of abstruse learning, when compleatly attained, is like Achilles's spear that healed the wounds it had made before; so this knowledge serves to repair the damage itself had occasioned: and this perhaps is all it is good for, it casts no additional light upon the paths of life, but disperses the clouds with which it had overspread them before: it advances not the traveller one step on his journey, but conducts him back again to the spot from whence he had wandered. Thus the land of philosophy contains partly an open champion country, passable by every common understanding, and partly a range of woods, traversable only by the speculative and where they too frequently delight to amuse themselves. Since then we shall be

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obliged

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obliged to make incursions into this latter tract and shall probably find it a region of obscurity, danger and difficulty, it behoves us to use our utmost endeavours for enlightening and smoothing the way before us.

There seems to be no likelier method of answering this purpose than that of Plato, if one could be so happy as to copy him: I mean in his art of illustrating and exemplifying abstruse notions by the most familiar instances taken from common life, though sometimes of the lowest and basest kind. We find him indeed rebuked, particularly in the *Hippias* or dialogue upon beauty, for introducing earthen crocks and pitchers into discourses upon philosophy: and if the plainness of ancient times could not endure such vulgar images, what quarter can we expect for them in this nice and refined age? But when one cannot do as
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one would, one must be content with what one can : I shall pay so much respect to my contemporaries as never to offend their delicacy willingly : therefore shall choose such illustrations as may appear fashionable and courtly as well as clear and luminous, wherever I have the option ; but where I want skill to compass both, shall hope for indulgence if I prefer clearness and aptness before neatness and politeness, and fetch comparisons from the stable or the scullery when none occur suitable to my purpose in the parlour or the drawing room.

With respect to ornament of style, I would neither neglect nor principally pursue it, esteeming solidity of much higher import than elegance, and the latter valuable only as it renders the other more apparent. I pretend to but one quality of the good orator, that of being more anxious for the success of his cause than of

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his own reputation : but having observed that the same matter meets a different reception according to the manner wherein it is conveyed, and that ornaments properly disposed, and not overloaded, make the substance more intelligible and inviting, I am desirous of putting my arguments into the handsomest dress I can furnish, not for the sake of show, but in order to gain them a more ready and more favourable admittance ; with the same view as a surgeon desires to have the finest polish upon his lancets, not for the beauty of the instruments, but that they may enter the easier and pierce the furer.

As for the laying down of my plan, and choice of the methods to be taken in pursuit of it, those of course will be left to my own management, who may be supposed better acquainted with the nature and
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particulars of my design than a stranger. Therefore my reader, if I have any, will please to suspend his judgment upon the several parts until he has taken a view of the whole : and even then I hope will not hastily pronounce every thing superfluous or tedious or too refined, which he finds needless to himself ; for I am to the best of my skill to accommodate every taste, and provide not only for the quick, the reasonable and the easy, but for the dull, the captious and the profound.

There is the better encouragement to try the strength of reason upon the subject of morality, because many judicious persons, Mr. Locke for one, have pronounced it capable of demonstration equally with mathematics : but howmuchsoever morality may be demonstrable in its own nature, the demonstration has hitherto been found impracticable,
being

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being prevented I conceive by one main obstacle Mr. Locke has pointed out, that is, because the ideas and terms belonging to it are more indistinct, unsettled and variable, than those of number or measure. The difference between ninety nine and a hundred is discernible to everybody, and as well known as that between a hundred and a thousand; no man calls that an inch which another calls an ell; nor does the same man sometimes conceive a yard to contain three feet and sometimes four. But the case is far otherwise in the language of ethics: if one receives contrary commands from two persons to each of whom he owes an obligation, who can determine the preference where the obligations bear so near a proportion as ninety nine to a hundred? What this man esteems an honour, the next accounts a disgrace: and if the same person
were

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were asked his idea of virtue, free-will, obligation, justice or favour, 'tis odds but he will vary in his notions at different times, nor ever be able to fix upon a definition himself will always abide by. Since then we see what it is that hinders our moral and metaphysical reasonings from proceeding with the same justness as our mathematical, let us endeavour to remove the impediment by fixing a steady and determinate sense to our terms ; for so far as we can compass this, so near shall we approach towards the certainty of demonstration : and I am persuaded that in cases of the highest importance we may often arrive, if not at mathematical demonstration, yet at a degree of evidence that shall command as full and merit as unre-served an assent.

This persuasion will lead me now
and then to bestow more time than I
could

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could wish upon the signification of words: such disquisitions, I fear, may appear tedious and irksome to many, notwithstanding that no pains in my power shall be spared to make them easy, smooth and palatable; but I hope to find excuse in the absolute necessity of the thing. For without accuracy of language it is impossible to convey a chain of close reasoning to others, or even to be sure of carrying it on unbroken ourselves; because we must always deliver our conceptions by words, and for the most part we think in words, that is, when we would recall an idea to our minds, the word expressive of it generally occurs first to usher it in; but if the word should have shifted its meaning without our perceiving it, as too frequently happens, we shall run a hazard of drawing conclusions without a consequence.

There

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There is not the same danger in mathematics, because the terms there employed are either peculiar to that science, or such as constantly carry the same precise idea upon all common occasions, as relating to objects under cognisance of our senses. But ethics being chiefly, and metaphysics entirely, conversant in ideas of reflection, of which we have greater multitudes than words to express them, we are necessitated to use the same mark for various significations: as in scoring at cards, where the counters stand sometimes for units, sometimes for threes, fives, tens or fifties, according to their position, or according to the game, be it whist, cribbage or piquet. And yet the ideas in our reflection being fleeting and transitory, passing to and fro, present before us this moment, and gone the next, we have no other

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method of fixing them than by annexing them to particular words. Tis true the studious often affect to employ technical terms, hoping thereby to escape the confusion incident to the language of the vulgar: but these being all, either common words restrained to a particular sense, or else derived from words of general currency, partake in some measure of the slippery and changeable quality of their primitives: nor can even the thoughtful always agree with one another, or maintain a consistency with themselves, in the application of their terms.

Wherefore in these sciences philology must go along with philosophy, not as a partner or companion but as an attendant or handmaid. For the knowledge of things is our principal aim, and criticism no further

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ther than shall be found expedient to secure our meditations against confusion, and our discourses against misapprehension. I may think myself entitled to the liberty others have taken of coining new words, or extending, restraining or a little altering, the signification of old ones; but shall never use this liberty so long as I can do without it. I would rather make it my business to distinguish the various senses belonging to words already current, as they stand in different expressions, or are employed upon different occasions: if this could be sufficiently remarked and born in mind, it would prevent mistakes as effectually as if every idea had a particular name appropriated to itself alone.

I shall need great indulgence with respect to the manner of my performance, wherein I fear will be

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found a degree of wildness and deviation from the ordinary rules of composition : I was the less scrupulous in adhering to them during the course of my work, as depending upon a subsequent revision for setting matters to rights, but upon trial I perceive that correction is not my talent : I have made some few additions in the second volume, as of two entire chapters, the first and the XXIVth, the beginning sections in that of the vehicles, the visit to Stahl in the vision, and the six concluding sections of the last chapter ; but for the rest, am forced to give out the first running off with very little alteration. This disappointment falls the lighter, because what amendments I had hoped to make, would have tended only to the better look and appearance of the work, for which I am much less solicitous than for the substance.

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
stance. I do not pretend insensibility to reputation, but my first and principal wish is to be of some little service to my fellow creatures by suggesting some observations which they may improve to their advantage ; and my greatest concern to avoid doing hurt by misleading into notions of dangerous tendency. Under this caution I must warn the reader against judging too hastily upon the last chapter of this volume, for I should be very sorry to have him take his idea of virtue from the very exceptionable figure wherein she is represented there. But he will please to observe that I proceed solely upon the view of human nature without any consideration of Religion or another world, and will expect no compleater edifice than can be erected upon such scanty bottom : and that he may not fit down with
a notion

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a notion of my believing the plan of morality ought to lie upon no other ground, I entreat his attention to the two concluding sections of that chapter; from whence he may augurate that I have a larger scheme in reserve, whereon my building will make a very different appearance from what he sees it here; and possibly^{ly} may be shown in good time that I had my reasons for drawing this imperfect sketch before I proceeded to designs more extensive.

I shall now begin to work upon my foundation, which was proposed to be laid in human nature; and having taken the line and plummet in hand, shall look for directions in the contemplation of the mind, the manner and causes of action, the objects affecting us and their several ways of operation.

H E





THE
LIGHT OF NATURE
PURSUED.

C H A P. I.

FACULTIES OF THE MIND.

WHOEVER considers the frame and constitution of Man, must observe that he consists of two parts, Mind and Body. And this division holds equally good whatever opinion we may entertain concerning the nature of the mind; for be it an immaterial substance, be it a harmony, or be it a certain configuration of corporeal particles, at all events it does not extend to the whole of the human composition. There are several things within us which cannot belong to the mind under any notion we may conceive of it; such as the bones, the muscles, the sinews, the blood, the humours, and even the limbs and organs of sensation, because by losing some of these, we lose nothing of our mind: when an arm is cut off or an eye beat out, tho' the man become less

perfect, the mind remains entire as before; the harmony is not dissolved, the mental compound disunited, or the spiritual substance destroyed.

How variously soever we may think of the mind, every one will readily acknowledge the body to be a very complicated machine, containing muscles, tendons, nerves, organs of motion, organs of sensation, and a multitude of other inferior parts. But with these we have no immediate concern; our purpose being principally to consider the mind, but the body with its members no farther than as they concur with the mind or serve as instruments in the performance of its operations.

2. Now in pursuit of this enquiry we shall find it requisite to distinguish between the faculties of the mind and the faculties of the man, of whom the mind is only a part. For in all compounds there are some properties, belonging to the parts separately, and others, resulting from the composition or joint action, of the united parts. Thus he that should describe the first mover in one of those curious pieces of workmanship made to exhibit various appearances by clockwork, would speak untruly in saying it had the properties of showing the time of the day or year, rising and setting of planets, conce

Chap. I. *Faculties of the Mind.*

beasts after Orpheus, for these are all properties of the machine: the part under consideration has no other property than to gravitate, if it be a weight, or to expand, if it be a spring; and this single quality of gravitation or elasticity produces the various movements above mentioned, according to the several works whereto at different times it is applied.

In like manner we hear of many faculties ascribed to man, such as walking, handling or speaking, hearing, seeing or feeling, which manifestly do not belong to the mind, since it can exercise none of them without aid of the body: we can neither walk without legs, handle without arms, nor speak without a tongue; neither hear without ears, see without eyes, nor touch without fingers. But tho' the mind has some share in the performance of all these actions, yet the faculties it exerts are not so various as the operations it produces: for it is by one and the same faculty of the mind that we walk, handle or speak, and by one and the same faculty that we hear, see or touch; which faculty produces different effects according to the different bodily organs whereto it is applied.

Nevertheless there is this difference observable with respect to the mind itself, that
some occasions, as in walking, hand-

ling, speaking, it affects and acts upon the body; on others, as hearing, seeing, feeling, it is itself affected and acted upon by the body. Hence we reasonably gather that the mind possesses two faculties; one by which we perform whatever we do, and another by which we discern whatever presents itself to our apprehension. The former has usually been stiled the Will, and the latter the Understanding.

3. Faculty is the same as Power, or rather a particular sort of power; being generally appropriated to those powers only which belong to animals. We get our idea of power, says Mr. Locke, from the changes we see made in things by one another: upon seeing gold melted by the fire, we consider a quality in the fire of changing the gold from a solid into a fluid state; and upon seeing wax blanched by the sun, we conceive the sun must have a quality to alter the colour of the wax. But the same quality working upon different subjects does not always produce the like effect, therefore that it ever does appears owing to some quality in the subject whereon it operates: thus if gold melts in the fire, not only the fire must have a quality of melting, but the gold likewise a quality of being melted; if wax blanches in the sun, it is not because the sun possesses a quality of blanching, but

there must be a quality of being blanced in the wax. -The qualities of fire remain the same whether you throw gold or clay into it, yet upon casting in the latter no liquefaction will ensue, solely for want of the quality of being liquified in this latter. These qualities are called Powers in the writings of the studious, and distinguished into two kinds by the epithets of active and passive powers; both of which must concur in producing every alteration that happens, to wit, an active power in the agent to work the change and a passive in the recipient to undergo it.

According to this distinction it will appear that of the two faculties of the mind before spoken of, one is active and the other passive: for on every exertion of our Will, the mind causes some motion, change of situation, or alteration of the subject it acts upon; and in every exercise of our understanding, the mind passes either from a state of insensibility to a state of discernment, or from one kind of discernment to another, as from sights to sounds or tastes or reflections, according to the variety of objects that act upon it.

4. We readily enough conceive ourselves active in the exertions of our Will, but by the our language we seem to the exercises of our unde-
ve generally express them

them by active verbs, such as to discern, to see, to observe, and apply the passives of those very verbs to the objects when we say they are discerned, seen, observed; all which carry an import of something done by ourselves and something suffered by the objects from us. Yet a very little consideration may show us, that in all sensations at least, the objects are agents and ourselves the patients. For what is sight but an impression of things visible upon our eyes and by them conveyed to the mind? what is sound but the percussion of air upon our ears and thence transmitted thro' the like conveyance? In all these cases the sensations are caused by bodies without us, and are such as the respective bodies are fitted to produce: the mind can neither excite nor avoid nor change them in any manner; it can neither see blue in a rose nor hear the sound of a trumpet from a drum, but remains purely passive to take whatever happens to it from external objects. Nor is the case different in hunger and thirst, the pleasant feel of health or uneasiness of distempers, tho' proceeding from internal causes: for nobody can doubt of these sensations being raised by the humours or some parts of our body, which tho' within the man yet lie without the mind, and therefore with respect to that are truly external agents.

5. Thus

5. Thus it appears evidently that we are passive in sensation of every kind: but the matter is not quite so plain in the business of reflexion, which the mind seems to carry on entirely upon its own fund without aid of the body, without intervention of the senses or impression of any thing external, acting solely and immediately in and upon itself.

Yet supposing the mind acts in this manner, it does not prove the understanding to be active herein, it proves only that the mind is both agent and patient at once. As a man who after holding his right hand to the fire claps it upon his left, altho' active in the motion of one hand, is nevertheless passive in feeling warmth with the other: for whatever power he may have to move his hands, it would signify nothing if he had no feeling. So admitting that the mind furnishes its own thoughts in and from itself, altho' it acts in producing the thoughts, nevertheless is it passive in discerning them when produced: for whatever power it may have to generate reflections, all will avail nothing without a power of discernment.

But we may justly question whether the supposition above made be true in fact, whether the same thing ever does act wholly and solely upon itself, or whether the notion of action does not require two substances,

one to act and the other to be acted upon. I know we are often said to perform actions upon ourselves, as when Cato slew himself at Utica; but he did it with a sword, therefore his action was exerted upon that, and he was passive in receiving the wound made by the sword. And if a mother upon the loss of her child beats her breast in despair, neither is this an acting of one thing upon itself altho' she uses no instrument; for every compound is one in imagination only, in nature and reality it is as many things as the component parts it contains: because the hand which strikes and the breast which suffers are parts of the same woman, therefore we may say she beats herself, but consider them separately and the hand will appear as individually and numerically distinct from the breast as if they had belonged to different persons. And if we transfer our expression from the whole to the parts, we shall find ourselves obliged to change the form of it: for tho' we may say the woman beats herself, we cannot say the same either of the hand or the breast. In short it seems to me difficult to frame a conception of any one individual thing acting immediately and directly upon itself, or without some instrument or medium intervening between the power exerted and effect produced thereby.

6. But

6. But this abstruse reasoning from the nature and essence of action may not satisfy every body, as it may be not understood by some and not agreed to by others; the conceptions of men, in their abstract notions especially, being widely different. Let us therefore consider what passes in our minds in the work of reflection, in order to try whether we can gather any lights towards determining the question from experience. And this will furnish us with numberless instances wherein reflections intrude upon the mind whether we will or no: a recent loss, a cruel disappointment, a sore vexation, an approaching enjoyment, a strong inclination, an unexpected success, often force themselves upon our thoughts against our utmost endeavours to keep them out. Upon all these occasions the mind shows evident marks of passiveness, the Will wherein its activity lies being strongly set a contrary way: it suffers violence and that violence must be offered by something else, for it cannot be suspected here of acting upon itself, the action produced being directly opposite to that it would have, and the state whereinto it is thrown the very reverse of what it wishes: when it wishes content, it is overwhelmed with anxiety and disquiet like a torrent, and when it would rest in calmness, passion, expectation and impatience, rush upon it like an armed giant.

7. The

7. The same experience testifies of other reflections coming upon us without tho' not against our Will. How many fancies, conceits, transactions, observations, and I may say, arguments, criticisms and measures of conduct, shoot into our thoughts without our seeking? If we go abroad on one errand, another suddenly occurs; visiting such a friend, buying such a trifle, seeing such a sight that lies opportunely in our way. When a man coming off from a journey throws himself carelessly into an easy chair and being desirous of nothing but rest falls into a reverie, what a variety of objects pass muster in his imagination! The prospects upon the road, occurrences happening to him, his acquaintance at home, their faces, characters, conversations, histories, what he has seen, what he has done, what he has thought on during his journey or at other times. His mind remaining all the while half asleep, for tho' the understanding wakes, the Will in a manner dozes, without preference of one thing before another, without attention to any particular part of the scene, but suffering all to come and go as it happens. Can this indolent posture be said to be a manner of acting when it does not act at all? It is a manner of being produced, while the mind is in a state of

the act of some other agent extrinsic to the mind and individually distinct from it.

8. Let us now consider voluntary reflection, such as recollecting, studying, meditating, reasoning, deliberating and the like, wherein the mind from time to time calls up the thoughts it wants, and is if ever both agent and patient in the same act. Yet even here, if we examine the matter closely, we shall find that the mind does not call up all our thoughts directly by its own immediate command, but seizes on some clue whereby it draws in all the rest. In meditation, tho' we choose our subject we do not choose the reflections from time to time occurring thereupon. In reasoning we seek after some conclusion which we cannot obtain without help of the premises: or hit upon some discovery, a stranger to our thoughts before, and therefore not under our obedience. Deliberation and investigation are like the hunting of a hound, he moves and sniffs about by his own activity, but the scent he finds is not laid nor the trail he follows drawn by himself. The mind only begins a train of thinking or keeps it in one particular track, but the thoughts introduce one another successively. I believe few persons, how-
ed soever with Virgil, can re-
line of his Eneis without
be-

beginning with the first: we see here the second line brought to our remembrance, not by the mind, but by the first line, which therefore must be deemed a distinct agent or instrument employed by the mind in bringing the second to our memory. Whoever will carefully observe what he does when he sets himself down to study, may perceive that he produces none of the thoughts passing in his mind, not even that which he uses as the clue to bring in all the others: he first withdraws his attention from sensible objects; nor does he then instantly enter upon his work; some little time must be given for reflection to begin its play, which presently suggests the purpose of his enquiries to his remembrance and some methods of attaining it; that which appears most likely to succeed he fixes his contemplation upon and follows whithersoever that shall lead, or checks his thoughts from time to time when he perceives them going astray, or stops their course if he finds it ineffectual, and watches for its falling into some new train: for imagination will be always at work, and if restrained from roving in all that variety of fallies it would make of its own accord, it will strike into any passages remaining open. Therefore we may compare our student to a man who has a river running through his grounds
which

which divides into a multitude of channels: if he damms up all the rest, the stream will flow in the one he leaves open; if he finds it breaking out into side branches, he can keep it within bounds by stopping up the outlets; if he perceives the course it takes ineffectual for his purpose, he can throw a mound across and let it overflow at any gap he judges convenient. The water runs by its own strength without any impulse from the man, and whatever he does to it, will find a vent some where or other: he may turn, alter or direct its motion, but neither gave nor can take it away. So it is with our thoughts, which are perpetually working so long as we wake, and sometimes longer, beyond our power to restrain: we may controul them, divert them into different courses, conduct them this way or that as we deem requisite, but can never totally prevent them from moving. Which shows they have a motion of their own independent of the mind, and which they do not derive from its action nor will lay aside upon its command.

9. We may remark further that the mind cannot always call up those thoughts which for the most part lie ready to appear at our summons. How often do we endeavour in vain to recollect a name, a transaction, a circumstance, we know extremely well? How often

often do we try to study without effect, to deliberate with various success, and perplex ourselves with difficulties we have heretofore made nothing of? Sometimes we find ourselves totally incapable of application to any thing; sometimes unapt for one kind of exercise but ready at another: mathematics, ethics, history, poetry, business, amusements, have their several seasons wherein the thoughts run more easily into each of them than any other way. Which affords a strong presumption that the mind employs some instrument, which when at ^{not} ~~not~~ hand or unfit for service, it cannot work at all or not pursue the train of thought it attempts.

The more narrowly we examine our procedure in all exercises of the understanding, the more firmly we shall be persuaded that the mind uses a medium by whose ministry it obtains what it wants. Both in sensation and reflection of our own procuring, the mind acts upon the medium and that again acts upon the mind: for as in reading we only open the book, but the page presents the words contained in it to our sight; so in thinking we set our imaginations to work which exhibits appearances to our discernment.

10. If we go about to examine what those mediums are, and how necessary to the mind, it will prefer

in our imagination are to be ranked among the mediums: and it may be worth while to bestow a little consideration upon these ideas.

We use idea sometimes for the very discernment the mind has of some object on thought passing in review before it, and sometimes more properly for the thing or appearance so discerned. It is obvious that when I speak of ideas as mediums I must understand them in the latter sense; not as effects produced in the understanding, but as causes immediately producing them.

Idea is the same as image, and the term imagination implies a receptacle of images: but image being appropriated by common use to visible objects could not well be extended to other things without confusion; wherefore learned men have imported the Greek word idea signifying image or appearance, to which, being their own peculiar property, they might affix as large a signification as they pleased. For the image of a sound or of goodness would have offended our delicacy, but the idea of either goes down glibly: therefore idea is the same with respect to things in general as image with respect to objects of vision.

to render the notion of ideas
begin with images. When a
his tail in our sight we have

a full view of the creature with all his gaudy plumage before us : the bird remains at some distance, but the light reflected from him paints an image upon our eyes, and the optic nerves transmit it to the sensory. This image, when arrived at the ends of the nerves, becomes an idea and gives us our discernment of the animal; and after the bird is gone out of view, we can recall the idea of him to perform the same office as before, tho' in a duller and fainter manner. So when the nightingale warbles, the sound reaches our ears, and passing thro' the auditory nerves, exhibits an idea affecting us with the discernment of her music : and after she has given over singing, the same idea may recur to our remembrance or be raised again by us at pleasure. In like manner our other senses convey ideas of their respective kinds, which recur again to our view long after the objects first exciting them have been removed.

These ideas having entered the mind, intermingle, unite, separate, throw themselves into various combinations and postures, and thereby generate new ideas of reflection strictly so called, such as those of comparing, dividing, distinguishing, of abstraction, relation, with many others : all which remain with us as ²stock for our
¹ture occasion

11. Here perhaps I shall be put in mind that I have before supposed two substances necessarily ^{con}curring in every action, one to act and the other to be acted upon; and thereupon asked whether I conceive ideas to be substances. To which I answer, No: but as such answer will seem to imply a contradiction, the only agents in the business of reflection being ideas which nevertheless are not substances, I shall be called upon to reconcile it.

For which purpose I shall have recourse again to the image employed before. When we look upon a peacock, what is that image conveyed to us considered in the several stages thro' which it passes? Not any thing brought away by the light from the bird and thrown in upon us thro' our organs, but a certain disposition of the rays striking upon our eyes, a certain configuration of parts arising in our retina, or a certain motion excited thereby in our optic nerves: which disposition, configuration and motion, are not substances but accidents in ancient dialect, or modifications according to modern philosophers. But accident or modification cannot exist by itself, it must have some substance to inhere in or belong to, which substance is indeed the agent occasions. Nevertheless we connect the action to the modification,
C because

because what kind it shall be of depends entirely upon that: for the same rays, the same retina, the same nerves differently modified by the impulse of external objects, might have served to convey the image of an owl or a bear or any other animal to our discernment. Therefore that last substance, whatever it be, which immediately gives us the sensation, is the agent acting upon our mind in all cases of vision: and in like manner that something so or so modified which presents to our discernment, is the agent in all cases of mental reflection, which modification we call our idea: but because we know nothing more of the substance than the operation it performs, therefore if we would speak to be understood we can say no otherwise than that the idea is the thing we discern.

What those substances are whereof our ideas are the modification, whether parts of the mind as the members are of our body, or contained in it like wafers in a box, or enveloped by it like fish in water, as many expressions current in use might lead us to imagine, whether of a spiritual, corporeal or middle nature between both, I need not now ascertain; nor indeed can I until the sequel of our enquiries in the progress of this work shall by degrees have brought us better acquainted with some particulars relating to them.

them. All I mean at present to lay down is this. That in every exercise of the understanding, that which discerns is numerically and substantially distinct from that which is discerned: and that an act of understanding is not so much our own proper act as the act of something else operating upon us.

12. After all that has been said I think we may look upon the passivity of the understanding as fully established. But active power alone, says Mr. Locke, is properly power: and however men of thought and reading may suppose two powers necessary to effect every alteration, an active in the agent to work the change and a passive in the recipient to undergo it; men of common apprehensions cannot find this power in the latter. If they see one man beat another, they readily enough discern a power in him that beats, but they cannot so easily conceive the others defeat owing to his power of being beaten, which they rather look upon as weakness and defect of power. So when they see gold melt in the fire, they ascribe the melting to an inability in the gold to resist the force of fire, as stone or clay or other fixed bodies might do, which have a stronger power to hold their parts together.

If Faculty be derived from Facility it implies active power, and that in the highest degree; for if I with much ado can heave up a

huge folio upon an upper shelf, my servant who can toss it up with facility must have a much greater degree of strength: and probably this term was pitched upon to denote the surprizing agility and readiness shown by the mind upon most occasions as well of acting as discerning. The term Faculty I believe has been generally applied by most men to the understanding, nor do I wonder it should, because we do not minutely consider the progress of action nor the stages thro' which it passes: therefore when we observe the same action beginning and ending in the same thing, and do not take notice of any medium or instrument employed to carry it on, we naturally conceive the same thing acting upon itself. But there is a distinction between an immediate and a remote effect: I never denied that the mind acts upon itself remotely, I know it does so very frequently both in producing sensation and reflection. For what is reading, hearkening, singing, tasting a sweetmeat, warming our hands at the fire, but sensations excited in the mind from something done by itself? When we read, the opening the book, turning to the proper page, running our eyes along the lines, and fixing our attention thereupon, are our own acts; and the sight of the words and sense of the author conveyed thereby are of our own discernment.

cernment. When we study it is we ourselves who put our imagination into a posture for thinking, and the reflections, determination or discovery, resulting therefrom are effects produced in ourselves.

Besides that the measure of our understandings gives scope to the range of our wills; men of duller apprehension cannot perform many things which those of quicker apprehensions can: perhaps the difference really lies in the instruments we have to use, but is commonly supposed in the mind itself. Therefore the extent of our active powers depending upon the sensibility of our understanding, this is deemed a part of them and denominated by the same appellation; for being found to have a share in the performance of our actions because they could not be performed without it, it lays claim to the title of an active power.

Thus we see the mind invested according to common conception with two powers; but in philosophical strictness and in propriety of speech, if we may take Mr. Locke's judgment of that propriety, it has only one power, namely the Will, and one capacity, namely the understanding. Yet as I find them both sometimes termed powers, as well by Mr. Locke as by other writers upon this subject, I shall comply with the prevailing custom,

and make no scruple to speak of our passive power and acts of the understanding, as I see no inconvenience therein ; having already declared my opinion that they are truly passions of the mind and acts of something else.

13. But I cannot be quite so complaisant with respect to the names given the faculties, as I apprehend great mischiefs arising therefrom ; for being terms of common currency we shall find it very difficult, perhaps impossible, at all times to disjoin them from the sense generally affixed to them by custom : which frequently ascribes acts that do not belong to them, or acts of one to the other, or complicated acts wherein both concur jointly to either singly. By which means we shall run a great hazard of perplexing ourselves and talking unintelligibly to others ; or what is worse, of making syllogisms with four terms and thereby leading both into mistakes.

Observe how men express themselves as well in their serious discourses as in their ordinary conversation, and you will see them appropriating the term understanding to that knowledge, skill or judgment, resulting from experience in particular things : as when they talk of understanding such a language, of a divine understanding the scriptures, yer the statutes, a painter.

man the different goodness of corn in a market. If any one asks, Sir, do you understand this paragraph in a book, he does not mean Can you read it, but Do you know the sense of it? if he ask whether you understand the bell, he does not enquire whether you hear it, but whether it rings to breakfast or chappel. Whereas seeing the letters of a paragraph and hearing the sound of a bell are acts of the faculty as much as understanding the drift of them: and the same objects convey their sensations to the novice, if his senses be perfect; as fully though not so usefully as to the man of skill. When we improve or enlarge our understanding by learning, we do nothing to our faculty, for that we must take as nature gave it us; nor can any application encrease or diminish our natural talents, we can only lay in a larger stock of materials for them to work upon. Like a man who cuts down a wood to extend his prospect, he does nothing to his eyes nor encreases their power of vision, but only opens a larger field for them to expatiate in.

So what we call exercises of our understanding are in reality exercises of our reason, not the single act of either, but the joint work of both faculties; such as reading, composing,
 ting, contriving and the like, wherein
 employs both her powers and certain

instruments besides in a series of actions tending to some end proposed. Whereas every notice of our senses, every wild imagination, every start of fancy, every transient object or thought exercises our faculty. What need divines and philosophers exhort us perpetually to use our understandings? Their admonitions were superfluous if they meant the faculty, for this we use without ceasing while awake, nor can we choose but do so. The little master playing at pushpin uses his faculty, for that discovers to him the situation of the pins and thereby directs his fingers how to shove one across another. When Miss Gawky lolls out at window for hours together to see what passes in the street, she uses her faculty all the while; for by that she discerns the coaches going by, a woman wheeling potatoes in a barrow, or a butcher's prentice with a dog carrying his empty tray before him. How oddly would it sound to say this pretty trifler makes as much use of her understanding as the laborious patriot, who spends his time and himself in contriving schemes for the public good? Yet we cannot deny her this honour if we speak of the faculty, for both equally furnish that with constant employment. How sh ~~the mind is not a machine~~ sions, A man has lost his

ideot or madman, if he can see and hear and remember and fancy, possesses the faculty of discerning objects in such manner as his senses convey them or his imagination represents them.

14. So likewise the term Will in common acceptation stands for something very different from our active power, as appears evidently by our frequently talking of doing things unwillingly or against our Wills: for the mind has one only active power whereby it brings to pass whatever it performs, nor is it possible to do any one thing without exerting that; therefore it would be highly absurd to talk of acting without or against our Will in this sense. But by acting against our Will we mean against the liking, against the grain, against the inclination, which being observed to set us commonly at work, for we do most of our actions because we like them, hence the cause is mistaken for the effect, and the liking gets the name of the power operating to attain it: and if we find inclination drawing one way and obligation or some cogent necessity driving another, our compliance with the latter we call acting against our Will.

If we view this compliance separately in its own light, this also appears to us an act of

1. Suppose a girl living with some re-
whom she has large expectations,
invited

invited to a ball which she would go to with all her heart but the old lady thinks it improper ; therefore she stays at home and says she does it solely against her Will. Ask her whether any body could have hindered if she had resolved positively upon going. No, says she, but to be sure I would not go when I knew it must have disobliged my aunt : I should have been a great fool if I had. You see here by saying I would not go, she looks upon the staying at home as an act of her Will, and thus the Will appears to act against itself ; which were impossible if Will stood for the same thing in both sentences. This leads us to another sense of the word wherein it signifies a dictate of prudence, a judgment or decision of the understanding, whose office it is, not that of the Will, to discern the expedience and propriety of measures proposed for our conduct. But because our judgment many times influences our actions, and perhaps we flatter ourselves it does so always, therefore we denominate it our Will, by a like mistake of the cause for the power working the effect.

Do not we frequently join Will and pleasure together as synonymous terms ? Now not to insist that pleasure is no action but a feeling of the mind, we use this expression upon occasions wherein it can power. It

that the parliament should assemble: what has this to do with the faculty of the King? the members must come by their own activity, they derive no motion nor power of motion from the crown. Oh! but the King must do some act whereby to signify his pleasure, or they will not know what to do in obedience thereto. Who doubts it? But when we speak of Will and pleasure we do not understand the act of declaring, nor any power exerted to perform it, but the thing so declared; and what is that but the royal judgment that such assembling will be for his service.

When we are called upon to curb, to restrain, to deny our Wills, what are we to understand by these exhortations? or how shall we go about to practise them? Why by resolving strongly not to let our Will have its bent. But is it in our power to resolve? Yes, you may pluck up a resolution if you will take pains. This Will then whereby we form the resolution must be different from that we controul: which carries an appearance of two Wills, one counteracting the other. Hence Man has been often represented as containing two persons within him: the old man and the new, the flesh and the spirit, reason and passion, the intellectual and sensitive soul, a rioter and pair of horses; each having its own, perpetually thwarting, contending

contending and struggling with each other, sometimes one getting the direction of our actions and sometimes the other. Nevertheless when we reflect that these actions are all of our own performance, we are at a nonplus to determine which of these Wills is our own, and which of these persons ourselves.

15. To get rid of the ambiguity clinging to vulgar terms, the words Volition and Velleity have been coined, and applied, one to that Will which gets the mastery and the other to that controuled thereby. Thus the young lady who excused herself from the invitation had a velleity to go but a volition to stay away. But velleity can scarce be called a power, for a power which never operates is no power at all: Velleity gives birth to none of our motions, it may strive and struggle a little but volition always carries the day. Our actions constantly follow our volition, such as that is such are they, and what action of those in our power we shall perform depends solely thereupon. Yet neither can we deem volition the same as power, since the one may be where the other is not: a man who sits still may have the power to walk, but he has not the volition and that is the only reason why he does not walk. Again, or — as Mr. Locke has shown, are in their compa

volition, it produces nothing but a total indolence, nor does volition come until the mind exerts itself upon something. Therefore volition is not so much a power as the turn or direction of our power upon particular occasions : just as the turn of the wind is not a power, but only the direction the wind takes at any time. Yet the clouds constantly follow the turn of the wind, such as that is such are their courses, and it depends solely thereupon to determine whether they shall travel to the east or to the west, to the north or to the south : nevertheless nobody can think the turn of the wind is the force or power by which the wind carries the clouds along.

16. Nor does there want room to believe that the double fence of the word understanding has given rise to many disputes, Whether the Will always follows the last act of the understanding or no. For observing that we are generally prompted to action by something we discern pleasant or expedient, and being taught to look upon every discernment as an exertion of the understanding faculty, we conceive our motions governed by our understanding. Then again finding that common the standard of language, has approached to knowledge, judgment the result of thought or experience

rience from which we too frequently and notoriously swerve in our conduct, we bewilder ourselves in mazes without ever coming to an issue. And when we canvass the point with one another, whichever side of the question we take, it will be easy for an antagonist to produce expressions from authors or persons of undoubted credit proving the contrary. Nor shall we be able to satisfy our opponent or ourselves, because we cannot settle what is properly an act of the understanding, and whether it be the same with an act of the faculty.

Mr. Locke complains of the faculties being spoken of and represented as so many distinct agents: not that I suppose any body ever seriously believed them such, but by talking frequently of the understanding discerning, judging, representing things to the mind or determining the Will, and of the Will obeying or disobeying the understanding, or directing our active powers, we slide insensibly into an imagination or temporary persuasion of their being agents and proceed in our reasonings upon that supposition, which must necessarily many times mislead and confound us. But neither he nor I can descry any other agent in the mind besides the mind itself: nor can I distinguish any more than two stems of action of the mind, the discerning

be done, and the doing it ; or any more than three substances concerned in the whole process, the object, the mind, and the subject whereton it operates. Thus when upon seeing an orange tossed at your head, you instantly hold up your hand to save your face : the orange is the object, the mind is the discernor and sole actor upon your hand, which is the subject. Or more accurately, the further end of the optic nerve, or that other substance, if any such there be, whereof the idea of the orange is the modification, we call the object ; and that inner end of some nerve or other nearer substance employed by the mind in moving the arm, is the subject.

17. Perhaps I may be thought too nice in the last part of this explanation, but there are folks who push their refinements a bar's length beyond me, and draw out the process of action much farther than I can pretend to. For besides our active power, they in their great bounty give us an elective power too, without which the former cannot wag a finger ; and according to their way of discoursing, the matter seems to stand thus. Understanding and passion, like two council, plead their causes on opposite sides, while the Will, an arbitrary monarch, sits umpire between them, and by virtue of its prerogative or elective power gives the preference to either as it pleases
without

without regard to the weight of their arguments, or creates a new preference not suggested by either: this being done the bill goes to the understanding, which discerning the preference so given, pronounces it Good and adds the sanction of its judgement thereto: then it returns back to the volition where it receives the royal assent, and is from thence transmitted to the active powers as officers of government in order to be carried into immediate execution.

Wherefore in hopes of escaping all these perplexities, I shall crave leave to call the faculties by other names, to wit, the active power, or simply power, activity or energy of the mind, and the passive power, perceptivity or discernment: for I think these cannot be mistaken for agents having powers of their own, nor for instruments distinct from the mind and employed by it in the performance of its works. Nevertheless as one is never more easily understood than when using the language current in vogue, I shall not totally discard the old terms Understanding, Will and Volition, nor scruple applying them to the faculties as often as I can do it safely, and when the occasion introducing or context accompanying them shall ascertain their meaning beyond all danger of misapprehension.

C H A P.

C H A P. II.

A C T I O N.

I Have heard of a formal old gentleman who, finding his horse uneasy under the saddle, alighted and called to his servant in the following manner. Tom, take off the saddle which is upon my bay horse and lay it upon the ground, then take the saddle from thy grey horse and put it upon my bay horse, lastly put the other saddle upon thy grey horse. The fellow gaped all ~~this~~ while at this long preachment and at last cried out, Lack-a-day, Sir, could not you have said at once, Change the saddles? We see here how many actions are comprized under those three little words Change the saddles, and yet the master, for all his exactness, did not particularize the tenth part of them; lifting up the flap of the saddle, pulling the strap, raising the tongue, drawing out the buckle, taking up the saddle, pulling it towards him, stooping to lay it down, lifting up his body again, and so forth. But had he staid to enumerate all the steps his man must take in executing his orders, they would not have got home by dinner time. Therefore expedience recommends compendious forms

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of

of speech for common use, and puts us often upon expressing a long course of action by a single word, else we could make no dispatch in our discourses with one another: for were we to describe all the motions we make in any business transacted, we must spend more time in the narrative than we did in the performance.

But our horseman, tho' by far too minute and circumstantial for the fine gentleman, was not enough so for the philosopher. Whoever would penetrate into the nature of things, must not take them in the lump, but examine their several parts and operations separately. The anatomist when he would teach you the structure of the human body, does not content himself with telling you it has head, limbs, body and bowels, for this you knew before and was knowledge enough for common occasions: he lays open the muscles, injects the veins, traces the nerves, examines the glands, their strainers, vessels and tunics. And the naturalist goes further, he describes the little bladders whereof every fibre consists, their communication with one another, the nitro-aerious fluid pervading them, distending their coats, thereby shortening the string and producing muscular motion.

Thus

Thus to become intimately acquainted with our mind we must, as I may say, dissect it, that is, analyze action into its first constituent parts. The action of the Drama or Epopee, the critics say must be one and entire, or the performance will prove defective. To that of a play they allow the compass of a natural day; that of the Iliad takes in I think twenty nine days, and that of the Eneid six years. We may look upon actions of this enormous bulk till we are tired without learning any thing from thence concerning the structure of the mind: let us therefore consider what is truly and properly a single action, and try how far that will help us in our researches.

2. A single action I take to be so much as we can perform at once, for the present moment only lies in our power nor does our activity reach any farther. What our future actions shall be, depends upon our future volitions; we may determine and resolve long before hand, but it is well known our resolutions frequently change, and when the time of execution comes, we shall do what is then in our minds, not what we had there before, if the two happen to differ.

I will not pretend to calculate how many actions we may perform in any given space of time, as some have computed how many particles of air would lie in an inch; but cer-

tainly the motions of our mind are extremely quick. When upon finding yourself thirsty in a sultry day you snatch up a cup of liquor, if after you have gotten it half way up, you espy a wasp floating on the surface, you thrust it instantly from you ; which shows that one volition is not sufficient to lift your hand to your mouth, for you see the mind may take a contrary turn in that little interval. How nimble are the motions of the fencer and the tennis player ! the hand perpetually follows the eye and moves as fast as the objects can strike upon that : but between every impulse of the object and every motion of the hand, an entire perception and volition must intervene. How readily do our words occur to us in discourse, and as readily find utterance at the tongue the moment they present themselves ! The tongue does not move mechanically like a clock which once wound up will go for a month, but receives every motion and forms every modulation of voice by particular direction from the mind. Objects and ideas rise continually in view, they pass without ceasing before us, vary, appear and vanish : for what is so quick as thought ? Yet volition keeps pace with perception and sometimes perhaps out-strips it: for in speaking the word MIND the whole idea seems to present in one perception, but there must be
four

four several volitions to guide the tongue successively in pronouncing the four different letters. Not that volition runs more ground than perception but follows close with unequal steps, like young *Julus* after his father : for when you read you see the whole word together, and consequently the *D* before you pronounce the *M*.

3. In very nice works we lie under a necessity of spinning very fine, but though we are obliged sometimes to split the hair we need not quarter it. Therefore I shall call one action so much as passes between each perception and the next, although this action produce several cotemporary motions. And any body may see with half an eye that our larger actions, such as we speak of in common conversation, consist of those under actions : for as days, months, years and all measurable portions of time are made up of moments, so all our performances and transactions are made up of momentary acts. A walk consists of steps, a game at chess of moves, a description of particulars, a narration of circumstances, and discourse in general, whether serious or trifling, laboured or careless, of words and syllables, each whereof must have its distinct volition to give it effect.

Nor does there need much penetration to observe how sociably the two faculties lead

one another as I may say hand in hand, not only in entering upon our works but through all the steps necessary to compleat them. If you would walk to any place, it is not enough to use your understanding before you set out in choosing the nearest or most commodious way, but you must use your eyes all along to conduct your steps: for should you shut them a moment, you might chance to run against a post or tread beside the path. If you are to discourse on any subject, when you have chosen your matter and settled your form, the business is not all done; you must consult your judgment from time to time during the delivery for proper expressions and proper tones of voice. Even your perpetual gabblers, who let their tongues run before their wits, cannot proceed with one faculty alone, for though they talk without thinking, they do not talk without perceiving: their ideas draw through their imagination in a string, though it proves indeed only a rope of sand without pertinence and without coherence.

4. But these single acts, though confined to a moment of time, may contain several co-existent parts. For we make many motions together by one and the same exertion of our activity: we may reach out our hands, step with our feet, look with our eyes, speak and think at once. And the like may be said of

perception, for we can see, hear, feel, discern, remember, all at the same instant. I know not whether I may have occasion hereafter to consider the parts of action, but for the present I stick to my definition before laid down, terming the whole scene of ideas presented together to our view one perception, and the whole exertion of our activity, upon how many subjects soever operating, one volition, which though without duration may have a large scope: just as your mathematical surfaces which, though void of thickness, may extend to a very spacious circumference.

The not observing the shortness of action, has given occasion I believe to the notion mentioned at the end of the last chapter concerning distinct agents and various powers in the mind: for by help of this clue we may unravel the mystery, and discover that what was esteemed the act of several agents, was indeed successive acts of the mind exerting her two faculties at different times. When several ideas present together, the mind cannot always judge immediately between them, for their colours change for a while, fading and glowing alternately, or the scales of judgment and inclination rise and fall by turns: the mind being sensible of this, sees nothing better than to hold them in her attention until the colours settle or the balance fixes; as

soon as that happens she perceives which of them is the stronger, and this some people fancy done by an elective power, wherewith the Will gives a preference of its own, because the preference follows in consequence of a voluntary attention. Or perhaps a new colour sparkles out unperceived before, or a new weight falls into the scale: and this they call creating a preference. When the preference becomes visible, the mind instantly discerns it, and pronounces the object good whereon it alights; and having now no further use for contemplation, she looks out for proper measures of execution, which as soon as they occur she puts immediately in practise.

5. Nor will it be useless to take notice that in common speech we confine action to outward motions and exercises of our bodily powers: as when we distinguish between an active and a sedentary life, between seasons of action and seasons of deliberation: which expressions look as if we thought ourselves totally inactive of the latter, and so indeed we naturally may at first-sight because we can show no effects of our activity. But every volition produces some effect altho' not always discernible; and every production of our own, be it of a fleeting thought or a permanent work, springs from ^{some} ~~our~~ volition. If a man retires from business into his closet, we cannot necessarily con-

conclude he does nothing there ; for whatever indolent posture he may throw his body into, his mind may find constant employment all the while. Now the mind has only one active power to serve her upon all occasions : therefore acting and thinking are the same with respect to the power enabling us to go thro' them ; they differ only in the subjects operated upon. When the mind withdraws from the world, she may roam about her own habitation : when she ceases to act upon the limbs, she may nevertheless act upon herself, that is, raise ideas to pass in review before her.

6. There is another division of action I find made by Mr. Locke into action properly so called, and forbearance, which latter he seems to think requires the interposition of the Will as much as the former : thus if a man asks his friend to take a walk, it is equally an exertion of his Will whether he refuses or accepts the offer. But I cannot readily understand how a meer forbearance to act is any exercise of our active power at all : it seems to me rather a discernment of the other faculty that we do not like the thing proposed, which discernment or dislike we have seen before is frequently taken for our Will. What we call a forbearance I apprehend to be generally a choice of some other action. We will not
walk.

walk because we had rather ride or talk or think or do something else : we forbear to act because we would consider first what is proper to be done ; or we forbear to deliberate any longer because the time of action is at hand. When we make several motions together we may forbear one and continue the rest, for while walking and discoursing with a companion we may point at some distant object, which after he has seen we may let our hand fall to our side : but this I do not look upon as any volition of ours, it is rather a ceasing of volition with respect to the arm, which falls down by its ^{own} gravity not by our power, and would do the same were we at that instant utterly to lose our active faculty. Nevertheless it must be owned that forbearance is sometimes the sole point we set our minds upon and take pains to effect. When Rich fits as an equestrian statue in one of his pantomimes, we take him for the very marble he represents, for he moves neither head nor body nor limbs, he wags neither eye nor finger, but continues wholly inactive ; what he thinks of all the while, whether of the audience or profits of the house neither you nor I can tell, but if any such thoughts rove in his fancy their rovings are accidental, his mind being intent on nothing else but forbearance from all manner of motion. We
can-

cannot deny this attention to be an effort of the mind, but then it is not a forbearance, it is an actual watching of the ideas as they rise and excluding such as would prompt him to motion. Perhaps his face itches or the stir-rop presses against his ankle and he wants to relieve himself, but checks those desires as fast as they start up, and if by this care he can avoid every volition to move, his purpose is answered without any thing further to be done. For our limbs do not move of themselves nor unless we will to move them : therefore that they remain motionless is not owing to volition, but to the absence of volition.

Should we think the limbs do not move because we will Not to move them, this would be sliding back into the vulgar sense of the word Will, wherein it stands for inclination or judgement : for a Will not to move is an act of the other faculty, being no more than a dislike to motion or a discernment of its impropriety, which produces no volition nor exertion of our activity at all upon the object so discerned.

7. Some immoveable postures we keep ourselves in by a continual effort of the mind. If our statue holds up a truncheon in the right hand, he must keep his arm in that position by his own strength : but this cannot in any light be deemed a forbearance, for if he forbears

bears to exert himself but for a moment, the arm will fall downwards by its own weight.

If there is any such thing as a total forbearance of action, I conceive it must be in reverie after a fatigue, or when we lie down in order to sleep. Ideas run to and fro in our fancy uncalled, without attention, without preference or rejection of any thing occurring, and the mind seems to remain entirely passive. But since whatever passes does not proceed from volition, where shall we find marks of any volition at all? Were we to suppose the mind utterly divested of her active power just at her entrance upon the scene, I do not see how any thing could fall out otherwise than it does.

8. But we very rarely find a necessity of considering action so minutely as to distinguish the restraining those workings of imagination, which would excite us inadvertently to motions we choose to avoid, from the forbearance consequent thereupon; and since forbearance often requires a stronger effort of the mind than action itself, for it will cost us more pains to forbear cutting faces, swearing or any other foolish habit we have got than to practise them, therefore I shall not scruple to ascribe forbearance to volition, for so it may be remotely tho' not directly; and after the example of Mr. Locke, to include that together

ther with any actual exercise of our powers under the general name of action.

9. One remark more shall conclude the chapter. In speaking of action, besides the several co-existent motions and several successive volitions before mentioned, we ordinarily comprehend several operations of other agents acting in a series towards compleating the purpose we had in view, provided we conceive them necessarily consequent upon our volition. Thus when Roger shot the hawk hovering over his master's dovehouse, he only pulled the trigger, the action of the spring drove down the flint, the action of the flint struck fire into the pan, the action of the fire set the powder in a blaze, that of the powder forced out the shot, that of the shot wounded the bird, and that of gravity brought her to the ground. But all this we ascribe to Roger, for we say he brought down the felon; and if we think the shot a nice one, applaud him for having done a clever feat. So likewise we claim the actions of other persons for our own, whenever we expect they will certainly follow as we shall direct. When Squire Peremptory distrained his tenant for rent, perhaps he did no more than write his orders in a letter, this his servant carried to the post, the postman conveyed it into the country, where it was delivered to the steward, who
sent

sent his clerk to make the distress. Yet we ascribe the whole to the Squire's own doing, for we say He distrained his tenant, and call it a prudent or a cruel act according as we think of the circumstances of the case.

Hence the law maxim He that does a thing by another, does it himself; which tho' valid in Westminster hall will not hold good in the schools of metaphysics, for there we shall find nothing an act of the mind that is not the immediate product of her volition. But for the uses of prudence and morality we must recur back again to the common language, because we cannot judge of the merits of men's doings without taking the consequences into our idea of the action. Pulling a trigger or drawing characters upon paper are neither good nor bad, right nor wrong, considered in themselves: but as the trigger so pulled shall occasion the slaughter of a man, or of some vermin, or only a bounce in the air; as the characters so drawn shall tend to the necessary security of our property, or to bring a hardship upon our neighbour, or shall carry no meaning at all, we pronounce the action prudent or idle, moral or wicked.

C H A P. III.

CAUSES OF ACTION.

PHILLOSOPHERS of old have observed several causes necessary to concur in producing an effect; and have distributed them into several classes, which they have distinguished by epithets of their own invention. Whoever will look into Seneca, may find the causes of Plato, of Aristotle and some others, amounting I think to eight or ten classes a piece. But since those sages have given us different lists, I presume the matter of distribution to be arbitrary, being left to every one's discretion to rank his causes under such classes as he shall judge most convenient to himself in marshalling his thoughts.

I shall not set myself to study for a complete list of the causes contributing to human action, but shall name only such as occur at present; which are the material, the formal, the ideal, the final, the instrumental and the efficient. Thus when you sit down to an entertainment, the victuals are the material cause of your eating, for you could not eat if there were none; their wholesomeness and palatableness the formal, for if they were raw or corrupted or in any unsuitable form you would

would not eat them ; your sight of them and knowledge of their qualities the ideal, for without them you would not know how to proceed in eating ; the gratification of your appetite the final, for if you had not this end in view you would scarce think it worth while to eat ; your knife and fork the instrumental, for without them you could not cut your meat ; and the mind or body the efficient, for by them you perform the action of eating. I say mind or body disjunctively, with reference to the different lights in which you may regard them : for if you consider the eating as an act of the mind, then is the mind the sole efficient, and the hands and mouth only instrumental causes ; but if as an act of the man, then the whole compound, mind and body together is the efficient cause.

I do not intend a dissertation upon all these causes severally in their order : some I may dwell more largely upon, others perhaps I may scarce ever mention again, nor do I give the above as a compleat list to which no new articles could be added. For my aim is not meer curiosity or theory, how much soever I may seem to deal that way ; I have something useful in my eye, tho' it lies at a distance, and I must travel many a weary step before I can arrive at it.

But

But as I would not run on of my own head without regard to the sentiments of any body else, I must observe that there are persons who deny the mind to be any efficient cause at all, and they being men of learning, probity and reputation, it would not be civil to pass by them without exchanging a word or two.

2. Dr. Hartley gives us a very different account of sensation and muscular motion from all we ever learned before from our masters and tutors. We used to hear that the muscles and organs were so many bundles of nerves and fibres, which were little hollow pipes containing a very fine liquor called animal spirits; that these spirits were the carriers serving us in our traffic upon all occasions, perpetually hurrying to and fro, some carrying sensation from external objects to the mind and others bringing back motion from thence to the limbs. But he tells us the nerves are solid capilaments having neither hollowness nor liquor within them but surrounded on all sides with Ether, which is a subtile fluid extremely moveable and elastic, intimately pervading all bodies whatever, even the most compact and solid. That the nerves lie constantly upon the stretch like the strings of a harpsichord, and like them, quiver and vibrate upon the slightest touch received at either end, which vibrating causes similar vibrations in the circum-ambient Ether. That

those vibrations of ether, which he calls sensory vibratiuncles, excite perceptions in the mind and at the same time agitate the ether standing round the muscular fibres, which agitation, termed by him motory vibratiuncles, causes those fibres to vibrate and propagate their motion along one another quite to the fingers ends. That the sensory vibratiuncles, like waves raised in a pond upon throwing in a stone, extend to distant parts out of view, and being reverberated by the banks recoil again at other times, or mixing together form new vibratiuncles, thereby furnishing us with ideas of reflection.

Thus the mind remains totally inactive, reduced to one faculty alone, for the Will, which he terms expressly a certain state of the vibratiuncles, belongs to the ether not to her: she sits a spectator only and not an agent of all we perform, she may indeed discern what is doing but has no share in what is done: like the fly upon the chariot wheel, she fancies herself raising a cloud of dust but contributes nothing towards encreasing it: she may lay mighty schemes and rejoice in the execution, but in reality does nothing herself; she can neither move the limbs nor call ideas to her reflection, the whole being brought to pass by the action of vibratiuncles upon one another. The mind in this case resembles man, who thrusts his hand among

of a clock, he may feel the movements and by long practice may acquire a skill in distinguishing the hours and knowing when the clock will strike; if he perceives the hour of dinner approach, this may set his mouth watering and raise an appetite of hunger, which he thinks influences his Will to strike and thereby give notice to the cook that it is time to take up dinner.

3. On the other hand the late bishop of ^{loyne} ~~Clogher~~ goes into a contrary extreme, for he allows us neither ether nor nerves nor organs nor limbs nor external substances nor space nor distance. He does not deny we have perceptions of all these matters, but says we have no communion with the things themselves nor can penetrate into them, and therefore can know nothing of their existence, our knowledge consisting wholly of perceptions existent only in the mind: and since we find some perceptions totally dissimilar from any thing in the objects exciting them, as colour, sound, pain and pleasure, how can we assure ourselves the rest are not so likewise, such as magnitude, solidity, figure, situation and motion? Therefore for aught we can tell, our perceptions may arise from ~~unperceived~~ ^{unperceived} objects than those whereto we or perhaps may all flow con- and the same source: and may, he concludes, by

an inference common among persons of lively imagination, that they certainly do. Thus the life of man turns out a meer vision and delusion. We dream of taking long journies, traversing countries, encompassing the globe, but really never stir a foot from home : we please ourselves with the thought of ^{con}traversing among an infinite variety of objects, whereas in good truth we sit in perpetual solitude having nothing but ourselves to converse with. For Hampsted hill you stand upon, Harrow, London, Blackheath, Banstead Down, you see from thence, are not those enormous piles and masses lying miles asunder from each other, as you suppose, but only perceptions huddled together into a mathematical point in your mind ; nor with your utmost stretch can you carry your eye an inch beyond yourself.

But here occurs an objection from the regularity of perceptions arising upon the application of proper objects to excite them, which seldom frustrate our expectation. When my fingers are cold, upon holding them to the fire I shall find them grow warm : if then I have neither fingers nor fire, how comes it that I feel a real warmth from an imaginary fire ? If I have neither mouth nor meat, how comes it that I taste the favour of visionary roast beef ? Oh ! says the right reverend, our perceptions are thrown upon us by an invisi-
 file

ble intelligent Agent, who supplies them in such regular order that they may seem to come in a chain of causes and effects. If you have a perception of cold in your fingers and of a fire in the room, this is followed by a perception of approaching them to the fire, which again is followed by a perception of warmth. And this succession of perceptions often extends to different persons in order to keep up our intercourse with one another. If you chance to perceive yourself thirsty there succeeds a perception of ringing the bell, this is succeeded by a perception in your servant of hearing his master ring and running up stairs to receive his orders, next in succession comes your fancy of seeing him stand in the room, upon which tho' you have neither tongue nor voice you fancy yourself bidding him bring you some beer, then he instantly fancies he runs down and fetches up the mug, and lastly your fancy of quenching your thirst closes the whole imaginary scene.

4. Thus these two gentlemen represent the mind as an idle insignificant thing, never acting at all, but always gaping and staring at what passes. Both equally divest her of all employment whatsoever tho' in different ways:

by finding other hands to compleat all her
for her and so leaving her no work to

the other by sweeping away her

whole stock of materials and so leaving her nothing to work upon.

But tho' they seem to stand directly in my way, I have so little the spirit of opposition that I shall not endeavour to push them ^{down} if I can any how slip by them. Wherefore to avoid dispute I shall ~~not~~ put myself upon the country, leaving the matter in issue to a fair trial by my neighbours upon a full and fair examination of such evidence as their own experience shall offer. And as I find the opinions above cited have not made many converts among mankind, I need not be in much pain for the verdict.

In the mean while I shall venture to proceed upon these Postulata: That the bodies we daily see and handle, actually exist in as great variety of magnitudes, forms and situations, as we commonly suppose, and our operations upon them are of our own performance: that Westminster hall is bigger than a nutshell, and the Moon somewhat higher than the weather-cock; that the cloaths I wear are not the same thing with the glass window I look at; that I hold a real pen and have a real paper before me, that my hand would not write unless I moved it, that the thoughts I write down are the products of my own labour and study, and that the ideas floating in my brain would produce neither meditation nor outward
action

action if I forbore to exert myself. All who are willing to grant me thus much, may listen as long as they find me to their liking; the rest may turn their heads aside as from one who builds without a foundation.

5. Yet upon second thoughts I wish these latter would cast a glance or two more upon me, as they might possibly find something turning to their account. For who knows what effect the characters I draw upon paper may produce upon the ether within them? The rays of light reflected from thence, striking upon their eyes, may possibly excite sensory vibratiuncles affecting their minds with some little degree of pleasure; or rolling round their better shaped understanding, may recoil again in more improved forms, exhibiting useful measures of conduct, and at the same ^{time} raising motory vibratiuncles proper for carrying the same into practice. Or on the other system, who knows what a train of imaginations my perception of scribbling may drag after it? When we reflect how ready the mechanical members of our literary commonwealth are to entertain ideas of presenting every thing they can get to the public, it will not appear unlikely that some printer may fancy himself printing off the fancies I seem to write down, and then some bookseller may fancy himself spreading open a book in his shop

window; the next in succession may be some idle passenger, who having little else to do, may fancy himself perusing the pages, this perchance may introduce a perception of something amusing, or by great good luck of some useful observation, which may possibly draw after it a perception of benefit received in the practice.

If I can light upon any little hint which may do real service to somebody or other, I care not thro' what channels it is conveyed: whether by the ordinary methods of persuasion, illustration and argumentation, as commonly apprehended, or by agitating the sensorial and motorial ether, or by beginning a succession of perceptions. I trouble not my head for the means, so they prove effectual to the purpose intended.

Having thus slid thro' the crowd without jostling any body, which pleases me better than if I had overthrown half a dozen opponents; and gotten behind them into my former track with an open road before me, I shall e'en jog on soberly and quietly in quest of whatever I can find deserving notice.

6. But notwithstanding that we have assumed the mind an efficient cause, we must acknowledge she has not strength enough to do our business alone without some foreign help. Not that I pretend to limit the mind's internal

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nal efficacy, or to determine exactly how great or how small it may be: for aught I know she may have force sufficient to remove mountains, could she apply her force immediately to the whole width of their bases; but this is not her case with respect to the limbs employed in our service. The old notion of the mind's existing like the estate of a coparcener in law jargon per my and per tout, or being all in every part throughout the whole human frame, has been long since exploded: we now rest convinced that the mind does not act herself upon the limbs but draws them to and fro by tendons, muscles, nerves and fibres; which latter our anatomists have traced to the brain, where they find them grow smaller and smaller till at last they quite lose them thro' their extreme minuteness: and tho' we cannot thoroughly agree where she resides, yet wherever her place of residence be, she keeps constantly there in kingly state, never making wanton excursions to the toes or fingers, but exercising her executive power upon them by the ministry of those imperceptible fibres.

Now there needs not much argument to show that if you are to act upon bodies at a distance by some string or other medium, you cannot exert more strength upon them than your medium will bear: consequently the mind, be she as mighty as a giant, can impart

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no more of her might to the limbs than her fibres are capable of conveying: what could Goliath or Sampson do if you allowed them only a single cobweb to work with? They would not have power to stir a silver thimble, for if they went to push, the string would bend, if to pull, it would break. Yet when one tossed his weavers beam and the other carried the gates of Gaza, they performed their prodigious feats by tender filaments lighter than a cobweb, undiscernible with a microscope.

7. To solve this difficulty we are put in mind that the human body is a most admirably contrived machine, and by machinery a small power may be made to perform the works of a greater: and we are shown strings of bladders representing the nerves, which upon blowing into them will shorten considerably and draw after them whatever hangs to the end of the string. But let us consider what all your writers upon the mechanical powers agree in, that no machinery whatever can lessen the momentum necessary for performing any work required; which momentum is compounded of the strength of the power and the velocity wherewith it moves: therefore if you would lessen the power you must encrease the velocity in proportion, to make the product of both when multiplied

multiplied together equal. Thus a man by help of a lever may raise double the weight he could lift by his own strength, but then that end of the lever he holds must move double the space the weight passes thro' in rising. I have seen a curious engine compounded of wheels, screws and pulleys, whereby a lady, with a single hair of her head, might raise a stone of two hundred weight: the hair was fastened to a wheel something like the flyer of a jack, and in raising the weight an inch, the wheel turned round as many inches as there would have required hairs to lift up the stone directly without any engine at all.

Let us now reflect on the greatness of our works, for great I may call them compared to those Tinder threads we have to work with, as likewise how suddenly we often perform them, and we shall scarce find time to make up for the deficiency of our strength by an encrease of our velocity. I remember when I attended a course of experiments at the university, we were told a man's greatest strength lay in the muscles of his hams, and in order to try their force, an iron ring was screwed into the floor having a pretty strong cord tied to it; this one of the company wound round his waist, then standing just over the ring and raising up his body, broke

broke the cord asunder by main strength. At the same time our professor told us that if a machine were contrived to move by weights, and act with the force exerted by all the muscles of a man of ordinary size when he jumps from the ground, it would require a weight of I think thirty thousand pounds. Now suppose a person sees a huge stone rolling directly towards him, which he did not observe till it was just ready to strike him, how nimbly will he jump out of the way! But if the mind performed this leap by an inflation of bladders with her nitro-aerious breath, she must either give so strong a puff as would burst their flimsy coats into atoms like an explosion of gunpowder, or if she breathed in such gentle manner as not to hurt them, she would want time for the length of her puff: for the current of her breath must run at least the space of a mile to throw up the whole body an inch, which cannot be conceived possible in so little an instant of time as between the discernment of the danger and springing up of the feet from the ground.

8. Wherefore it seems more than probable the mind has always some good friend at hand ready to assist her weakness, and the main of that strength she exerts upon the limbs comes from some other quarter than her own storehouse. Whether this help flows from the ani-

animal spirits, ether or that unknown pressure causing gravitation and cohesion, or what else you please, 'tis no matter: but that there is another force within us besides our own, capable of acting upon the muscles, we may be convinced by convulsive motions, wherein the mind has no concern nor volition any share, yet they sometimes imitate and generally exceed the vigour of our voluntary actions. Perhaps there lies a mighty weight of some subtile fluid ~~thereon~~^{rown} from our animal circulation and bearing constantly against the orifices of our nerves, but prevented from entering by certain little sliding valves kindly provided by nature for our use: the mind then has nothing more to do than draw aside the valves and in rushes the torrent. The mind in this case works like the miller of an overshot mill, he has shoots lying over every one of his wheels, stopped by flash-boards at their upper ends, against which the water lies bearing always ready to drive the wheels whenever it can find a passage: so the miller by drawing a little board which any child might pull up with a finger, turns the stream upon this wheel or that as he pleases, and twirls round a massive stone which he could not stir with both his arms. But as comparisons seldom go on all four, the mill and the human machine differ in one respect: the miller, when
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he takes up his flashes, lays them it may be on the bank, goes whistling into his mill and thinks no more till his grist is ground, for the water will work on for ever unless he shuts it out again: but the valves used by the mind fall back again of themselves when the mind withdraws her activity. Therefore if you would point with your hand at some object for any time, you must continue to exert yourself all the while: for the moment the mind forbears her volition, the valves close, the stream ceases to flow upon the brachial muscles, and the arm no longer supported falls to your side. Then again the likeness returns upon disorders in each: for should an eel wriggle under any of the flash boards, this might give the water a passage without any act of the miller: or should some flood buoy them quite out of their places and pour down a larger stream than usual, the wheels might turn with more violence than the miller could throw upon them at other times. So some foulness of our juices may work under the valves keeping them open whether we will or no; or the boiling of a fever may stretch them beyond their natural width and produce convulsions stronger than any thing the mind can effect by her volition.

Nevertheless as we ascribe the grinding of our corn to an act of the miller, because he sets
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the mill at work when and in what manner he pleases ; we may with equal justice ascribe our actions to the performance of the mind, because it depends entirely upon her of what kind they shall be. If we consider them as acts of the mind, they extend no further than to drawing back the valves, whereof she remains the sole efficient cause : if as acts of the man, we may still deem her an efficient cause, because the other powers co-operating stand always ready in waiting for her direction, and whatever happens afterwards follows necessarily in the nerves, muscles or limbs, in consequence of the motion by her first begun.

C H A P. IV.

I D E A L C A U S E S.

UNDER the class of ideal causes I comprehend all those notices of our senses and judgements of our understanding, which direct us from time to time in every step of our proceedings : which is giving a larger compass than I believe Plato allowed them, for he understood by an ideal cause only that plan or design of any work laid in our own thought before we go about it. Thus when a painter draws a picture, whether

ther from some original or by his own fancy, he takes his idea either from the original standing before him or from some archetype of his own invention. But besides this archetype, I conceive other ideal causes necessary to finish the picture : our painter must have an idea of his canvass, his palat, his brushes, his colours, he must know where they lie, what they will do, and how to handle them ; and must receive fresh information continually from his eyes, his hands and his reflection, or he will make but bungling work. Nor is this archetype wanting except only for works of design and contrivance : whether Plato ^{quir} received an ideal cause for all our common actions I know not, but this nobody will deny me, that we cannot proceed in the least of them without repeated directions from our senses or reflection. We can neither walk nor write nor cut our victuals without using our eyes, our feeling, and applying some little degree of attention. Whatever we go about, we must have some notion of the thing we mean to do, and of the means or motions proper to perform it.

2. Yet if we consider carefully how small a part of our actions is properly our own, there will appear something very mysterious and unaccountable in them : for we shall find that strictly speaking we have no idea of any one thing

thing we do, nor of the manner how we do it. I have shown in my last chapter that we do not move our limbs ourselves, and have supposed certain valves which open to let in the stream that moves them : I do not warrant this for a right account of the matter, having given it for want of a better, and until a better shall be given I may find excuse for continuing to use this. In a former place upon the subject of voluntary reflection, I have supposed certain channels, by stopping some of which, we can turn the current of our imagination into any course we like best : perhaps nature may have furnish'd us with valves too here to serve us for stoppers. How little share then of our mightiest performances can we justly claim to ourselves? Our own proper action, the action of our mind, extends no further than to opening the valves, nor perhaps so far neither ; for she may have little imperceptible fibres to pull them by. Yet she neither sees nor feels either valve or fibre, nor has any notion or perception of them : she knows not how many they be, where they lie, nor to what they fasten.

If the master of a large family had his study hung round with bells, one reaching to the dressing room, another to the nursery, another to the kitchen, another to the stable,

and so to each of his offices; when he went to use them, besides his knowledge of the person he would call, he must know the proper bell, in what quarter of the room it hangs; common sense must direct him that he is to stretch out his hand to the handle and pull downwards rather than lift up, and his eye must guide the motion of his hand in taking hold: for were the bells newly put up and he not instructed in their several uses, or were he left quite in the dark, he might pitch upon the wrong as well as the right, and fetch up the cook when he desired to see my lady or wanted to speak with the coachman.

In like fashion the closet of our mind is hung round with multitudes of strings reaching to the eyes, the mouth, the hands, the feet and every member of our body: we know not their number, their situation, nor the member to which they respectively belong; we know not which lies on the right side or the left, in the ceiling or the floor, before or behind; nor the manner in which we must proceed to work, whether by pushing or pulling, by lifting up or weighing down, by screwing, turning, or driving as with the stroke of a hammer. Yet have we all our limbs perfectly at command, we put them upon services which they do not fail

fail to execute according to our expectations, and all this without knowing what we do to compass our intentions. We feel a desire of helping ourselves ^{to} ~~with~~ victuals, and strait our arm stretches out towards the dish; we want to be on the other side the room, and instantly our foot steps forward to convey us. Whence then have we this surprizing dexterity in a state of utter darkness? How do we escape perpetually making egregious blunders? How comes it that we never pull the wrong string since we cannot discern or distinguish them from one another? How comes it that we never kick about with our legs when we would handle with our arms; that we do not toss up our nose instead of turning our eyes, that we do not loll out our tongue when we go to chew our meat? To such questions as these I can give no other answer than by an exclamation. How wonderfull are the works of nature! how admirable her contrivance in all parts of this our human machine! exceeding the skill of man to find out, the utmost stretch of our understanding to comprehend!

- 3. But here perhaps Dr. Hartley, if he be not gone out of hearing, may give me a Hip, and call out, Prithee friend, do not think to slip so easily by me; I must stop you with a remark or two upon your last observation.

You say the mind draws her valves without any discernment of what she does, therefore their opening is not owing to discernment since it may be effected without any: but you require an ideal cause for every action of the mind, therefore must not we conclude that this motion of the valves is not an act of the mind but of some corporeal agent which can act by impulse without any idea at all? You admit that those discernments we have are not of the action nor of the instrument primarily employed, but of some remote consequence worked thereby. You have an idea of speaking but none of the measures you must take to perform it: therefore you have not an adequate ideal cause, because your idea does not take in the valves opening to the muscles of your mouth and tongue; which valves you must nevertheless draw up before you can bring out your words. May not we then presume that discernment is not the cause but concomitant of action, or co-effect of the same cause, given us for our entertainment rather than use in directing our conduct; and we are led only to esteem it the cause of our motions by seeing it constantly precede them? just as we say the swallows bring us summer because they come always before it; not that they have any hand in lengthening our days, ripening
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our corn or producing other effects of summer.

You may remember I have told you of a German of great repute among our brethren of the faculty, who asserts that all our automatic motions, that is, our motions purely mechanical, such as the circulation of the blood and other juices, were originally voluntary: so that the child before birth works out that whole plan of animal oeconomy which is to support and serve him during his state of manhood, by his own industry during his state of gestation. If you will not believe this outlandish man believe your own senses. Your breath comes and goes of its own accord when you do not think of it, when you do, it seems your own act: for upon the lungs being full you perceive them uneasy, which puts you upon puffing out their contents; upon their becoming empty you feel a want of fresh air, which urges you to draw in a supply. In sound sleep, fainting of extacy, the lungs continue their play, which you must allow they do mechanically at a time when the mind remains wholly senseless and inactive: while awake and well, your lungs make their strokes at regular and equal intervals if you let them alone, yet you may lengthen, shorten, accelerate or retard their motions as often as you please to interfere.

To read the long periods of Demosthenes or Cicero, you must stretch them far beyond their natural length : to make your stops rightly, to lay your accents or emphases properly, you must break, encrease or abate of their violence from time to time, as occasion shall require. All this the young schoolboy must learn to do with laborious application of mind, but you who have been long enured to the work I suppose perform it so easily that, upon having attended closely to the sense of your author for a while, you cannot afterwards resolve with yourself whether it were your own particular volition or some mechanical power that accommodated the length of your breath to the length of your sentences, and the checks, the strength and softness of that, to your various modulations of voice.

Since then we find our automatic and voluntary actions so similar as that we cannot well distinguish them asunder ; since what was once voluntary becomes afterwards automatic and what we sometimes acknowledge mechanical appears at others an effect of design : may not we fairly conclude them both of the same kind, effected alike by the mutual action of vibratiuncles, and that our discernment is not a direction to us what we shall do, but a foresight only of what will be done ?

done? For what needs volition to produce an event that may as well come to pass without it? The region of our active ether extends much wider than the prospect of the mind, so that she sees a part only and not the whole of what passes there: the tides, which lie near enough to excite perception in the foetus, may remove further off upon the growth of the body: and those, which ordinarily roll a little beyond our ken, may be brought within distance by attention. In both cases the vibrations, whether near or remote, hold on their course after the same manner: the only difference is this, in one case we discern them, or as you call it, the ideas they exhibit, in the other we do not. When we see what is doing preparatory to action, we judge it voluntary; when we know nothing of the matter, we account it automatic.

4. Now against this second attack I shall make the same defence as I did upon the former, namely, by an appeal to my neighbours, desiring them to determine the matter between us: and that they may have some particular case to judge upon, I shall offer them a feigned issue in imitation of those directed out of the court of chancery. Suppose the mind of a man separated from his body without any of those diseases, accidents or disorders in the latter, which ordinarily bring on

our dissolution: let the limbs, the muscles, the fibres, the juices, the ether, if any such there be, remain in the same state as before: how would this body behave after the separation? I in my declaration must aver that tho' the pulse might continue to beat, the animal secretions be carried on and the lungs to play, it would do nothing further: its palate in some few hours might come into that state which affects us with hunger, but having no sensation, it would not call for dinner, walk down stairs, sit at table, help itself to victuals, nor converse with the company. The Doctor in his plea, to be consistent with himself, must insist that it would perform all this and every thing else one might expect from a reasonable creature: and thus the point is brought to an issue.

Or if the court should think it beneath their dignity to take cognizance of a fictitious case which never actually happens, I shall present them with one that may have fallen under their own observation. Have they never seen a careless nurse sitting by candle light with a young baby in her arms, gabbling among her gossips without attention to her charge? The child stretches out its hand to play with the candle, and upon touching the flame instantly snatches it away, crying and squawling as if its little heart would break.

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Here then was a volition, that is in the doctor's language, a certain state of the sensory vibratiuncles, proper to agitate such motory as would have continued the motion of the hand until the fingers had grasped the snuff. What then breaks off this motion and turns it to a contrary; is it solely the action of the flame in putting the tide of vibratiuncles into a new course? or is it the smart felt by the child, which influences it to exert its activity in a different manner? But the discernment of pain belongs confessedly to the mind alone; how different notions soever we may have of colour, magnitude, distance, all who have seriously thought upon the matter unanimously agree to place the sensation of pain in the mind itself, not in any objects, organs or fluids, contributing to excite it. This then is the question waiting for a determination; and if there should be hands holden up on both sides, I shall demand a division. As many as are of opinion that the soul-less body above mentioned would neither eat nor drink nor talk like other folks; or that the child, were it not for the fence of pain, would still go on to play with the candle after its fingers were burnt, come along with me: as many as are of the contrary, turn back again after the doctor.

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For I think we may go each his several way without being solicitous for the success of our cause, as we need not alter our measures according to the verdict. He well knows how strong the tide of vibrations runs which sets the fingers a scribbling, and that it would be labour lost to endeavour at stopping them: and indeed why should he desire to do so unless he sees them running into dangerous currents? Nor can I find reason for pursuing a different plan upon either principles: my design drives at bringing men better acquainted with their mind and that inner part of their constitution wherewith it has immediate intercourse, in hopes they may strike out some light therefrom, which may direct them to the better management of their faculties. If I shall be so happy as to succeed in any single instance of an addition to their stock of useful knowledge, it is all one whether this improves their judgement and puts them upon thinking or acting for themselves, or whether it agitates their ether into salutary vibrations which shall do their business for them whether they will or no. I shall find my intention equally answered in both cases, and the service I may do will rise to the same amount in the upshot.

5. Upon a review of this whole chapter, without entering into a nice disquisition of what motions

motions are of our own operation and what purely mechanical, we may justly conclude that in all voluntary actions the mind must have a discernment, if not of the very act she performs, yet of some bodily motion or other distant consequence effected thereby : and for the most part we take continual direction from our senses, our judgement and our experience, shaping the manner of our proceedings according to the notices they afford us : which justifies me in ranking ideas among the causes of action.

But as it is a hard matter to please every body, many people perhaps will chide me for staying so long to talk with the doctor. What a pother do you make, say they, about nothing ! what a deal of pains to convince us the sun shines at noon-day ! Every child sees that we cannot move without the direction of our senses. Common sense and common experience inform us that we never discourse without a notion of conveying our thoughts to one another ; that we never do any thing without having an idea of something we would be at.

In excuse to this rebuke I beg leave to observe, that we do not always advert to what we perfectly know, and in reasoning upon abstruse matters often mistake for want of reflection upon things we are extremely well acquainted

acquainted with. Therefore they may look upon me, not as unveiling a secret unknown to them before, but as pointing out an observation they cannot fail of making themselves upon such notice ; and desiring them to bear in mind as an axiom to be employed upon further occasion, That we have ideal causes of our proceedings and shape our actions from time to time according to the models by them exhibited. Besides they may please to remember I told them in my introduction that my architecture partakes of the military kind: I must provide against attacks as well as for commodious habitation. And by another figure I compared the land of metaphysics to a wilderness abounding in by-paths and intricate mazes : while we travel the plain road of common sense, we shall meet with profound speculatists who will every now and then be drawing some of the company aside into the wood : therefore it behoves us to get acquainted with all the turnings and windings before hand, that we may know where to look for our lost sheep and how to bring them back again. In the mean while those who were not inveigled, may sit down upon the turf until they see us come out of the bushes again, and their good nature no doubt will pardon an excursion that was needless to them but necessary for their fellow travellers.

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Such necessities may possibly occur more than once, we may be put to prove that snow is white; that we know our own houses, or remember any thing happening to us yesterday: and upon these occasions we must take the method we have done already of submitting ourselves to a trial by jury. There is no more received rule in logic than this, Against persons denying principles there is no argumentation: when we have to deal with an adversary of this cast all pleadings are vain, we must proceed directly to an issue appealing to common sense and experience for the truth of our principle; after stripping it of all that sophism and equivocation wherewith it has been artfully overclouded, and reducing the question in dispute to a naked fact or single proposition which any body can judge of and understand.

C H A P. V.

M O T I V E S.

HAVING in my list of causes assigned a particular class to the final, I shall treat of them distinctly, tho' in reality they are a species of the ideal, as the latter are of our ideas in general. For many ideas pass in
review

review before us which have no share at all in our actions: and many serve us for a guidance in our conduct which yet did not prompt us to pursue it. While we stand talking at a window, passengers may go by without drawing our attention; we see them move along, but do nothing different nor in a different manner from what we should have done had they not appeared: the sight of our companion and our knowledge of language direct us which way to turn our head and how to express ourselves: these ideas perhaps we had before we entered upon our discourse, which we do not begin till another idea arises, probably of entertainment or of giving or receiving some information. When a man walks, he may see bushes growing by the wayside, cows grazing in the field, birds flying in the air, without regarding or making any use of the notices they offer: these then are part of his ideas but not ideal causes, which are the shape of his path and several marks whereby he knows his way; yet neither are these the final cause but health, exercise, diversion, business or some other end he proposes to himself in walking.

This final cause we commonly stile the Motive, by a metaphor taken from mechanical engines which cannot play without some spring or other mover to set them at work:

work: and because we find action usually follows upon the suggestion of proper motives, therefore we conceive them moving the mind to exert herself. Thus by a like figure we hear her frequently compared to a balance, and the motives to weights hanging in either scale. But if we will apply this comparison to the mind, I think it suits her better in the exercises of her understanding than in her volitions: for 'tis the judgement poizes the motives in its scale to try which of them preponderate, nor does volition ensue until the weight be determined.

Some there are who will not allow the mind to act upon motives at all, or at least assign her a limited power which she exercises sometimes of acting against or without them or of giving them a weight which does not naturally belong to them: they say she plays tricks with her balance, like a juggling shopkeeper who slides his little finger sily along one side of the beam, and by pressing upon it, makes twelve ounces of plumbs draw up a pound of lead. It must be owned to our shame that we too frequently practice these scurvy tricks to cheat those who have dealings with us, and what is more fatal, to cheat ourselves into error and mischief: but I hope to make it appear in due time that this is done, not by a free will of indifference overpowering

powering the force of our motives, but by privately slipping in or stealing out the weights in either scale, which we often get a habit of doing so covertly that we are not aware of the fraud ourselves.

2. Now how shall we manage to steer safely between two opposite extremes? The doctors Hartley and Berkeley would not allow the mind an efficient cause of her own actions: the maintainers of indifference make her not only the efficient cause of her actions but of their causes too, for they will have it that her activity supplies the place of final causes or gives force to motives.

I shall remark in the first place that they distinguish between acting and choosing, to which latter only they ascribe the privilege of indifference. Whether such distinction has any foundation in nature I have already suggested some reasons to question, and may canvass the point more thoroughly hereafter when a proper occasion shall offer. But since they admit we never proceed to action without motives, that our choice sometimes arises from the decision of our judgement without our interposition, and that motives often operate so forcibly we cannot resist them: this is going a great way, and it will be but one little step further to show that acting upon our ideas is acting as well as upon our limbs:

limbs : which will entitle us to enquire upon the subject of those choices we make in consequence of something done by ourselves, whether some motive does not influence us in every thing we do towards bringing on the determination.,

In the next place I would beg leave to ask them how they become so well acquainted with their own actions beforehand as to lay schemes and plans for their future conduct and depend upon their adherence thereto? I suppose they do not pretend to the spirit of prophecy, and without that I do not see how we can know any future event, otherwise than by our knowledge of the causes : for an event, independent on antecedent causes, must remain absolutely contingent until it comes to pass. Yet do they lay claim to commendation for their steadiness in adhering to their plan : the mind then must remain indifferent during the whole time of such adherence, else they would forfeit their claim which they rest solely upon the right exercise of this privilege. For did not the mind retain her freewill of indifference either to keep or to break a resolution already taken, how much soever we might applaud them for resolving, we could owe them no applause for performing.

Then as to their resting the merit of actions solely upon the due use of this freedom

of indifference without which, say they, we shall have no room to praise or blame, to reward or punish : have patience and perhaps in the sequel of these enquiries we may find other sources of distributive justice besides this privilege. What if we should discover approbation and censure so little inconsistent with the efficacy of motives that they act themselves as such, and become due solely for the influence they are likely to have upon our behaviour.

But as I find the work of improving my own knowledge much more agreeable to my taste than that of battling the opinions of others, I shall leave my antagonists in possession of their indifference for the present, if they still think fit to claim it after all the evidence produced against their title by Mr. Locke : and shall proceed in my consideration of final causes in hopes thereby to kill two birds with one stone. For while in pursuit of my journey minding only my own business, I may happen to discover motives for every species of action, and then indifference must quit the field of course as having nothing to do there. Nor can we take a better method for the recovery of our right than by enclosing the whole contested ground piece by piece until there be not a spot left where-
on

on the liberty of indifference may rest its foot.

3. To prevent mistakes when I speak of the efficacy of motives and of their moving the mind to exert herself, I desire it may be understood that these are figurative expressions; and I do not mean thereby to deny the efficacy of the mind or to assert any motion force or impulse imparted to her from the motives, as there is to one billiard ball from another upon their striking: but only to observe that motives give occasion to the mind to exert her endeavours in attaining whatever they invite her to, which she does by her own inherent activity, not by any power derived from them. And all mankind understand the matter so except perhaps some few persons of uncommon sense and superfine understandings. When the poet makes Belinda ask What mov'd my mind with youthful lords to roam? would he have you believe that vanity, pleasure, desire of conquest, hope of an advantageous match, or any other motive you can assign, made all those motions contained in the idea of roaming. No surely, it was the lady herself by her own vigour and sprightliness. When she sets down to her toilet, unnumbered treasures open at once. What opens the treasures? Why the maid, with her hands, not with

her desire of tiffing out her mistress in a killing attire. And it is this agency of the mind which denominates an action ours, for whatever proceeds from other efficient causes does not belong to us. Therefore you see when the maid had Sylphs to work for her, he describes the performance, tho' done by her hands, to them instead of her, And Betty's prais'd for labours not her own.

Nobody will deny that we sometimes act upon motives, that we follow where they lead us, and that we should have acted otherwise had they not presented or had other motives appeared in the opposite scale to outweigh them. How many people flock to hear Handel play upon the organ! they follow him to the Haymarket, to Covent Garden, to the Foundling Hospital; had he not been to perform they never would have stirred from home, but if their Doctor had told them that going abroad might prove fatal to their health, they would have forborn. Therefore motives have a natural efficacy to put us upon action, and we need no other spring to move us so long as we have store of them; nor need we fear the want of a continual supply when we consider how many occasions of life, of amusement, of business we have to provide for, and how many idle fancies to gratify.

But

But we run into frequent mistakes concerning the operation of motives for want of first settling accurately with ourselves what they be. A motive I conceive is the prospect of some end actually in view of the mind at the time of action and urging to attain it : whereas we are apt to take for motives any reasons we can alledge in justification of our conduct. If any body should ask why you make your stated meals of breakfast, dinner and supper every day, I warrant you would answer, why, I could not live without eating. But reflect a little with yourself. Do you think of starving every time you run down stairs to dinner? Do not you go because you are hungry, because you like the victuals, because you will not make the family wait, because it is your usual hour? How then can the preservation of life, which is the farthest of any thing from your thoughts, be your motive of eating? If you would dissuade a debauchee from his courses, you tell him of the discredit he will bring upon himself from all wise and judicious persons : yet he still goes on as before, and this you call acting against a powerful motive. But is it so in fact with him? Perhaps the approbation of your musty sober fellows weighs nothing in his estimation, he feels no other weight in his scale besides the

gratification of appetite; therefore he follows the only motive inclining him to action.

4. But as Hermogenes was a singer even when he did not sing; and the cobbler retains his appellation after he has shut up his stall and sits among his fellow toppers at the two-penny club: so motives still preserve their character with us while they lie dormant in the box and do not operate in the scale. If we know a man has covetousness or ambition, we impute all his actions to that motive; so that a politician cannot take an airing but we suppose him going on some deep design, nor a miser step into his closet but we conclude him counting over his bags. But besides our general motives of conduct, we have many little desires and whimsies which come in every now and then for a share of our motions; and unless we get acquainted with these, we cannot account for a man's behaviour in particular instances.

Few of us I hope are without some prudential motives in store, and those being the most creditable we would willingly ascribe all our motions to them, not observing what other inducements may slip in unawares to weigh down the scale or so cover it as to leave no admittance for any thing else: for inclination and humour so mimic the garb and gestures of reason that we take them for
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her very self. Sometimes two motives occur together both inciting to the same action, and in this case we cannot rightly tell to which it belongs; because we can judge the efficacy of causes no otherwise than by their effects. This last deceit is greatly promoted by that aptness of inclination to draw reason after her, not as a friend to consult with but as an advocate to support her cause: for reason, which ought always to keep upon the bench, too often descends to the bar, and then we take her arguments for judgements of court and applaud ourselves for having paid them a due obedience. When the minister labours to extend the prerogative which he has under his own management, he thinks himself all the while pursuing the public good: when the parson vexes his parishioners with lawsuits, he good man would be contented with his present income but he must not injure his successors: when the young girl chooses her mate for black eyes, white teeth, a frolic air and sprightly prattle, she despises all mercenary views and pays regard only to solid merit and happiness.

In short we shall find it extremely difficult with our utmost care and circumspection to know our real motives; as well in general, what stock of them we have, as what weighed with us upon every particular occasion. For

we seldom attend to our motive at the instant of its operation, and if we go to recall it afterwards to our reflection, another shall start up in its place. Nor do we know the true weight of our motives before trial. While we hold them in the scale of contemplation they feel exceeding heavy, whereupon we confidently form resolutions of bearing pain, encountering dangers and surmounting difficulties, supposing that our motive fastened thereto, like lead to a bludgeon, will give it a force that shall bear down all opposition; but when the time of action comes they are found wanting in the balance and lie lighter than a feather.

There is a vulgar saying That we measure other folks corn by our own bushel: therefore we wonder at their proceeding when running in a different channel from our own, because we judge of their sentiments by those we feel ourselves. One is apt to cry, I should have done otherwise had I been in such a one's place, that is, had you had the same materials, abilities or opportunities as he: but are you sure you should have acted otherwise had you had the same notions, ways of thinking and motives too without any mixture of those you now possess? For our desires vary as much as our faces, and what works powerfully upon one, may have no influence

fluence at all upon another. If we see a person bringing great damage upon one who has never offended him, without any inducement either of pleasure or profit to himself, we stand in astonishment that any body can behave so absurdly without the least motive to urge him; and ascribe his procedure to meer perverseness of Will. For we find no motives in our own storehouse that could engage him: resentment, gratification of some appetite or self-interest, may have surprized us sometimes into unwarrantable actions, but we feel no temptation to do mischief for mischiefs sake, and therefore can conceive no such in another. But there are tempers with whom mischief itself acts as a powerfull motive; some dispositions there are utterly void of humanity whose place is supplied by a love of injustice and cruelty: even freak and wantonness may do much upon a mind where there is no consideration either of benevolence or prudence to weigh against them.

5. Motives frequently introduce and give life to one another. Your coachman entred into your service for a livelihood, this led him to obey your orders, which directed him to take care of your horses; this put him upon providing hay for them, and that induced him to enquire where the best was to be had. While on his way to the market, he
thinks

thinks of nothing but the shortest road to get thither; this therefore is the sole motive he has now in view: but if the prior motives had not operated, none of the subsequent would have had any influence upon him.

For the most part we portion our time into large actions tending to some distant end not presently accomplished, which consists of under parts and admits many bye actions not belonging to the principal. He that travels to York, goes most likely upon some business: he divides his journey into several stages and while upon each, thinks of nothing but getting well to his inn: this then is his motive for the time. On the road he finds himself weary and alights, or thirsty and stops at the door of some public house, or perhaps he enters into discourse with the passengers in going along, or stands still to look at some magnificent building. All these have separate motives of their own; refreshment, thirst, amusement or curiosity, which bear no relation to his main design.

While we work or study or converse, we often change our posture, turn our eyes and make many side motions having no connection with the purpose we are about. But have we not motives for those excrescencies of action? We feel ourselves uneasy in one posture and therefore exchange it for another, we look out
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for new objects because those before us have cloyed our eyes, we find some trifling amusement in every exercise of our activity. For employment seldom so totally engages us as to fill up all the spaces of our time, but restlessness, whimsy or habit, come in to supply the vacancies. The busy mind of man cannot lie a moment inactive: she works incessantly with both her faculties while awake, and if her weightier motives suspend their action ever so little, some lighter will slip in to keep her in play: for she has often been compared to an exceeding fine balance that will turn with the slightest hair when nothing lies in the opposite scale; and she has her drawers stocked with the grains of fancy as well as the pounds of reason.

While one motive urges to action, another may model the shape of it. When a grave divine and powdered fop enter the room together, civility prompts them alike to pay their compliments to the company, but decency leads one to a sober manly deportment, and affectation drives the other into a mincing step, a fantastic air and an over-delicacy of expression.

The designs that generate our larger actions take time in the forming, we see them grow by degrees to maturity and have leisure to contemplate them: but the ideas causing
our

our lesser motions, like lightning, flash, strike and vanish; they pass so swiftly we cannot get a look at them nor remember their existence. Besides, our weighty motives having the largest influence upon our lives, deserve our greatest regard, and we commonly apply our whole attention to them, overlooking all the rest so far as scarce to know we have any such belonging to us; or to mistake them for something else. Therefore we say, The motive of prudence, but the impulse of fancy, the force of habit, or the fallacy of imagination: and sometimes term the motion of these latter mechanical, supposing volition had no share in them, or at other times ascribe them to the privilege of indifference for want of discerning the motive that made a difference between one idle motion and another. But whoever desires a thorough acquaintance with the mind, ought to bestow some thoughts upon her little motives since they have so considerable a share in our actions, and if we are not aware of them will so cover the scale as to prevent the weighty motive from re-entering, or slip in at improper times, thereby producing a total avocation from the business in hand or at least an interruption of our proceedings.

6. Nor must I omit to take notice of a certain magic that seems to alter the condition
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of our motives : they fluctuate and vary unaccountably, fading and regaining their colours, losing and retrieving their weight. An idea, that yesterday appeared vivid and strong, shall to day show no sign of vigour at all : we still see it in the same form and position of parts as before, but it looks pale and lifeless and feels as nothing in our hand. A thing we were extremely fond of at one time, we care not a pin for at another; what we admire this hour, we despise the next. Even virtue and pleasure have their seasons of engaging, not only as they appear or disappear to our thoughts, but when we have a full and distinct view of their features, we do not always find them strike upon us with equal allurements.

This fluctuation of our motives I believe has opened another door to the notion of a freewill of indifference ; for observing that the mind does not always proceed to action instantly upon the suggestion of motives, that others of them often prevail than we should expect, that she resists the strongest passions and breaks through the firmest resolutions ; we conclude she has an authority of her own independent of the motives, so that they cannot act until having first received her royal assent, but she can give any of them a preference without regard to their respective
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can give it strength to overpower judgement, or by siding with the latter enable it to master the former. But all this may as well be accounted for by the variable quality of motives: while they continue changing their colours the balance keeps nodding to and fro, the mind perceives she has not a just estimation of their weights, and this is a motive with her to suspend action until the balance settles, and then it is the preponderating weight, not the mind, that sinks down the scale. When you have formed a resolution, so long as the considerations inducing you to make it retain their original vigour and those you rejected their original weakness, and no new matter not taken at first into consideration interferes, you will surely adhere to your resolution: but if the tables turn, if that which was strongest becomes weakest or fresh inducements not provided against before fall into the opposite scale, you will as surely break it. And that such accidents frequently happen, every one may satisfy himself who will attend carefully to the difference there is in our ideas of a thing between the time of resolving and the time of executing.

Tis true we do sometimes play tricks with our balance, making it incline to either side as we please; but then this is done by art, not by strength or authority, and always brought

brought about by the application of motives. For we have a power over our ideas, as has been remarked before, by stopping some of their channels to turn them into what other courses we like best, thereby ~~including~~ ^{excluding} some ideas and calling up others to our thoughts. We may close our ears against the admonitions of wisdom, or may hear them without attending, or may fill our imagination with something else that shall hinder them from entering: but it impeaches not the weight of a motive nor shews your superiour strength, that it does not operate when you will not let it come into the scale. And whoever watches himself narrowly when he practises this juggling, may always discern some motive of prejudice, favour, wilfulness, or shame of being overcome, which puts him upon the artifice: so that the mind will be found not so perfectly indifferent as she pretends in the very exercise of her indifference.

7. Here I shall take the liberty to stop a moment while I recommend it to every man to study diligently his motives of action; to examine what stock he has, as well of the permanent as of the transient kind, as well of his grand undertakings as of his sudden motions and manners of proceeding; what are their respective weights, either absolutely or
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comparatively with one another: to remark how they introduce or mutually affect each other, how they fluctuate, their seasons of vigour and faintness; to distinguish what motive actually swayed with him upon every particular occasion. If he can do all this compleatly he will discover the impositions of others, and what is better will avoid imposing upon himself, which is the worst of all deceits. As the world goes we lie under a necessity sometimes of alledging specious motives which did not influence us. A man asks you to lend him money which you have reason to think he will not repay, but you dare not tell him so, then you must put him off with excuses: but you ought always to know your own real motive. If the mind ever exerts a power of willing as well as acting, she performs that work by the instrumentality of motives, for therein lies her whole strength. When she perfectly knows her tools, where they lie, what they will do, and when they are in proper order, she may take her measures surely with respect to her moral and prudential conduct, and attain what the poet calls a life unacquainted with disappointment. In short I look upon the study of our motives as conducing more than any one thing to that most usefull of all sciences The knowledge of oneself.

8. We have seen how the same considerations do not weigh alike with different persons, nor with the same person at different times; how they fluctuate and vary, their colours change to and fro, their weight diminishes, vanishes and returns again, their form and parts continuing all along the same. Hence it appears that motives are compound ideas, containing something whereon the force of the whole and its title to be deemed a final cause depends, which when wanting, it loses its essence: for a motive having lost its force is no motive at all nor the cause of any thing. It remains then that we turn our thoughts to seek for that ingredient which gives efficacy to the compound and denominates it a motive.

C H A P. VI.

S A T I S F A C T I O N.

PLEASURE seems at first sight to bid the fairest for being that ingredient which gives weight to our motives, and we find by experience in multitudes of instances that it proves a sufficient inducement with
 act, for we perform many of our actions
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because we like them. And perhaps this may be the thing according to some notions of pleasure, for the word is not always taken precisely in the same sence. But it is the safest way to settle the meaning of our words by the standard of custom, and if we understand the term as it is commonly understood, we shall find pleasure often insufficient to perform the office of a motive, for we do many things against our liking. Pleasure in vulgar estimation stands opposed to business, duty, works of use and necessity: yet in all these we feel some engagement, self-approbation or complacence of mind, that carries us thro' with them. Pleasures usually so called often lose their gust, they satiate and cloy upon repetition and nauseate instead of inviting. Therefore Mr. Locke has fixed upon the term Satisfaction as being more extensive, comprehending all that complacence we feel as well in business as diversion, as well in the works of prudence as in the starts of fancy. I cannot follow a better authority, especially as I find nothing within my own experience or observation to contradict it: therefore shall adopt his term Satisfaction to express that vivifying ingredient which gives life and vigour to our motives. But to prevent misapprehension I think it necessary to subjoin a few remarks

marks in order to ascertain what I conceive we both understand by Satisfaction.

2. In the first place I scarce need to take notice of what is obvious to every one, that we are not always in so happy a situation as to choose between enjoyments which we will prefer; we are sometimes reduced to the hard necessity of choosing between evils which of them we judge the lightest. The pleuritic lying on his left side does not expect pleasure by turning to the other; he has no more in view than a diminution of pain. Mischief and displeasure seize upon us unawares and we think of nothing but how to deliver ourselves from them: dangers threaten and our care tends solely to escape them. Now in all these cases we are prompted to what we do by uneasiness, therefore uneasiness has an efficacy to set us at work as well as Satisfaction; and accordingly Mr. Locke has given them both for distinct principles of action, tho' I have blended them together into one. But this I do not from any variance in opinion but for convenience and shortness sake: and I think the junction may be made without any violence, for as a penny saved is a penny gotten, and the miser looks upon it as an actual gain if he can procure the abatement of a payment, so every diminution or avoidance of uneasiness is an approach towards satisfaction.

easy and pleasure does not solicit, nor business urge, nor danger threaten, she rests perfectly satisfied with her condition, desiring nothing further. Which induced Hieronymus to place happiness in vacuity or absence of pain, that is, in meer ease; supposing the sweetest pleasures engage us no otherwise than by creating a want of themselves, which fills us with an uneasiness we cannot remove without attaining them. But I may venture to refer it to the first man you meet in the street, whether there is not a real and sensible difference between actual pleasure and the bare absence of pain; for if this were sufficient to constitute happiness, we must be happy during every sound nap or fainting fit; because while the senses are gone so that we feel nothing, we certainly do not feel pain.

The same consideration I suppose led Epicurus to maintain that all pleasures were equal in degree and differed only in kind, for the lowest of them satisfies the mind and the highest can do no more; therefore a man finds as compleat satisfaction in pulling up the heel of his slipper in a morning, as he does in recovering his only child that had been stolen away last week by a gipsy. But this contradicts daily experience, which testifies that we find a much greater relish in some pleasures than we do in others. A man
may

may sit picking his fingers after dinner with perfect tranquillity of mind, but this is nothing to compare with the joy he feels on hearing the voice of an intimate friend at the door. Nor is it true that the mind can satisfy herself with little pleasures, unless when greater are not to be had or not apprehended in the imagination: who would not leave his trifling amusements upon being invited to a diversion he is extremely fond of, if no prudential or other motive withhold him? Why need the mind ever suspend her choice between two pleasures proposed until she has determined which is the greater, if either of them would answer her purpose alike? Therefore when several satisfactions offer together, that apprehended the greatest always prevails and carries away volition from the rest: nor can it be said to do so by the uneasiness of wanting it, for though we sometimes would forego an opportunity but that we fear we shall blame ourselves for having slipped it, yet this is not always the case; we frequently quit a lesser pleasure for a greater instantly upon summons without the least thought of what we might suffer by a self denial. There is the like difference of degree in uneasiness: when several accost us at once we fly that which presses the hardest. So if satisfaction pulls one way and uneasiness

drives another, which ever is the strongest overpowers the other and gives the turn to our motion.

Happy is it for us that we can content ourselves with a small pittance of satisfaction, for else our lives would pass most uncomfortably: poignant pleasures and high delights rarely come in our way, and we should have nothing but uneasiness to fill up the large intervals between them. How miserably would the shopkeeper and the artisan spend their days if they could work no longer than while the dread of starving hung over them! This perhaps might drive them into the several occupations at first, but their work furnishes them with an amusement that wholly engages their thoughts, and while they content themselves with finishing their tasks they remove the evil without having it perpetually stare them in the face. What enterprize of moment could we perform? what business requiring a length of time could ^we compleat, if we might never stir without some very powerfull incitement to spur us? How many useful acquirements should we miss if the apprehension of their being usefull were not enough to move us, without having some particular signal service they will do us under contemplation? Our dearest pleasures seldom drop into our mouths, but we must do many things

things to prepare for their reception, and what we do preparatory thereto partakes of the nature of business. For how lively expectations soever we may entertain at our entrance upon an undertaking, they cannot keep up their vigour during the course of a long work, which we pursue with that quiet complacency accompanying our ordinary motions. It has been commonly observed that a man can never succeed in any science, art or profession, unless he takes a liking to it; but the liking here requisite need not arise to that high pitch as to render the fatigues of his profession an uninterrupted scene of transport or delight. Hence we find that our gentle satisfactions, taken together in their whole amount, are much more valuable than our higher enjoyments; as exceeding them greatly in number, as furnishing us principally with employment for our time, and as serving us in our most usefull and important occasions.

5. In the third place I shall remark, that although I have assigned satisfaction for the active ingredient of our motive, yet if we examine the matter strictly, it is not very satisfaction but the prospect or idea of it; for these are different; one may have the full idea of a toothach one does not feel, and of a diversion one does not partake of. Now we do

do not use to enter upon action but for some end, which end is some satisfactory perception attainable thereby. Even when we walk for walking sake, it is not the bare motion, but the pleasant feel of our limbs or of the air, that excites us. But this perception follows upon the action and had no existence at the instant when the motive operated. Therefore it is not the substance, but the prospect or expectance of satisfaction, which makes that part of the compound rendering it a motive. And this expectance, though sometimes fallacious, suffices to put us in motion: the child, that went to play with the candle, expected pleasure but found only smart; and the coward, who runs away from his own shadow, expected a mischief that would not have attacked him.

Since then expectation is not the same with the thing expected, it follows that we may pursue satisfaction without being in a state of enjoyment, and fly uneasiness without being in a state of suffering. The former does not often happen, because being founded upon delusion, we soon discover our expectations to be delusive upon trial, which then changes our prospect and we change our measures accordingly. Yet it does happen sometimes, for those who have made pleasures their constant employment, quickly cloy themselves with
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the frequent repetition of them, yet still pursue them with delusive hopes of the same relish they used to find heretofore, and run from diversion to diversion in restless expectation of an enjoyment they cannot attain. But uneasiness exciting us to avoid it, may continue to operate without delusion: for if we find our endeavours upon trial effectual to ward off a mischief, this will encourage us to repeat them as often as the danger presents, and so long as we can keep evil aloof, we shall not fall into a state of suffering. If two old acquaintance, who had not met for some years before, were to espy one another on the opposite sides of the Haymarket, probably they would run together into the middle of the street, if the weather were fine and the ground dry, where they would join in an agreeable conversation: in the midst of their discourse they see a coach fifty yards off driving directly towards them, I suppose they would remove out of the way to one side or other still continuing their talk. What then is it puts them upon this action? not satisfaction, for they propose no addition to that by changing their ground: it is no other than the uneasiness of being trampled upon by the horses, which because they can avoid without trouble, makes no interruption of their enjoyment. He that walks along Cheapside must
turn

turn and wind perpetually to avoid jostling the other passengers : the prospect of uneasiness he would feel upon running against people, induces him to all those motions, which yet makes no abatement of any satisfaction he may have in the errand he goes upon, nor throws him into a state of suffering.

6. For my fourth remark I shall observe that present satisfaction is the end we constantly have in view on proceeding to action. Nor does this contradict what I have just been endeavouring to prove, for by present satisfaction I would not be understood so strictly as to mean the satisfaction we actually have at the instant of acting : for this is no subject of action nor can receive alteration thereby. We cannot unfeel the pain we feel by any effort of ours, nor does the pleasure we now have need an effort to procure it. But the satisfaction we propose in every exertion of our activity is that of the moment next immediately ensuing, and this may be called present satisfaction without any impropriety of speech. For we are constantly told the present time only is in our power, the past being gone and the future lying out of our reach : but this present time is in reality the next succeeding instant, that alone being the subject of our power, for we do not act in order to obtain what we have already. Perceptions
flow

flow in upon us without intermission, and we generally have a foresight of them before they come, as also a power many times to alter their course by the proper application of objects or management of our organs: therefore we keep constantly upon the look out, while we see that such perceptions as we like will rise of their own accord we have nothing to do, when they will not we use our activity to procure them. In all action there are three things to be considered, the prospect or expectation, the action itself, and the perception to be introduced thereby: the first has no other value than as it directs us what action to pursue, nor the second than as it tends to procure the third, so that our business lies in helping ourselves to procure satisfactory or escape uneasy perceptions. But as we must every instant have some perception or other, we must provide for the next ensuing perception, and as soon as that is had, another to follow immediately after furnishes us with the like employment: so that our wants, starting up successively without intermission, require a continual supply; which confines our cares to the present moment, leaving the provision for future moments to our subsequent endeavours.

- This accounts for what Mr. Locke has fully proved to be fact, that good, the greater
good

good acknowledged and apprehended to be ^{such}, does not always determine the Will: and I may add, it never does unless by means of the satisfaction we feel in making advances towards it; for if any distant advantage can raise in us a desire of attaining it, the gratification of this desire will afford a present satisfaction. And that remote good and evil have ^{such} effect upon us, daily experience bears witness: we flatter ourselves often with distant hopes and shudder at future dangers, we contemplate with pleasure the prospect of enjoyments afar off and look with horror upon misfortunes before they come. Suppose a person, in whose knowledge and veracity you could fully confide, should say to you, Sir, you shall continue in plenty and the possession of every thing you can desire to day and to morrow, but the third day your estate shall be seized, your children carried into bondage, and your body afflicted with painfull distempers: would not the news fill you with a cruel anxiety? On the other hand had you been tormented with the gout for a long while, and after having tried many remedies to no purpose had lost all hopes of relief, should you receive the like assurance that in two days time you should be set at ease and perfectly cured: should not you feel an exhilarating joy that would overpower the pangs
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of your distemper? And the like happens proportionably upon the prospect of any thing usefull or detrimental, pleasurable or troublesome, in a lower degree.

7. This presentiment of the future makes the great privilege of human nature, for were we void of it we should have nothing but appetite to follow like the brute creatures: but our concern for the morrow creates another appetite which prompts us to escape mischiefs that must be guarded against before hand, and pursue great advantages that require much time and labour to attain. It likewise lengthens our pleasures beyond their natural measure, for enjoyment generally holds only for a little moment, but expectation, hope and successful pursuit often supply us with a constant fund of delight for a long season. But on the other hand it is attended with some inconveniences by tormenting us sometimes with unavoidable evils before they come near us, and making us tremble at imaginary dangers that would never have fallen upon us.

And these derivative satisfactions fluctuate as much as the original: for we do not always find equal relish in the same enjoyment, nor does the prospect of it always appear in colours equally vivid. Neither can we observe any other rule in this change of colours than that they generally heighten upon the
nearer

nearer approach of the enjoyment. But the very prospect of an attainable good, or an avoidable evil, commonly proves satisfactory; therefore, however it may sometimes happen otherwise, for the most part we continue in a state of enjoyment in some degree or other during the pursuit of a benefit we hope to acquire, or avoidance of a mischief we can easily ward off. Whence comes the saying Hope makes the heart glad.

8. Fifthly I shall take notice that satisfaction always attracts and uneasiness always repels; and either of them operates according to the present occasion. If some advantage invites, we set ourselves instantly to pursue it; if a greater starts up in view, we quit the former and run after the latter; if mischief approaches, we set ourselves to prevent it; and while it continues to hang over us, we continue our efforts to keep it aloof. Therefore to me it seems that both satisfaction and uneasiness have a like efficacy to make us either change or adhere to our measures as occasion shall require. But Mr. Locke ascribes the change of action solely to uneasiness, and the continuance of it to satisfaction: it behoves me then to give my reasons for departing from so great an authority.

I shall alledge first that properly speaking there is no such thing as a continuance of
action,

action, all our perceptions and all our volitions being transient and momentary. What we term a continuance is indeed only a repetition of successive perceptions and volitions of the same kind: just as a spout continues to run while it pours forth innumerable drops without any interval between. So if you stare at the same picture for half an hour together, the sight comes by successive rays of light affecting your eyes in the same manner, and the perceptions raised thereby, altho' exactly similar, are individually distinct. And if you keep pointing with a stick for the same time, successive volitions hold up your hand, for should you forbear to repeat them, your arm would fall instantly to your side.

But waving this nicety, let us consider a series of motions, all proceeding upon one plan and with the same design, as a continuance of action: yet I think one may produce instances wherein we depart from our design and change our measures without being driven by the lash of uneasiness. Suppose a man sitting down to his harpsichord intending to play thro' an opera of Corelli: in the midst of his diversion enters a messenger to tell him that if he will come away directly to the minister he may be intated in a considerable preferment he had long wished and ardently sought for. Is it uneasiness or joy that makes

him leave his music and run to catch up his hat? Suppose a company of young folks agreeably entertained in dancing; somebody tells them of a fine fire-work just going to be played off in a neighbouring garden: I will not ensure they shall not all run instantly to the window. When their curiosity a little abates and before the sight begins to cloy, some one puts them in mind of their dancing; perhaps the rest take the admonition and they run back to their sport as hastily as they quitted it. Surely this is a change of action and a departure from the plan laid down for the employment of the night: Yet I appeal to any gentleman or lady, who may have experienced such an incident, whether they feel the least spice of uneasiness either in breaking off their diversion or returning to it again. On the other hand suppose a man travelling through a lonely forest infested with a gang of desperate villains who murder all they meet, he sees them coming towards him and has but just time to jump into a stinking bog where he can hide his head behind a little bush: the rogues halt at a small distance from him, where they sit chattering perhaps an hour or two, all which time I suppose he will hardly quit his lurking hole. Now what is it holds him to this continuance of action?

tion? is it satisfaction? He sees none and expects none by sticking up to the shoulders in dirt and nastiness. Is it any other than the uneasy dread of falling into their hands, where he can expect nothing but misery and destruction?

9. But I am so averse to differing from Mr. Locke that whenever I cannot bring my notions to tally with his, I hunt about for all expedients to reconcile them, so that I may hold my own consistently with those he entertains. And such expedient is most likely to be found by observing upon the unsteadiness and variableness of language. The most carefull as well as the giddy use their words in various significations. Your men of close application, though taking their terms from the common language, find themselves under a necessity of recasting them in a mould of their own to fit them for purposes that were not wanted in the usual intercourses of life: and sometimes the moulds they severally use differ from one another in some little particular. What if this should be the case between Mr. Locke and myself? Might we not then think the same at bottom while we express ourselves by opposite sides of a contradiction? Perhaps what he calls a continuance of Action I should call a continuance of courses: and

so there is no repugnance because we are not talking of the same thing.

Now in order to understand what I mean by courses, please to take notice that we have each of us a set of views, aims and desires, leading us into those courses of behaviour which fill up the employment of our lives: and though we may frequently step aside out of one track into another, we still continue to pursue courses of the same set. The word carries this sense in common conversation when we speak of virtuous or vicious courses: nor is a man reckoned to alter his courses because he quits the exercise of one virtue or gratification of one vicious appetite for that of another as opportunity occurs. Neither does every turning after other pursuits at intervals make a discontinuance of the first: for some are of such a nature as not to be compleated but by returning to the work at distant seasons with large gaps and spaces intervening. Thus a man may continue a course of physic though he dispatches business, takes diversions and does many things between whiles. Therefore Mr. Locke would probably say of the man that left his harpsichord to get a place, that he had two desires directing his courses, the love of music, and of money or honour, and when the latter drew him away from the former, here

here was no change of measures but the continuance of a pursuit he had long since been engaged in. The dancers were following a course of pleasure which kept them on in the same road how much soever particular objects might vary. That the poor traveller was held in his quagmire by self-preservation, which is a main principle influencing us in the course of our lives, and which we never throw aside until some hard pressure of fortune shall make us uneasy with our being.

And that Mr. Locke had these courses in view appears manifest from the instances he makes use of in support of his assertion; which are that of “an idle fellow whom
“you shall not move to industry convince
“him never so much of the advantage
“plenty has over poverty, make him see
“and own never so plainly that the handsome conveniencies of life are better than
“naughty penury, so long as he can content
“himself with the latter and finds no uneasiness in it. And of a worldling who tho’
“never so well persuaded of the advantages
“of virtue, that it is as necessary to a man
“who has any great aims as food to life,
“yet enters not upon any ~~caution~~ pursuit
“of this confessed greater good until he
“hungers and thirsts after righteousness and
“feels an uneasiness in the want of it.”

Now I shall not deny that we seldom if ever fail to continue our courses of action so long as they prove satisfactory, nor change them until they become insipid and cloy, or lead into inconveniences that give us a disgust of them. Neither can you well reclaim a man from vicious courses by the offer of satisfaction, for you have none to propose that will be such to him: the pleasure and ease of virtue arise from the practice of it, and he who has never practised it will see nothing inviting in it. Therefore you must begin with him by representing the mischievous tendency of his evil doings, and if you can bring him to a dread and abhorrence of them which shall make him uneasy under the apprehension of them, you may prevail upon him to change his measures. There are indeed besides the satisfaction your proficients in virtue feel in every exercise of it, certain rewards and fruits that any man would desire, but these operate at first by the uneasiness they create in the want of them. For when a man has taken a resolution of purchasing those rewards, the solicitations of old habits will frequently draw him back into his old courses, upon which the uneasiness and vexation of having failed in his resolution may drive him to renew it again, and while he adheres the uneasiness of denying his other desires

desires still torments him: so that he must remain in a state of uneasiness while the change is making and until it be compleated by the old habits entirely losing their vigour, Which makes good the observation of ancient and modern ages, that the paths of virtue are thorny and rugged at their entrance, but lead into a pleasant and delightful country.

10. Thus tho' I have represented action in a different light from Mr. Locke, we must not therefore be thought to differ in substance but in our manner of handling it. For tho' I do not pretend to a clearer, perhaps I may to a more microscopic eye: I consider action more minutely, endeavouring to analyze it into its primary parts. Now the shape and other circumstances belonging to the parts may vary greatly from those of the whole. Look upon your table and you see it round or square or of some other regular form: hold your eye near the wood and you will perceive it waving in veins or running into longitudinal fibres: the little particles composing it attract and cohere strongly to one another, but the table neither attracts nor coheres to the paper, the ink bottle, nor the penknife you lay upon it. So if a habit of drinking be taken as one action, it may always be continued so long as a man can satisfy himself in

the practice, and always broken off as soon as the uneasiness of a gout, or other mischief brought upon him thereby, shall exceed his fondness for the liquor : and yet the single acts whereof that large action consists may spring from satisfaction or uneasiness indifferently as either happens at present. For he may change his bottle either because he dislikes that standing before him, or because he pleases himself with the thought of tasting another sort ; and he may stay sometime at the tavern for the pleasure of the company, and continue there after that pleasure ceases, to avoid the uneasiness of going home, where he will not know what to do with himself.

Since then nature has furnished me with a microscope why should I not accept her favour, for she bestows not the slightest of her gifts in vain ? The Temple of Knowledge cannot be built without the concurrent labours of many artificers working with various qualifications. Who then shall blame me for making such use as I can of my little talent in pursuing minute discoveries that persons of larger views overlook ? Should I fail of doing any good service myself, somebody else may turn them to better advantage : for it is no uncommon thing in the sciences, as well as arts and manufactures, to see one man pre-

prepare materials for another to work up. However, if my health and spirits hold, I shall strive hard but I will make some texture out of my materials that a man shall find convenient for his service without sending it to another operator to be finished.

11. I hope matters are pretty well accommodated with Mr. Locke in regard to the difficulty before mentioned: but I dont know how I shall come off with him upon another point where he speaks of the uneasiness of desire, and makes desire constantly accompanied with uneasiness. I can go with him half way, so far as to admit that desire often creates us cruel uneasinesses, and that the smart of their wounds rises in proportion to the intenseness of our desire. But this happens only when desire meets with a disappointment; when two incompatible desires urge strongly at once, both of which cannot be gratified; when some hindrance checks or at least retards desire. For while desire runs on smoothly in its course towards attainment, while we want nothing besides the object we pursue, while no bar stands across the way, nor difficulty occurs to check our speed, for my part I can see nothing but continual satisfaction accompanying the progress.

I may say with Mr. Dryden, " Old as I
" am, for lady's love unfit, The power of
" beauty I remember yet." I still bear in
mind the days of my courtship, which in the
language of all men is called a season of de-
fire; yet unless I strangely forget myself, it
proved to me a season of satisfaction too.
But, says Mr. Locke, it is better to marry
than to burn, where we may see what it is
that chiefly drives men into a conjugal life.
This for ought I know might be the motive
with some men, who being of an unsociable
and undomestic turn, can see nothing good in
matrimony but submit to it as a lesser evil
delivering them from a greater. And I can
excuse an old bachelor for entertaining so
despicable a notion of a state he never expe-
rienced the pleasures of himself. Others it
may be make their engagements too hastily,
and then would break them off again thro'
the shame of being doing a foolish thing, till
the smart of their burnings becomes intoler-
able and drives them headlong into the ma-
trimonial net. But this, thanks to my stars,
was not my case: my own judgement, upon
mature deliberation and the approbation of
my friends, gave leave for desire to take its
course. I might feel some scorplings in my
youthfull days when it would have been im-
prudent to quench them, and while the ob-
ject

ject of desire lay at an undiscernible distance : but as the prospect drew nearer and desire had licence to begin its career, it had no more the fierceness of a furnace but became a gentle flame casting forth a pleasing exhilarating warmth. Perhaps I might meet with some little rubs in the way that gave me disturbance : if my fair one spake a civil word to any tall well-bred young fellow, I might entertain some idle apprehensions lest he should supplant me. When I took a hackney coach to visit her, if we were jammed in between the carts, perhaps I might fret and fume and utter many an uneasy Pish ; but as soon as we got through the stop, though desire abated not, every shadow of uneasiness fled away. As near as I can remember during the whole scene, desire close attended by satisfaction directed all my steps and occupied all my moments : it awaked with me in the morning and was the last idea swept away by sleep : it invigorated me in business, it heightened my diversions, it gave me life when in company and entertained me with delightfull reflections when alone. Nor did it fail of accompanying me to the altar, where laying aside its sprightliness and gaiety as unsuitable to the solemnity of the occasion, it became more calm and decent, exhibiting the prospect of an agreeable companion who should double
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the enjoyments and alleviate the troubles of life; who should ease me from the burthen of household cares and assist me in bringing up a rising family; whose conversation should be a credit to me abroad and a continued feast to me at home. Nor yet did possession put an end to desire, which found fresh fuel to keep it alive from time to time in mutual intercourses of kindness and hearty friendship, in communication of interests, counsels and sentiments; and could often feed upon the meekest trifles. How often, having picked up some little piece of news abroad, has desire quickened my pace to prattle it over at home! how often, upon hearing of something curious in the shops, have I gone to buy it with more pleasure than the keenest sportsman goes after his game! Thus desire, leading delight hand in hand, attended us for many years, still retaining its first vigour although a little altered in shape and complexion; until my other half was torn away from me. Then indeed desire left me, for it had nothing now to rest upon, and with it fled joy, delight, content, and all those tender desires that used to put me upon the common actions of the day; for I could like nothing, find amusement in nothing and care for nothing: and in their stead succeeded melancholy, tastelessness and perpetual restlessness. And though I called in all my philosophy to rescue me from this disconsolate con-

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condition, it could not relieve me presently, but had a long struggle before it could get the better of nature.

12. I doubt not there are many persons in the world, who having been as happily paired, could read the account here given of myself as feelingly as ever I wrote it. As for your determined bachelors, or injudicious husbands who have married only for money or for beauty or for a frolic or for a bedfellow or for they did not well know why, tho' they may think me romantic yet I suppose they have had desires of their own of some sort or other : either of raising a fortune or of preferment or of building or of gardening or of sports or of dress or of acquisitions in learning, which have engaged them in long pursuits. And I believe we shall all give in our verdict unanimously upon the positive evidence of our own several experience, That our desires have furnished us with the greatest part of our enjoyments in life ; and that desire so long as it can move on successfully without rub or disappointment, without wanting fuel to feed it and without pain or unlucky accidents intervening, has supplied us with a continual fund of satisfaction. But when desire grows languid for want of fresh matter to work upon, when it cannot, like a wanton bird, hop about from twig to twig, from bush to bush continuing its play, then the
time

time hangs heavy upon our hands : when it meets with crosses or delays, when it rises to impatience, or is of such a nature as to require an immediate gratification that cannot be had ; then indeed vexation and uneasiness find a ready entrance.

And that the uneasiness Mr. Locke found in desire, proceeds from some of those causes, may appear by the examples he produces in proof of it. Desire, says he, deferred makes the heart sick. Leave out the participle Deferred, and the rest of the sentence will not hold true. Change it for another and we may lay down the contrary as a maxim; for desire promoted makes the heart glad. Therefore desire is not in its own nature a state of uneasiness, nor unless rendred so by disappointment or delay. Give me children, says Rachael, or I die ; but this was not till after a long course of barrenness she began to despair of having any ; when Joseph was coming we hear no more of such exclamations, yet I suppose she still continued to desire it might prove a boy. Where he speaks of the uneasiness of hunger and thirst, surely he must have in his thoughts the cravings of a person almost dying with either, rather than the common returns of appetite at stated seasons during health. I speak only for myself, when I sit down to dinner I feel no uneasiness

ness in being hungry, but rather rejoice at having a good appetite from whence I expect a better relish to my victuals than any sauces could give them. How do other people fare upon the like occasion? If on coming home from a journey in hot weather, you find yourself faintish and drouthy and call for a glass of wine and water, have you not a pleasure in seeing the wine pour from the bottle or sparkle in the glass, even before you bring it to your mouth? And does not this pleasure arise from your desire? for you would feel it no longer on the like prospect after having fully quenched your thirst. Pretty bottle, says Sganarelle, how sweet are thy little glug glugs! how envied would be my lot wert thou to keep always full for all my pourings! Desire then gave the glugs their sweetness, for Sganarelle was in a state of desire, not of fruition, when he solaced himself with their music, the liquor having not yet entred his lips: nor was there I suppose any thing very harmonious in the sound, or any other charm besides the assurance of his bottle being full and the means of accomplishing his desire abundantly at hand.

Could uneasiness alone determine the Will, how wretched must the condition of mankind appear! for the Will never ceases working from morning to night: we are always

ways a doing, but should have nothing to do unless to deliver ourselves from uneasinesses following close upon one anothers heels. Human life from beginning to end would be nothing but a restless endeavour to throw off an evil we could never totally remove, and would exhibit one continued scene of uninterrupted uneasiness. But kind nature be praised, our condition is not quite so forlorn and comfortless. We have our hours, and those of activity too, wherein we can employ ourselves with satisfaction and delight: and since in those pleasurable seasons we do not stand idle, there must be something else besides uneasiness capable of urging us to action.

13. Mr. Locke it seems once held that ancient, and till his time universally received opinion, That good, the greater good, understood and apprehended to be such, determined the Will: he first discovered that it was always something present, and no distant good, that gave the turn to our activity; for which I acknowledge myself and the world greatly obliged to him; for an important and leading discovery it was, as it has let us more than any thing into the secret springs of human action. But since new discoveries are seldom perfected at once, may I be permitted to offer at an improvement and add that present satisfaction as v

ness in being hungry, but rather rejoice at having a good appetite from whence I expect a better relish to my victuals than any sauces could give them. How do other people fare upon the like occasion? If on coming home from a journey in hot weather, you find yourself faintish and drouthy and call for a glass of wine and water, have you not a pleasure in seeing the wine pour from the bottle or sparkle in the glass, even before you bring it to your mouth? And does not this pleasure arise from your desire? for you would feel it no longer on the like prospect after having fully quenched your thirst. Pretty bottle, says Sganarelle, how sweet are thy little glug glugs! how envied would be my lot wert thou to keep always full for all my pourings! Desire then gave the glugs their sweetness, for Sganarelle was in a state of desire, not of fruition, when he solaced himself with their music, the liquor having not yet entered his lips: nor was there I suppose any thing very harmonious in the sound, or any other charm besides the assurance of his bottle being full and the means of accomplishing his desire abundantly at hand.

Could uneasiness alone determine the Will, how wretched must the condition of mankind appear! for the Will never ceases working from morning to night; we are always

minates our condition : now one may have the prospect of a very different sort of ground from that one stands upon. Delightfull is it, says Lucretius, to stand upon firm land and see the mariners tossing and toiling in a tempestuous sea. Delightfull to behold the bloody scenes of war spread over a spacious field without sharing in the danger yourself. Not because there is any pleasure in seeing others tormented, but because the prospect of evils from which yourself are exempt is delightfull. Nor I suppose would your delight be the less if you were to do something towards escaping the danger, provided you had certain and easy means at hand for effecting your escape : were you on board the fleet, but stepping into a boat that should land you safe before the storm began to rage ; or in the army, and mounting an easy pad that should carry you far enough out of harm's way before the battle joined. But where Mr. Locke treats of the uneasiness giving birth to our actions, I cannot understand him of the prospect but of very uneasiness itself ; which to my thinking cannot consist with a state of enjoyment, but must necessarily, according to the degree of it, throw the mind into a state of suffering so long as it continues and

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answers, Si

under. So that it is not timely caution against an approaching mischief, but the pressure of uneasiness actually felt, that alone suffices to set us at work: and this equally the same whether the avoidance of evil or attainment of distant good be the object of our endeavours. For, says he, there is a desire of ease from pain, and another of absent positive good, in which latter also the desire and uneasiness is equal: as much as we desire any absent good so much are we in pain for it. Now whether the prospect of absent attainable good does always fill us with a painful want and uneasiness I have some reasons to doubt: but shall defer giving them until I have gone thro' my next observation, which may render what I have to say upon this point more easily intelligible.

15. For my sixth remark I shall lay down That satisfaction and uneasiness often beget and introduce each other: the bare escape from pain gives a sensible pleasure, and the loss of any great pleasure grieves us: whatever affects us strongly of either kind generally leaves its contrary behind. In time to come, says Eneas, we shall find entertainment in reflecting on the hardships we now undergo. Sufferings not likely to return are of the mind; and past pleasures we enjoy remembered with regret.

A man just recovered from a fever finds enjoyment in the very deliverance from his disease; he can pass the day agreeably though with his servants only about him in a manner he would have thought insipid, lonely and irksome at another time; for he satisfies himself with ease and wants nothing further to divert him. Thus a great deal of our good springs out of evil; we should often rust in idleness and feel the time heavy upon our hands, were it not for pain, difficulty and danger, which rouse us to action: and though they make us smart for the present, repay us abundantly afterwards by affording a greater satisfaction in having surmounted them than they gave us trouble in surmounting.

On the other hand suppose a man provided with plenty of all conveniences and means of ordinary amusement and fully contented with his present situation: yet tell him of some high diversion going forward in the neighbourhood which he must not partake of, and you may perhaps raise a want in him that shall vitiate all his other enjoyments and throw him into a state of disquiet and uneasiness. For I shall never deny that strong desires do frequently raise an uneasy want of the object they fasten upon; nor that this does sometimes prevail where the satisfaction of advancing towards the object would not: but I

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conceive this is not always the case, but that desire sometimes operates by the satisfaction of pursuing, and sometimes by the uneasiness of wanting, the thing desired. If a lazy fellow has some acquisition greatly to his liking proposed, he may make a few faint motions at first and please himself with the prospect of possessing it, but his indolence puts him off from day to day from using any significant endeavours; he then begins to reflect with himself, finds the completion of his wishes no nearer than at first setting out; this raises an uneasy want of them which grows greater and greater by degrees, till at last it overpowers his slothfulness and makes him set his hand in good earnest to the plow.

16. That uneasiness is the motive in most of those instances mentioned by Mr. Locke I shall readily agree, and might produce others wherein uneasiness does the ^{work} ~~job~~ although pleasure in the eye of the world runs away with the credit of it: for many times it is not easy to discern which of the two determined the Will. Your debauchees, your triflers and very fashionable people, who make pleasure their sole employment, I doubt not find delight in it at first; but pleasure too often ~~generated~~ abates of its relish and at length becomes wholly insipid: yet still they run on round of diversions thinking they

follow pleasure all the while, and so indeed they do though not with satisfaction but for want of something else to amuse them, or through the cravings of an unnatural appetite brought upon them by custom. Follow them to their clubs and you may hear them sing without joy, laugh without being pleased, and thrum over the same jests till they grow thread-bare. View them in their routs and they run on the same roll of compliments and common expressions, talking incessantly without having any thing to say. Peep upon them at their toilets and you will perceive dress to be a labour undergone to avoid appearing hideous and out of mode among company. Some real satisfactions they may have when any thing new or unexpected engages their fancy : but chiefly I believe in going on the way to their parties, which is a kind of business, being an action undertaken not for its own sake but for some end : they may then rejoice at having thrown off the insupportable burthen of time and escaped the misery of staying at home alone, or may flatter themselves with the same relish in their diversions they used formerly to enjoy ; for delusive expectations will satisfy the mind so long as the delusion holds. Thus the cloven-footed tyrant invigiles the unwary with unobtrusive wages at a

them to his service by rendring them unfit for any other, he shortens their allowance, giving them no more than just enough to persuade them they earn something, and for the most part lashes them through his drudgery with scourges or pinches them with his iron claws.

Now let us do justice on all sides, and confess honestly that the virtuous man does not always find delight in the practice of his virtues. There is a joy, a complacence of mind which I hope every one of us feels upon acting right : but there is likewise a shame, a vexation, a compunction upon acting wrong ; and this latter often serves to keep us steady in our good courses when the other would have failed. Could we behold virtue naked, says Plato, we should find her so divinely charming that we could never like any thing else : but virtue is a modest virgin, she will not let you see her naked until you are wedded to her ; she displays a hand, an arm, a cheek at a time as you get further into her familiarity. Therefore howmuchsoever young admirers may be smitten with her at first sight while covered with her veil, this like all sudden desires cannot hold its vigour : but the solicitations of passion or old vicious will draw them from their pursuit, general persuasion of her being a

consummate beauty shall raise a want of her acquaintance that may overpoize all uncafinesses beside. As for those who are become intimate with the lovely creature, they may see so much of her beauties and retain such a taste of her sweetness as shall fill them with a warm and steady delight, sufficient to make them surmount difficulties and troubles with pleasure, and if I may so say, render uncafiness itself perfectly easy. I can imagine it possible in theory that a man may have so strong a relish for the practice of virtue as may make his condition happy under the greatest pain : that he may look upon all present sufferings as nothing for the exceeding weight of glory that lies in store hereafter. For I know any strong desire has power sometimes to pluck out the sting of pain : I have experienced it myself in little complaints, such as an aching corn or a grumbling tooth, which tho' I have felt, I have despised and not wished to remove when eager in the pursuit of something greatly to my fancy. But I much question whether ^{the} my acquisition of so strong a desire as shall keep a man easy in Phalaris's bull, be practicable among the sons of Adam : it is a great matter that can require resolution enough to carry us through our common difficulties and troubles without being overcome by them. Therefore unless we are able to acquire such a

and felt a want of virtue when absent as well as a delight in her company when present, we should make very little advance in our progress towards her.

Thus the lives of all men, the virtuous and the vicious alike, though not in equal proportion, are checquered; not only with respect to the vicissitudes of health and distemper, success and disappointment, favours and frowns of fortune attending them, but also to the motives of joy or vexation, content or disquiet, spurring on alternately to action. Desire, like a smiling Angel, and its bastard offspring Want, like the knight of the ill-favoured face, direct our conduct by turns. While some idle passion passing by holds desire in chat, the other jumps into the box; as soon as the intruder can be got rid of, the rightful coachman resumes his seat. While he holds the reins we roll smoothly and currently along, feasting our eyes upon the glad-some prospect before us; but when his deputy drives, clouds of noisome dust obstruct our view, we feel the carriage jolt and hobble, tossing us to and fro and knocking our brains perpetually against the sides. For as desire or want actuate our motions, in a state of enjoyment or a state of and this whether our object be some

some distant good or the removal from some approaching evil.

17. Now after what has been laid down under this sixth remark, nobody will expect me to controvert with Mr. Locke, that desire often begets uneasiness, and how much we desire an absent positive good so much we are in pain for it: but this I apprehend never happens until something obstructs our advances towards the good desired. Want does not come before, nor does the child use to be older than the parent. We cannot be said to want what we may have when we please or are in the ready way to obtain, yet we desire it or else we should not proceed in the way. Some desires do not tend to immediate gratification: if a man fond of hunting meets with friends who propose a match for the next day, he may desire to make one among them and give orders to his servant relative thereto without any want of the diversion, which were it offered he would not choose to go upon directly nor until he had prepared himself by a good night's rest for the fatigue. What we possess we cannot be thought to want, though we may desire the continuance of it; but that is for our future occasions, not to remove any present uneasiness. Every man having just received his last years income, desires I suppose to receive his next
also,

also, but he does not want it, nor had he it in hand and were a prudent man, would he make use of it for his expences of the current year. We all desire life and health and do many things for their preservation, but while in vigour, peace and plenty, what want do we feel of either? Can we never choose a food because it is wholesome, nor take an agreeable exercise to mend our constitution, unless driven by approaching sickness or affrighted by the king of terrors staring us in the face? We all desire the fresh air we breath, but must we never walk into the fields to enjoy a purer draught until almost suffocated by the smoke of town?

18. Besides although every considerable desire may have its opposite want and either of them be capable of inciting us to action; when we seek for the motive we must consider what actually operated. For the mind may have many motives in store which do not always enter the scale, and when they do not, have no share in weighing down the balance. Whatever other folks might do, Mr. Locke I dare say would agree with me that an action can be ascribed to no motive that was not present in the thought or imagination at the time of acting. A man goes to the playhouse thinking only to see the play, and there meets with an intimate acquaintance

tance in whose conversation he takes great delight : perhaps he did not know the other would be there, perhaps he had heard it last week but utterly forgot it again ; amusement then was his motive, the meeting his friend had no share in his motions, although had that occurred to his thoughts he would have gone ten times more readily. Therefore to discover the true spring of action, it is not enough to know that want is capable of performing the office of a spring, but we must examine whether we had such want in view at the instant of bestirring ourselves. The hard student, says Mr. Locke will not leave his studies for the pleasures of appetite, but when hunger begins to make him uneasy, then away he goes to remove it. But is this the case with every student ? When I have been staring all the morning at the light of nature till I have stared myself almost blind, I find my spirits want recreation : I then throw aside my papers some time before dinner, the veriest trifle suits my purpose best, the philosopher can loll out at window like miss Gawkey to see the wheelbarrow trundle, or the butchers dog carry the tray, and is perfectly contented with his situation as being fittest for the present occasion. Presently the bell rings, and down run I into the parlour. Now did Whitefield and Westley endeavour to stop me,

me, bellowing out their exhortations to abstinence, self-denial and mortification, possibly I might fret a good deal, and the uneasiness of wanting my dinner urge me to exert all my might in brushing by them. But by good luck they do not honour me with their acquaintance, nor have I any of their revelations commanding me to austerities: so that the thought of starving or of what I should suffer by missing a meal never once enters into my head, and therefore cannot be the motive actuating my motions.

But neither does it appear to me universally true, that how much we desire absent good so much we are in pain for it. There are many little goods weighty enough to turn the mental scale, but not strong enough to give us pain. We have numberless gentle desires continually prompting us to common actions, yet too feeble to beget any offspring. When these prompt us, if the object can be readily come at, 'tis very well: if not, we give ourselves no further concern, nor think it worth any trouble to procure; we feel no want, no pain, nor disappointment, in the miss of it. Sometimes I walk to and fro in my garden in the country intending only to ruminate on some trifle or other; perhaps I espy a peach that looks ripe and inviting, and I reach out my hand to pluck it: should my gardener tell me,

me, Sir, I thought to have reserved that for the company you expect to morrow, or should any other little reason occur to stop me, I should forbear; but if nothing intervenes I go on to compleat my purpose. Now when I reflect on the state of my mind on such occasions and examine mine ideas with the closest application of the microscope, as well when I gratify my fancy as when I restrain it, I cannot discern the least pain or want or uneasiness imaginable: and therefore crave leave to conclude that something else, besides want and uneasiness, is capable of determining me to the use of my powers.

19. Whence then comes it that Mr. Locke and I entertain so different notions concerning desire? For we are both carefull plodding folks not used to do things hastily but sifting our thoughts and weighing our words before we deal them out. Is the difference owing to the microscopic make of mine eye, that sees minuter goods, smaller actions, slenderer desires, than other people? or is there some fallacy, some equivocation, some various use of language, that keeps us asunder? Perhaps what I take for desire while successfull in its career, he may call joy or hope or by some other name. Perhaps all that we do in pursuit of the same object, tho'

I should think it a series of distinct actions and distinct volitions, he may consider as one action and one determination of the Will, which while retaining its full vigour and the purpose not compleated, we do not depart from to make a new determination until pressed by some urgent want or uneasiness. Thus if your hard student determines at breakfast to study so many hours and then take an airing abroad, while he turns over his books, or when he throws them aside, here is no determination made of the Will, for that was done once for all in the morning: nor can you draw him from his plan before the determined time by any sollicitations of pleasure, but should his head ach or his stomach cry cupboard, the uneasiness of that might drive him into a new course of action different from that he had determined upon before. I wish somebody would help us to a clue to guide through this labyrinth and bring us together again, for I am never better satisfied with myself than when travelling in his company. In the mean while though I reverence his authority beyond that of all others, whether ancient or modern, in matters relating to human nature, yet he will excuse me for adhering to my own judgement until it shall be motion: for he I am in the world to

impose an authority upon any body, or desire to draw followers by any other force than the conviction of their own judgement. Yet I still hope the difference is not a variance of sentiment but of expression or of the manner wherein we consider the same subject, and that we travel the same road tho' by different branches. But as one cannot go on currently in any other way than that one is acquainted with, I shall continue to proceed in my own track, trusting that we shall quickly be found walking hand in hand again and speaking almost the same language.

20. In the seventh place let it be noted that neither satisfaction nor uneasiness ever enter the mind without some other sensation or idea to introduce them. For as you cannot have the pleasure of sweetness without putting something sweet into your mouth, nor the delight of a prospect without having some delightful prospect to look upon; so neither can you procure satisfaction without seeing or hearing or contemplating or reflecting on something satisfactory. And that the satisfaction is something distinct from the concomitant ideas, appears manifest because it may be separated from them: for the same object, presenting in the same shape and features, affects us variously, being sometimes alluring and at other times insipid. One may be extremely

tremely desirous of seeing a particular play, but being disappointed this week, may not care a farthing for it the next, according as one happens to be differently disposed: the play is the same, the actors the same, and the opportunities the same with those you wished for before, nor can you find any other difference than only the relish. This makes good what I observed before, that all motives are compound ideas, for tho' satisfaction be the only ingredient weighing in the scale, others are necessary to serve as a vehicle for conveying it to the mind.

21. The eighth particular relating to satisfaction follows naturally from the last: for if we cannot have satisfaction but by applying some vehicle to convey it, it behoves us to look out for the proper vehicles containing the desired ingredient within them. Nature makes up the mixtures herself, nor have we any hand in the composition: sugar has its sweetness, gall its bitterness, success its joy and disappointment its vexation, by her provision; we can neither alter nor diminish the relish of things by our own power. Sometimes she shifts her ingredients, taking out satisfaction and leaving the vehicle insipid or substituting uneasiness in its room: but even these changes of taste are of her making, being effected by the variable nature of our palates disposed to

different viands at different times, nor can we help ourselves or restore them at pleasure to their former state, but must take objects as we find them according to the present disposition either of our body or mind. This nobody will deny, nor say that when salt has lost its savour we have wherewith to salt it; or that we can always raise the same fondness we had for a particular diversion tother day, or make nothing of a fatigue we used to undergo with cheerfulness.

22. Thus far we go on currently without opponent or contradiction; but in this divided disputatious world one must not expect to travel any road long without a check. There are people, namely, your sticklers for indifferency of Will, who pretend that nature has left some of her vehicles empty, indifferent to receive either satisfaction or uneasiness as we please to sprinkle it upon them, or mingle up others so loosely that we can pick out the vivifying ingredient and throw in its opposite, thus changing the quality of a motive and rendring that satisfactory which was naturally distastefull. Not that they deny volition always follows the last act of the understanding, but say they, we have a certain degree of power to give colours to our ideas and controul the understanding, so as to make it pronounce sentence against the clearest de-

cision of judgement or strongest solicitation of passion.

Here I have the pleasure of returning into my old alliance again and joining forces with Mr. Locke, whom I find as little inclined to this notion of indifferency as myself. Those he had to deal with, it seems, had delivered themselves so obscurely concerning this antecedent indifferency, as they called it, that he could not tell where they placed it: whether between the thought and judgement of the understanding, and the decree of the Will, where there appears no room for any thing; or before the former, which is a state of darkness exhibiting no object whereon to exercise our power. But by a book not extant in his time, Dr. King upon the origin of evil and his profound commentator, I can discern where they place this supposed indifferency, to wit, between the thought and judgement of the understanding; that is, between the action being proposed and the preference of that action or its forbearance: and the matter according to their representation stands thus. The mind sits in judgement between several objects offered to her option, arguments occur in favour of either, and unexceptionable evidences are produced; she sees plainly which has the strongest cause, yet gives judgement for the weakest by virtue of her

arbitrary power. Or some council makes a motion of course which never used to be denied and which there is no reason for denying, nevertheless she will reject it merely because she will. So the province of indifference lies between the trial and the judgement, which the understanding pronounces by particular direction from the Will, annexing the idea of Best to that which had it not before, and this the understanding having discerned gives judgement accordingly: and that idea the Will annexes by her own sole authority, after full cognisance of the cause, without regard to the merits and uninfluenced by any motive at all. But is there really no motive inducing the mind to annex this idea, if any such power she has? for acting upon our ideas is an act as well as acting upon our limbs, and she does not chuse to enter upon action of any kind unless for some end proposed, or to obtain some effect she conceives will prove satisfactory. Nor must we take understanding here in the vulgar sence for the judgement of reason, but for every discernment of the perceptive faculty, including the suggestions of fancy and impulses of passion; which may start up unawares and whisper the judge in the ear just before giving sentence, although they had not spoken a word during the whole course of the trial.

Your

Your abettors of indifference being solemn folks deal altogether in general terms and abstract reasonings; but to my thinking the abstract is seen clearest in the concrete, for ideas fluctuate in our reflection nor can we hold them long in the same state. If you would judge between two oranges you have seen a little while ago, which is the deeper coloured, you will think sometimes the one, and sometimes the other: but set them close together and fix your eye upon them, this will keep your idea of both steady so that you may quickly perceive which is the redder and which the paler. Therefore I wish they had given us instances of some particular actions wherein they apprehended this privilege of indifference is exerted, but since they have thought it below their dignity, or unbecoming their gravity, I shall attempt to do it for them: and if I can hit upon proper samples to their mind, we shall not rest in speculation alone but shall see by experience whether, in actions esteemed the most indifferent, there is not some motive actually prevailing upon us to perform them.

23. But I must observe by the way that the trial above described is a very complex action consisting of many single acts, each of which must have its several volition and several end in view following one another so

close that there is no where room for the power of indifferency to interfere. But as the gentlemen we have to deal with seem unprovided with a microscope, I shall not trouble them with minute objects nor such as cannot be discerned with the naked eye; and therefore shall present them with larger actions suitable to their organs and consider the whole compound as one body.

Since then they place the merit of their behaviour in the right use of this power of indifferency, one may expect to find the effects of it most apparent in the most arduous exercises of virtue. Suppose then a good man solicited by temptations, attacked by threatenings, urged by tortures, to betray his country, yet he bravely resists all opposition: but has he not thorough persuasion of the advantages of well doing? has he not a strong desire of fulfilling his duty and a vehement abhorrence of treachery? These must move him to take up his resolution, and support him in going through with it: for another who had not such motives, or had them in a lower degree, would undoubtedly decline the task or fail upon trial. If they should urge that all men have the like motives would they but listen to them: those who alledge this must have a different idea of motives from that we have given before, and overlook the distinction

another, either in our judgement or inclination, is often stiled the choice of our Will: and when some authority or obligation compels us to do the thing we dislike, we call it acting unwillingly or against our Will. It would be hard to produce an instance of any man going through with an arduous undertaking without having it strongly at heart, without a desire of the work to be compleated thereby, or without feeling a want of it upon being obstructed in his progress. I would ask the champions for indifference whether when they have made a wrong use of their power, for possibly they may trip once in a while, they do not feel a shame, a vexation, a disappointment, in reflecting thereupon; which could not well happen if they had no desire of improving their opportunities. But this desire which often has an efficacy to overpower the strongest motives, they confound with the Will, and find nothing previous in the thought that gives birth to it, they suppose it self-born, and thence wisely conclude the Will to be the power of determining self and others, giving satisfaction into that which nature has mingled up with uneasiness. There is nothing in it having no other object than restraint: for men virtuously inclined are full of passions and appetites perpetually

visible motive at all, or run counter to the weightiest?

Why do they ever exhort us to this or that kind of behaviour, or to make a right use of our privilege? Does not this imply an opinion that they may prevail upon us thereby to give a right turn to our indifference? Therefore indifference it seems may be operated upon by exhortation, and may as well be carried on by the same through the execution of its purpose. But what are exhortations besides the suggestion of motives to do a thing? which were needless if we might do the same without any motive at all; and useless if actions performed upon motives had no morality in them, nor any action were valuable unless for so much of it as proceeded from our power of indifference.

Most probably the notion of this power took rise from an inaccuracy of thought occasioned by an inaccuracy of language. Desire, says Mr. Locke, so constantly accompanies our actions that it is frequently taken for Will and confounded with it in our discourses. I have observed in a former place that Will and pleasure are reputed synonymous terms, nor would it be thought a different question should one ask Will you have such a thing, or Do you desire or please to have it. The preference of one thing above
another

another, either in our judgement or inclination, is often stiled the choice of our Will : and when some authority or obligation compels us to do the thing we dislike, we call it acting unwillingly or against our Will. It would be hard to produce an instance of any man going through with an arduous undertaking without having it strongly at heart, without a desire of the work to be complicated thereby, or without feeling a want of it upon being obstructed in his progress. I would ask the champions for indifference whether when they have made a wrong use of their power, for possibly they may trip once in a while, they do not feel a shame, a vexation, a disappointment, in reflecting thereupon ; which could not well happen if they had no desire of improving their opportunities. But this desire which often has an efficacy to overpower the strongest motives, they confound with the Will, and finding nothing previous in the thought that should give birth to it, they suppose it self-begotten, and thence wisely conclude the Will has a power of determining itself and of infusing satisfaction into that which nature had mingled up with uneasiness. There is a desire having no other object than the restraint of desire : for men virtuously inclined find their passions and appetites perpetually

tually drawing them aside out of their road: this gives them a jealousy of such intruders, and when desires solicit strongly, although not urging to any thing mischievous or improper, yet they will not comply merely because they will not let their passions get the mastery over them nor acquire a strength too great to be resisted at other times. Now this desire of restraining desire our profound speculatists mistake again for the Will, to which therefore they attribute a power of controuling desire without aid of any counter weight whatsoever, and of making an election, like the King by a *congé d'elire*, in virtue of its royal prerogative.

24. Let us next turn to the abusers of their privilege. A man is urged to some usefull attainment; you make him sensible of the good fruits dependant upon it so as to raise in him some desire of gathering them; you convince him there is nothing difficult in the pursuit, nothing irksome, nothing thwarting his other inclinations, yet you cannot get him to stir. But is there not some secret passion, some habit, some humour, some averfeness to trouble, that lies in the way? If you cannot presently discover the rub, it does not follow there is none; for the heart of man is deceitfull above all things, containing many springs unknown even to the owner.

owner. But if you have any knowledge of human nature and intimacy with the person, tis ten to one but you may discern the obstacle, which you find to be something that acts as a powerfull motive upon him tho' it might weigh nothing with yourself. Since then upon closer examination you can generally distinguish a motive where there appeared none before, it may be presumed there is one when it escapes your search: therefore those instances of wrong management are too uncertain a foundation to build the doctrine of indifferency upon.

But now and then you shall meet with persons, who being recommended to do something advantageous to themselves which they would have liked well enough and been fond of had it first occurred to their own thoughts, yet reject it out of meer crossness: the more you urge them with motives, the stronger they set themselves against it. But consider whether the bare having of their Will is not an engaging motive with most men. Liberty of itself is sweet, and to have the command of our motions without controul, what we all in some measure desire. This desire when excessive is thought owing to a perverseness of Will, which can run contrary to all motives either of expedience or inclination, but it may generally be traced to
to

to another source : for obstinate people are either such as have been constantly humour'd by those about them, or else persons of shallow understanding. Fools are credulous at first, till having been frequently deceived they contract a jealousy of all mankind, and see no chance of obtaining any thing they like unless by rejecting whatever shall be proposed by another. Besides there is a kind of honour in doing as we will : and honour operates as a mighty incentive action. But you will ask, do I conceive there is any honour in persisting obstinately to do just as we will without regard to motives dissuading us from it? Truly I cannot answer the question so generally proposed, but must give my opinion disjunctively. When done in opposition to passion, danger, fatigue or pain, which we will not suffer to drive us from any thing we have a mind to, I applaud it highly : when in contradiction to good advice or the suggestions of reason, I censure it as highly. For tenaciousness, even of a resolution taken for opposition sake, serves either to good or bad purposes : when to the former, it is called steadiness and bravery ; when to the latter, perverseness and obstinacy. But whether you or I or the world allow it to be honour or no, there are those who certainly esteem it such ; like the miser in Horace, who being hissed by the populace, applauded himself at home in counting

ing over his bags; as appears manifestly by the shame and vexation they feel upon failing of their Will, and the triumph and exultation they express upon prevailing.

Were the Will indifferent to all motives and could give itself the turn without any previous cause influencing it thereto, all our actions, those of them at least that are moral, must remain absolutely contingent. How then can we depend upon any man that he will keep this or that tenour of conduct? Yet we daily repose a full confidence in one man because we know he will deal honestly by us, and refuse it to another who we know would betray us. Oh! say they, the one has acquired a rectitude and the other a perverseness of Will. What do they mean by this rectitude and perverseness of Will? A perverseness of mind I can understand, when satisfaction or desire fixes upon pernicious or deceitfull views, and continually moves the Will to pursue them. If they will allow this to be a perverseness of Will I have no objection: but then this depends upon a quality in the Will to follow desire starting up perpetually to the thought, and he who has this desire stronger than any other, cannot remain indifferent whether he shall gratify it or no. Other perverseness I know none, but were there any other it must equally destroy indifference, for we see this perverseness once contracted

tracted determines the Will afterwards to act perversely as often as opportunity shall offer: so the Will remains no longer at liberty to follow or reject the instigations of perverseness, nor is it the less bound for having brought the thralldom upon itself: as a man who sells himself to the plantations is no less a servant than the felon transported thither by judgement of law.

25. Thus the doctrine of indifferency canvassed narrowly contradicts and overthrows itself: for if indifferency be a privilege inherent in human nature, it can never depart from us, for we cannot lose our nature while we continue to be men. Then although the Will should have given itself a perverseness, it might as well give itself a rectitude again, and vice versa, as often as it pleased without any previous cause or motive: and the behaviour of men would be totally uncertain and unsteady, for we should act right or wrong, prudently or foolishly, just as indifference happened to take the turn. But if indifferency, by I know not what magic, can controul itself and persevere in the turn it has once taken, then we have our independency on prior causes only upon some few occasions, that is, when we are to enter upon a new course of action, which having once determined we proceed therein mechanically, like
a ball

a ball put in motion, by virtue of the impulse first imparted. If this be the case and merit or demerit extend no further than while the Will can act independently, why do your indifferencists ever punish for acts ^{done} in consequence of a perverseness already contracted? As soon as the perverseness appears they ought to examine the degree of it and appoint a punishment adequate thereto, which the party having suffered, has paid his penalty and remains no longer obnoxious to the law: his independency is now gone, and nothing happening during its absence can upon their principles be imputed to his account. Nevertheless we find them forward enough to punish again for subsequent offences, proceeding from a perverse turn of Will visible many years before. Will they plead that the power of indifferency is a limited power and that the Will may give itself so strong a determination as it cannot afterwards resist by its own strength, therefore they throw in the terrors of punishment in counterbalance, to bring the weights so nearly equal that the power of indifferency may suffice to turn the scale? Let them have a care how they alledge this, because it will tear up the main foundation whereon they build their doctrine of indifferency, namely, that without it there could be no demerit, and consequently no
room

room for punishment: for here we see there is room for punishment, which may be lawfully inflicted, not solely with reference to past offences, but also as a necessary remedy to prevent the commission of them for the future. If they give us this inch perhaps we may take an ell, and show by parity of reason that the justice of rewards and punishments may remain in full extent, although there should be no such power as that of indifference.

What do they mean by a determination of the Will carrying us thro' a long course of behaviour? Do they conceive volition a permanent act extending to a long series of performances? Surely they never reflected with themselves upon the operation of their own Wills nor the manner of their own motions. We have it upon Mr. Locke's authority that the mind is capable of but one determination to one action at once: and his judgement stands confirmed by daily experience. Successive volitions keep us incessantly in play, each performs its several act and has the sole direction of our powers for the present moment, both themselves and their effects being instantaneous and transitory, nor does one operate by any force received from a former. Whatever we may will to day to do to morrow, we shall perform

or

or omit according as we shall then be in the mind: for the actions of to morrow depend upon the morrow's volitions, which are determined either by some motive occurring at the time or else by the power of indifferency then exerted. Therefore to talk of the Will by a single act giving birth to many successive motions and casting a perverseness upon itself that shall continue for days, months and years, is talking unintelligibly: the continuance of a thing in its own nature momentary being a contradiction in terms.

Were indifferency a privilege appendant to human nature, one would think all men should possess it in equal degree: but we see the same temptations overcome some men which others can resist, altho' both strive equally against them. Must we not then ascribe their different success either to the variety of colours wherein the same objects appear to different minds, or to the various strength of other motives they have to oppose against them? I knew an old gentleman who being pressed by his physicians to go out in his chariot every day as the only thing capable of relieving him in his infirmities, acknowledged the expedience of their advice and wished to follow it, yet could never muster up resolution enough to do as he desired. What now was become of his power of in-

difference which was supposed able to controul any motives, but could not here act in concurrence with the weightiest? Yet he could choose for himself upon other occasions and act rightly when tempted to the contrary; and could even go out when he fancied something of moment called him. May we not then look out for some secret motive to account for this difference of behaviour? He had been a man of business, unused to stir unless upon some affair of importance, and had contracted an aversion to your idle jants taken for amusement only, as fit for none but women and triflers: therefore could not brook his mind to descend to them, altho' they were become matters of moment by being necessary to his health.

26. Hitherto we have considered important actions, such as are undertaken with deliberation and design or upon some distant purpose in prospect. We will now take a view of sudden and trifling motions, which scarce seem to have any motive inducing us to them, and therefore may be thought to proceed from the sole power of the Will. But there needs no great sagacity to observe that the very want of employment creates an uneasiness, and almost every exertion of our activity affords a small degree of satisfaction, which whatever first starts up to the fancy prompts

prompts us to pursue. Whoever will take the trouble to watch men in their idle hours, will find a certain regularity in things done without regard to any rule: some habit acting uniformly sets them for the most part at work. For tho' different persons amuse themselves differently in an infinite variety of ways, each adheres steddily to his own kind of amusement, and acts most in character when he thinks of it least. Therefore one man whistles, another sings, another dances, another plays with his fingers, when he has nothing else to do. Which shows that the Will has not an indifference even with regard to trifles, but catches from time to time at such little motives as custom has taught to rise most readily in ~~the~~ ^{the} imagination. One may discern the like causes in those bye motions which fill up the vacant spaces of time during our engagement in some earnest pursuit: when we set ourselves to think intensely few of us leave our limbs entirely at rest, but give them various employment for every little interval while thought stops and until it can find an issue: some play with their buttons, some twist their knee strings, or rub the table, or kick their leg to and fro, or practice some innocent trick they have fallen into by accident or catch'd by imitation from somebody else. Now in times of study or busi-

ness the determination of the Will tends solely towards the principal end we labour to attain, the power of indifferency is all exerted that way: yet we see any idle habit can give a motion of its own to the Will, which like a cord drawn to the stretch by a mighty force, may notwithstanding be bent to this side or that by the slightest lateral pressure.

Even in cases where the objects proposed to our option appear indifferent as well to judgement as inclination, and the Will seems to determine by arbitrary power because there is nothing else to give the preference; yet a prying eye may discover some latent motive that escap'd the general notice. Suppose you call upon a friend just after dinner before the bottles and glasses are removed. He asks, Will you take a glass of wine with us. Thank ye, Sir, I dont care if I do. Shall I help you to red or white? Any that you have upon the table. Here are both. That that stands next your hand. See both bottles stand equally near. Why then white if you please. This little dialogue, happening frequently between friends, exhibits as much indifference as the mind of man can well be in: for we suppose neither wine disagreeing with your stomach or displeasing to your palate, you had drank as much as you cared
for

for before you came out, but a glass extraordinary will do you no harm, yet you are willing to be sociable and therefore accept his offer, but civility makes you refer the choice of your wine to him, and the same civility prompts you afterwards to choose that which will give him the least trouble : but finding this will not do and perceiving that further compliments would be troublesome, you take the first that occurs ; for you cannot pronounce the words White and Red together, and as you want to end the dispute, which ever comes quickest to the tongue's end, is therefore fittest to relieve you from this want.

Why should choice be deemed an act of the Will, when the understanding many times presents a choice ready made without staying for the Will to assist in the production ? An ambassador making his public entry throws out money among the populace : a porter scrambling among the crowd spies a half-crown and a sixpence lying upon the ground, he can get either but has not time for both, so he takes up the half crown, not for any preference thrown upon it by his Will, but from his knowledge, that this piece will go five times as far at market as the other. Many times the Will acts without any choice at all : a man hears a sudden cry of fire ; he

starts up instantly from his seat and runs to see what is the matter. The alarm banishes all other ideas, he has not a thought of any thing else he would not choose to do, nor even of forbearance from all kind of action. The wanton sallies of fancy proceed more from thoughtlessness than wrong election; ideas come in one by one without a competitor, and the mind follows the present whim for want of seeing the inexpediency or impropriety attending it. Can this be called a choice? which in the very nature of it implies a judgement between several things and a preference of one above another: but when one object only lies in view, there can be no preference, nor can one choose but take that which alone is presented.

27. But I find there are persons of all characters in the interests of indifference. Those of a humourous turn, not being good at argument, endeavour to ridicule our doctrine of motives by putting the case of an ass placed between two bundles of excellent hay, both equally alluring to his sense, who they say must starve in the midst of plenty for want of being able to prefer either. It is no uncommon thing for wit to outrun discretion, therefore I would caution these jokers to beware how they anger their solemn friends of their
own

own persuasion. For if the beasts cannot live without a power of indifferency, what becomes of the noble privilege peculiar to human nature? It is rather a benefit we share in common with our brethren asses, who by the right use of it may merit as glorious rewards as ourselves. But we contemplative folks are not to be jested out of our notions, nor shall I scruple to own that their supposition is true in theory: and so it would have been had they put the case of a sharpened pole ten feet long set upright upon a marble pavement with the centre of gravity directly over the point, which would remain for ever in that posture if nothing meddled with it. But I question whether such experiments be practicable: let them try if they can to place the ass, the pole or their own mind, in such a situation. Should the beast shake his head ever so little, this may bring it nearer to one bundle, which will make the scent of that become the stronger: the least breath of air or brush of a fly's wing is enough to throw down the pole: and imagination continually supplies us with motives, either great or small, either of judgement or fancy, sufficient to put the mental balance in motion.

Of the two, I believe instances of such an inability to act for want of motives, more likely to be met with in men than asses; I

myself have met with them in my time. I remember once calling upon a friend in the Temple to take a walk, we came down stairs presently and then began to talk of the course we should steer. I found him irresolute, but would not interpose having a curiosity to see the event: the business was whether we should go to the Park or to Islington, we had no particular call to either and both appeared equally agreeable. I believe we stood a full quarter of an hour in the court before he could determine; for he was a man of gravity used to weigh his motives carefully, and had rejected the impulses of fancy until they had entirely lost their force: so he had nothing to sway with him, for you may suppose there could be no weighty reasons for preferring one tour before the other. Where now was his power of indifferency, which had he possessed in the lowest degree, might have helped him out at this dead lift?

Such hesitancies as these are weeds of the richest soils, being most frequently found in serious, considerate and industrious tempers: but they will grow in more barren grounds. I have been pestered with them upon my own estate in former days, till I found out the secret of nourishing a crop of fancies in those spots which judgement would not cover. I endeavour first to take direction from my reason,

son, but if that has no commands I give up the reins to fancy ; if fancy presents me with double objects I toss up cross or pile rather than lose time in hesitating : for employment upon any motive, the best to be had, is better than no employment at all. I never could reap any service in those cases from indifference, for so long as that lasts I can do nothing at all : nor could I ever remove it unless by suggesting something expedient or amusing to my imagination which might urge me to bestir myself.

28. Thus have we examined every species of action, trifling and momentous, sudden and deliberate, fantastic and judicious, in search of an indifference to the preponderancy of motives, but in vain : nor is indifference any where to be found unless in a suspension of action, while the motives hang doubtfull and the mind waits until some of them shall preponderate. I think now we may fairly conclude the mind enjoys no such privilege as this boasted power of indifferency. Nor would it be a valuable privilege if we had it: for as the turns it takes must be absolutely contingent depending upon no prior cause, there is an even chance it might turn as well to our detriment as our advantage : nor could we ever pursue a plan or lay our measures surely or compleat any long work, for want of
of

of a sufficient dependence upon our own behaviour or that of other persons ; for the hazard of wrong elections disconcerting our schemes would discourage us from attempting any thing. Should you send for a surgeon to bleed you tomorrow, you could never depend upon his attendance ; profit, credit, duty, his adherence to his profession, may urge him to come, But these operate only as motives, and neither you nor he can tell but his Will to morrow, by virtue of its arbitrary power, may annex the idea of Best to the refusal of his assistance. Nobody can pretend here that the motives are so strong as to exceed the power of his Will to controul them : for certainly he may stay at home if he will, nor will his legs or his chariot bring him without some act of his Will to order their motion.

29. But is it never in a man's power to change the pleasantness or unpleasantness, that is, the satisfaction or uneasiness accompanying any sort of action ? Yes, says Mr. Locke, it is plain in many cases he can. One may change the displeasingness or indifferency in actions into pleasure and desire by doing what lies in one's power towards effecting it. A due consideration will do it in some cases, and practice, application and custom in most. But he no where says it may be done by mere dint

dint of volition, or otherwise than by the use of proper means, which means must lie within our reach or we cannot procure the change. Is your tea bitter? You may sweeten it by putting in a knob of sugar: but not if there be no sugar in the dish. Does your meat taste insipid? You may give it a relish by sprinkling a little salt: but not if the salt have lost its savour. So should you feel an averseness to labour, you may conquer it by contemplating the credit of industry or shame of idleness; or the good fruits expected from your labours: but not if you have no value for reputation nor desire of any particular benefit attainable by diligence greater than your love of indolence. For I look upon it as an invariable rule that you can never bring a man into the liking of any thing disagreeable unless by means of something he already likes appearing connected therewith or attainable solely thereby. Bread or tobacco, says Mr. Locke, may be neglected when shown usefull to health, because of an indifference or disrelish to them: reason and consideration at first recommends and begins their trial, and use finds or custom makes them pleasant. That this is so in virtue too, is very certain. Thus in his opinion our very virtues derive from other sources than the power of indifferency. But if bread appears insipid, tobacco nauseous, or
virtue

virtue disagreeable to the present taste, no man can render them otherwise or suddenly alter his palate solely by willing it.

With respect to ourselves indeed we have another expedient for changing the state of our motives by that command we have in some measure over our organs both of sensation and reflection. For as we can turn our eyes upon any object of the scene before us and shut them against the light or wink when it strikes too strongly upon them; so we can close the organs of reflection, bringing particular ideas to our notice, and thereby throw the course of thought into another channel; or where we cannot entirely dam up the passage we may sometimes obstruct it, thereby reducing the current to a smaller stream. This way we can and very frequently do alter the colour of our motives by throwing a stronger attention upon them or by removing or obscuring their competitors. But when we take the latter method, it is no impeachment of the efficacy of motives that they do not strike when you shut your eyes upon them or discern them faintly, nor mark of absolute power in the Will that it is forced to thrust out of sight a motive which it could not resist: and when the former, it is the reflection not the Will that adds colour to the motive. For as when you put sugar
into

into your mouth, it is the sugar, not yourself, that affects your palate with sweetness, notwithstanding you put it in yourself: so when you throw a strong attention upon some particular idea, it is the state of your organs, not your Will, that heightens its colours, altho' you put them into that state by an act of your Will. Certain it is we do sometimes pluck up a resolution to surmount a pain, a labour, a danger, without suggesting fresh reasons to encourage us, and this I take to be done by some such method as that above spoken of: for earnest eager resolution is a kind of temporary passion brought upon us by our own procurement, and it is well known we may work ourselves up by degrees into almost any passion by dwelling upon ideas fomenting it without admission of others. Upon these occasions I conceive the mind raises an extraordinary motion in some parts of the animal circulation, which then runs more rapidly than while under command in the service of our ordinary purposes. For it seems apparent from the quick violent starts of motion, the ferment of spirits, the solicitous turn of countenance, usual in times of vigorous resolution, that the body bears no inconsiderable share in the business.

30. This power over the organs I take to be indeed the grand privilege of human nature,

ture, for I can discern nothing of it in the brute creation. 'Tis true our notions concerning them amount at most only to conjecture, for we know not certainly what passes within them nor in what manner they proceed to action. Remembrance, fancy and some degree of knowledge, cannot well be denied them; unless you suppose them meer machines, which tho' perhaps it cannot be demonstratively disproved, there is not the least shadow of positive evidence to prove that they are: but their ideas come up uncalled, being occasioned for the most part either by sensible objects or the motions of their animal juices or particular state of their bodies: nor can I discern any such thing as voluntary reflection or any controul of fancy belonging to them; which therefore remains the peculiar property of man. From hence spring all our virtues, all our rules of prudence, all our measures of conduct, and upon this principally, tho' not entirely, stands the justice of reward and punishment; for we reward and punish the beasts to bring them thereby to do something we like or deter them from something we dislike. If our opponents will accept of this power in lieu of their indifferency as equally serviceable to all usefull purposes, they are heartily welcome, but I cannot allow them that both are the same thing. For indifferency

rency implies a power in the Will of furnishing the idea of Best out of its own store and by its own sole authority, without recourse to any contrivance or artifice to obtain it. And because a man may give the preference between two objects proposed to his option, either by suggesting considerations recommending the one and dissuading the other, or by throwing a stronger attention upon one and withholding it from the other, it no more shows an indifferency of the Will or a power of annexing Best to what appears Worst in the judgement, than because one may make a pebble outshine a diamond, either by covering them with different kinds of paint or by diminishing the light falling upon the latter and encreasing that upon the former, it shows an indifferency in the eye or a power of annexing lustre to objects naturally obscure.

31. Besides, whoever will diligently examine the state of his mind, when he gives this supposed arbitrary preference, will always find opposite desires accosting him at those times, to one of which he harbours a secret prepossession or favour, therefore practises every art to make that prevail in his imagination: and this alike in the right or the wrong exercises of his power. If pleasure, profit or resentment, sollicit to act, and the still voice of conscience whispers to forbear: one man
has

has a love of virtue which he cannot easily forego, therefore he suppresses all instigations of passion that might draw him aside, for he will not suffer his beloved and valued object to be wrested from him; or fortifies himself in his desire by considerations proper for that purpose, or the earnest contemplation of what he used always to behold with delight. Another man has a favourite inclination which he longs to gratify but reason puts in her negative: therefore he stifles the cries of reason or turns a deaf ear against them lest they should importune him too much; or hunts for any excuses or palliations he can muster up; or casts a wistfull look upon his darling whom he is unwilling to leave, and contemplates so long until all other ideas are banished out of his thought. Thus in reality the preference is already given before we enter upon the act whereby we fancy ourselves conferring it, nor was the mind indifferent whether such act should be performed or no: and the subsequent determination or idea of Best thrown into the doubtfull scale comes from the means used to effect it, not from the Will. But if you ascribe it to the Will because that applies the means, you might with better reason ascribe it to the predominant inclination because that puts the Will upon making such application. For whatever the

Will does towards annexing the idea of Best, even supposing it to do the ^{work} job without employing any other means than its own inherent power, nevertheless it acts herein ministerially, not authoritatively but in service of the favourite desire, to which therefore the credit and merit of the performance belongs:

32. What has been said concerning the methods and organs employed in bringing about a determination of the mind, accounts for the limitation of that power and the difficulty attending the exercise of it: for our organs can perform their office for a certain time, but no longer. A man may walk a mile with pleasure but when he has walked five he may find it fatiguing, nor perhaps can he walk twenty at all, because his legs tire long before. So he may hold up a weight at arms length for some time, but cannot keep in that posture for ever, for the muscles of his arm will grow weary. The same may be said of satiety, which proceeds from an alteration in our organs, as weariness does from an alteration in the state of our muscles. We may like venison prodigiously for a day or two, but should be terribly closed had we nothing else to feed upon during the whole season: for the palate being over-closed, no longer receives the flavour in the same manner as

before. This of course limits our power to that proportion of labour the instruments we have to serve us are capable of bearing, and confines our activity to that compass of time whereto the relish of things may extend. But I know of no labour, no difficulty, no satiety, in pure acts of the mind; we are never tired of commanding so long as our limbs and organs are not tired of executing: we Will from morning to night without intermission and without trouble, and though our employments often fatigue and nauseate, let but some new desire give play to a quite different set of organs, and the mind runs after it with as much freshness and eagerness as if it had never done any thing. Upon coming home quite wearied down with a long journey, a man may give orders for his conveniences and refreshments to be brought him, perhaps with more ease and relish than he had in first mounting his horse. After a long morning spent in hard study, we could easily find volition enough to continue the work, but that our head aches, our spirits fail, and nature can no longer bear the fatigue: wherefore labour of mind is as often called labour of brain, and more truly belongs to the latter than the former. Even at night when all kind of action becomes irksome, it is not the Will but the eye that draws

draws straws, for the mind does not desire to sleep so long as the body can hold awake. What then should limit our power with respect to any thing we can do by barely willing it? Why do we ever strive to exert such power and fail in the attempt? or why do we succeed at one time and fail at another? A man may as easily will to walk a hundred miles as one, or to lift up the house as to take up his slipper, if he can believe himself able; every one sees why he cannot do either, namely, from the deficiency of his strength: but what the Will has once performed, it then had strength to perform, what then is become of this strength that it cannot perform the same again? Does the Will grow feeble and vigorous by turns like the muscles upon labour or rest? If we assign for cause that the Will used some medium before which now is wanting, the difference may be accounted for much better than by any variation of strength in the Will itself.

History informs us that Mutius Scevola held his hand in the fire till it was burnt to the bone, therefore burning was susceptible of the idea of Best: why then could not you and I pluck up the like resolution? But perhaps we can annex the idea to some objects he could not. One man can restrain his appetite of meats and drinks but cannot refuse the offers of ambition: another can reject all

temptations of unlawful gain but cannot resist the impulses of anger. Is there then a strong and a weak side in the Will? or are the Wills of men cast in different moulds? One may readily conceive how the various degrees of resolution may arise from strength of spirits, texture of brain, habit, education or turn of imagination, but from the constitution or mould of the Will it seems inexplicable. When we take up a strong resolution we find pains and difficulty in keeping it, and often faint in the midway after having made a very good beginning: a pain or trouble that a man has born patiently for a while, shall sometimes fairly overcome him without growing stronger, meerly by tiring him out. This, not to repeat what I have said before of the effects visible upon the body, shews that there are organs or nerves employed upon those occasions which require labour to keep them upon the stretch, and can serve us no longer than to a certain period, but may acquire strength, like our limbs, by constant use and practice.

33. After all, the very expression of a power belonging to the Will, when used in philosophical discourses, will not bear a strict examination. Will, in the vulgar sense, stands for a pressing inclination or strong conviction of judgement, to which we may properly
enough

enough ascribe the power of making labour pleasant and difficulties easy. But if we go into the land of abstraction and study the language current there, what must we understand by Will but the turn of the mind's activity? The mind has power to move our limbs and organs of reflection, but none of them will move by the bare possession of this power unless it be directed some particular way, and this direction we call our Will: therefore our actions all depend upon the Will, such as our volitions are such will they be. So the wind has power to drive the clouds or ships along, but there being such a force in winds avails nothing unless it be turned to some particular point of the compass: therefore the courses of the vessel depend upon the turn of the wind, for it cannot get into port while the wind sets a contrary way. Now to talk of a power of the turn of the power of the wind would be accounted meer jargon: and how much better is it to contend for a power of the turn of the power of the mind? Yet have we been talking and arguing all along in that stile, nor could do otherways: for one must speak like other folks if one would speak to be understood, and this may plead our excuse. For custom has a despotic authority in matters of language, so far as to

render even nonsense and absurdity reputable by turning them into propriety of speech.

34. Is there ^{then} no liberty at all in human action? no freedom of Will? Are we under a constant necessity, and our motions all brought upon us by the cogency of causes without our intervention or power to controul? By no means: neither Mr. Locke nor I ever dreamt of such a notion. As for necessity I cannot be suspected of inclining to that since the little conference I had with doctor Hartley upon the road. For freedom of action, Mr. Locke strongly asserts it; but we both apprehend it to consist in our being so circumstanced as that action will follow or not upon our willing to do it or forbear: nor will our present opposers I believe controvert this point with us. When upon using our endeavours towards something lying within the compass of our natural powers, some obstacle would prevent their taking effect, then is our liberty gone: when no such hindrance intervenes but that we shall effect our purpose or not according as we try for it or forbear; then are we free; and never the less so for being influenced thereto by consideration of judgement or instigation of fancy. He that relieves a family in distress gives his money freely altho' he does it upon motives of charity or compassion or particular kindness,

and would have kept his money in his pocket had he not had those or any other inducements whatever to part with it. He that goes to stir his fire is not at liberty while anybody holds back his hand, but the moment they let him alone his liberty returns, and he acts freely tho' he falls a poking for the sake of warming himself: and even tho' he should resolve to bear the cold in his toes till he can bear it no longer, still when he puts forth his hand to relieve himself it is his own free act, for the poker would not have stirred of itself had not he meddled with it, neither would the muscles of his arm have operated to extend it without some act of the mind to begin their motion.

35. As to freedom of Will how much soever Mr. Locke may seem to reject it in words, where he declares liberty as little applicable to Will as swiftness to sleep or squareness to virtue, yet I do not apprehend him denying it in substance, nor that he would count me heterodox for holding what I take to be generally understood by freewill. For I conceive the exercise of this to be only a particular species of action performed in raising up ideas or fixing them in the mind, which shall determine us to such volitions as we want. And this we may and do practise every day of our lives: we determine upon

things beforehand and execute them punctually, we form resolutions for difficult undertakings, we collect reasons to support us in them, we fortify ourselves with motives, we inculcate them deep in our imagination, and afterwards find they produce the effect we expected. Thus we have a power over our future volitions, and in respect of that power are capable either of liberty or restraint. For if any obligation or compulsion prevents us from exerting this power, or any prevailing dread or inclination obstructs so that it cannot take effect, though we still remain at liberty to act, we are not at liberty to will as we desire: if no such obstruction or hindrance lies in the way, we are perfectly free both to will and to do. And after the determination made, our liberty still remains to change it by the like methods whereby we established it at first, though we shall never employ them unless we happen to view the matter in a different light from that we saw it in before. Nor is liberty the less for our being prompted to use it this way or that by reasons or motives inducing us thereto. But here we must distinguish between want of liberty and want of power: for our title to freedom accruing to us only in respect of our power, we can be capable either of liberty or restraint no further than our power extends. He that goes to
push

push down a stone wall fails in his attempt through a defect of strength not of liberty, provided you do not restrain him from thrusting and shoving against it as long as he pleases. So we may attempt in vain to overcome the terror of any great pain or danger without an impeachment of our freewill. None of us but may, if he will, thrust his hand into burning coals like Scevola, for the hand will undoubtedly obey the orders of the mind should she so direct, but we cannot bring our mind to such a pitch of resolution because we have not command enough over our imagination nor motives in store sufficient to overbalance the smart of the fire. Yet nothing hinders us from trying, therefore we are at liberty to exert such power over our Will as we have; and if any strong desire incite us we shall employ our organs of imagination however inadequate to the task, so long as we can retain any hope of prevailing, there being no encouragement to try where we are sure to fail of success. For there is a manifest difference between the two cases; where some secret reluctance prevents us from using our best endeavours to bring the mind into a right temper, and where we set about it heartily and in good earnest but want strength to compass our design.

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Therefore I am not for expunging the term freewill out of our vocabulary, nor against exhorting men to raise their Wills to a proper pitch when some laborious enterprize is to be gone upon. But there is no occasion to trouble them with niceties concerning their manner of going to work, for though they have not the power of indifferency to determine their Will without the use of means, yet if you can once stir up in them an unreserved desire of exerting themselves, they will hit upon the proper means without knowing what they be: just as we move our limbs by touching the nerve leading to each particular muscle, without knowing what nerves we have or where they lie. The common notions of liberty serve well enough for the common uses of life; and were it possible totally to eradicate them there must ensue a total stagnation of business and cessation of all activity whatever: for nobody would stir a finger or resolve upon any future measures of conduct, if he conceived himself not at liberty either to act or will otherwise than necessity should urge him. They may contain some inconsistencies which men of plain sense do not see and so never perplex themselves therewith, nor yet suffer any inconveniences from this their want of discernment. The young lady spoken of some time ago who
staid

staid away from the ball because her aunt disapproved of it, could say she had a good Will to go and forbore much against her Will, yet declare in the next breath that she might have gone if she would but chose to stay at home because she would not disoblige the old gentlewoman. She saw no contradiction in these expressions, nevertheless appears to have been a sensible girl by this instance of self-denial, and I doubt not had discretion enough to gratify her inclinations or restrain them whenever either were most proper: and this perhaps without having ever heard of the terms Velleity and Volition; nor had any body done her a kindness that had taught her them, for she could not have conducted herself better had she known them ever so well.

36. But when we would penetrate into the depths of philosophy we cannot proceed to any good purpose without a philosophical microscope: therefore before we begin the attempt we ought to examine whether nature has furnished us with a good one, and whether we have brought it into due order by care and application. How much soever people may make themselves merry with me for talking of my microscope, I shall not be laughed out of it while I find it so necessary for discovering the secrets of human nature.

And

And I can comfort myself the easier because I observe our reprovers themselves very fond of using something like it : but they have only a common magnifying glass, such as we give children to play with, which just enables them to discern objects not obvious to the naked eye, but does not exhibit a perfect view of their shape and colour ; therefore they see distinctions without a difference, and perplex instead of instructing mankind. But the possessors of a good microscope see the difference too, which they either find immaterial or turn to some usefull service : it is observable they never unsettle the minds of men, nor combat with received opinions, and tho' they may seem to oppose them for a while, it is only in order to establish them upon a more solid foundation, to render them more clearly intelligible or purify them from error and extravagance. They have many things to discourse of not cognisable by the vulgar, for which they must find names and phrases not current in ordinary traffic : hence it comes that philosophy has a language peculiar to herself, a little different from that of common conversation, from which nevertheless it ought to vary as little as possible. But your half-reasoners, getting a smattering of the language without a thorough knowledge, lose their mother tongue and acquire no other in lieu,

lieu, so they are fit to converse neither with the vulgar nor the learned : for they puzzle the former with their shrewd observations, and stand in the way of the latter with their cavils and blunders. They add nothing to the public stock of knowledge but deal altogether in objections, without knowing how to solve them or being able to understand a solution when given : and if they take up an opinion at hap hazard, they fortify themselves in it by throwing a cloud of dust over whatever shall be offered to undeceive them, and thus if they can escape conviction by confounding themselves, they look upon it as a compleat victory.

Enough has been said, and perhaps more than enough upon indifference; but I have still a long chapter in reserve for human liberty, together with those three concomitants which never fail to enter the thoughts when contemplating freedom of Will, Necessity, Certainty and Fatality. But this I must postpone until I have gathered sufficient materials, which I hope to pick up here and there in the progress of my search : and when I have gotten matters together preparatory for the task, I have such confidence in the microscope, having already found it serviceable upon many occasions, that I doubt not to follow, without losing or breaking the threads,

threads, all the twistings and crossings and entanglements in those intricate subjects that have hitherto perplexed the learned world; for men of plain understandings would never trouble their heads about them were they let alone by the others. All my concern is where to get a good pencil to delineate exactly what I see, so as to make it apparent to another. I wish it were invariably true what I find laid down by many, 'That clear conception produces clear expression: but I have often experienced the contrary myself, and Tully, that great master of language, maintains there is a particular art of conveying one's thoughts without dropping by the way any thing of that precision and colour belonging to them in our ^{own} minds. When the time comes I shall try to do my best, than which nobody can desire more; and in the meanwhile shall return back to the course wherein I was proceeding.

37. The ninth and last remark I have to make upon satisfaction and uneasiness is this, That they are perceptions of a kind peculiar to themselves, analogous to none others we have, yet capable of joining company with any others. We neither hear nor see nor taste nor imagine them, yet find some degree or other of them in almost every thing we hear or see or taste or reflect upon. But tho' they

they often change their companions, they never change their nature: the same thing may become uneasy that before was satisfactory, but satisfaction never cloyes and uneasiness never loses its sting. Sometimes nature assigns them their places on her original constitution of the subjects, and sometimes custom, practice or accident, introduce them. To some sensations and reflections they adhere strongly, not to be removed at all or not without much labour, time and difficulty; and upon others they sit so lightly that the least breath of air can blow them away. They have their seasons of absence and residence, lasting longer or shorter as it happens, and often trip nimbly from object to object without tarrying a moment upon any: and when separated make no other difference in the idea they leave than that of their being gone. For in a picture that you looked upon at first with delight and afterwards with indifference, you shall perceive no alteration of form or colour or other circumstance than that it once gave you pleasure but now affords you none. Sometimes they propagate their own likeness upon different subjects, at others they come into one another's places successively in the same. One while they come and go unaccountably, at another one may discern the causes of their migration: for an idea, whereto
satisf-

satisfaction was annexed, entering into a compound which is afterwards divided again, the satisfaction shall rest upon a different part from that whereto it was at first united : and a satisfactory end shall often render the means conducive thereto satisfactory after the end is removed out of view. Some things please by their novelty, and others displease from their strangeness : custom brings the latter to be pleasant, but repetition makes the former nauseous.

All which seems to indicate that there is some particular spring or nerve appropriated to affect us with satisfaction or uneasiness, which never moves unless touched by some of the nerves bringing us our other ideas : and that the body being a very complicated machine as well in the grosser as the finer of its organs, they delight or disturb us in various degrees according as in the variety of their play they approach nearer or remove further from the springs of satisfaction or uneasiness. For as the difference of our ideas depends probably upon the form or magnitude or motion or force of the organs exhibiting them, one cannot suppose the same organ by the variations of its play affecting us either with pleasure or pain without producing an alteration in our ideas. Now what those springs are, where they lie, or by what kind of motion they

they operate upon us either way, I shall not attempt to describe : nor is it necessary we should know so much, for if we can learn what will give us pleasure or pain and how to procure the one and avoid the other, we ought to rest fully contented without knowing the manner in which they produce their effect. And in order to attain so much knowledge as we want, I shall endeavour to examine how our ideas form into compounds, and how satisfaction becomes united to them, or is transferred from one to another.

C H A P. VII.

S E N S A T I O N.

SENSATION, as we learn from Mr. Locke and may find by our own observation, is the first inlet and grand source of knowledge, supplying us with all our ideas of sensible qualities ; which together with other ideas arising from them after their entrance into the mind, compleat our stores of knowledge and materials of reason.

Sensations come to us from external objects striking upon our senses. When I say external, I mean with respect to the mind ; for

many of them lie within the body, and for the most part reach us by our sense of feeling. Hunger and thirst, weariness, drowsiness, the pain of diseases, repletion after a good meal, the pleasure of exercise and of a good flow of spirits, are all of this kind. But sometimes we receive sensations by our other senses too, coming from no object without us : as in the visions and noises frequent in high fevers, the nauseous tastes accompanying other distempers, and the ^{noisome} ~~nauseous~~ smell remaining many days with some persons after catching an infection of the small-pox. For whatever in our composition affects our senses in the same manner as external objects used to do, excites a sensation of the same kind in the mind.

I shall not go about to describe what are to be understood by external objects, for any man may know them better by his own common sense than by any explanation of mine : but I think it worth while to observe that they are not always either the original or immediate causes giving birth to our sensations. When we look upon a picture, the sun or candle shining upon it primarily, and the rays reflected from it and image pencilled upon our Retina subsequently, produce the idea in our mind : yet we never talk of seeing them but the picture, which we account the

the sole object of our vision. So when Miss Curteous entertains you with a lesson upon her harpsichord, both she and the instrument are causes operating to your delight, for you thank her for the favour and may speak indifferently of hearing the one or the other : but when you consider what is the object of your hearing, you will not call it either the lady or the harpsichord, but the music.

2. It is remarkable that although both visible and sonorous bodies act equally by mediums, one of light and the other of air vibrating upon our organs, yet in the former case we reckon the body the object, but in the latter the sound of the air : I suppose because we can more readily and frequently distinguish the place, figure and other qualities, of bodies we see than of those affecting our other senses. We have smells in our noses but cannot tell what occasioned them ; tastes remain in our mouths after spitting out the nauseous thing that offend^{ed} us ; we may feel warmth without knowing from whence it proceeds, and the blow of a stick after the stick itself has been thrown into the fire and consumed. And that this distinction of bodies denominates them objects of vision, appears further because some, having in a course of experiments been shown a calve's eye whereon they see the miniature of a landscape lying

before it delineated, very learnedly insist that the image pencilled on the backside of our eye, and not the body therein represented, is the object we behold. But unless like Aristotle they hold the mind to be existing in every part of our frame, they must allow that neither is this image the immediate object of our discernment, but some motion or configuration of the optic nerves propagated from thence to the sensory. Therefore it is the safest way to take that for the object which men generally esteem to be such: for should we run into a nice investigation of the causes successively operating to vision, we shall never be able to settle whether the object of our lucubrations be the candle or the light flowing thence or the letters of our book or the light reflected from thence or the print of them upon our eye or the motion of our nerves. If we once depart from the common construction of language and will not agree with others that we see the lines we read, we may as well insist that we see the candle or the optic nerves as the image in our retina.

But with regard to the sense of hearing there is no such difficulty started, because you cannot, by dissecting a calve's ear, exhibit any thing therein to your scholars similar to the lowings of a cow which the calf
heard

heard when alive. Wherefore learned and simple agree in calling sound the object of hearing: nevertheless every one knows that it must proceed from the cry of some animal, play of some instrument, collision or other action of some body making the sound. When imagination works without any thing external to strike upon the senses, we call our ideas the objects of our thought, because we cannot discern any thing else from whose action they should arise: yet this does not hinder but that such of them at least, as come upon us involuntarily, may proceed from something in our humours or animal circulation conveying them to the mind, and were we as familiarly acquainted with these as we are with visible bodies, we should call them the objects.

3. Our manner of talking that the senses convey ideas from objects without us implies as if ideas were something brought from thence to the mind: but whether they really be so is more than we know, or whether there be any resemblance between them and the bodies exhibiting them. The sense of hearing bids the fairest for such conveyance, for when you strike upon a bell you put it thereby into a tremulous motion, which agitates the air with the like tremors; and those again generate similar vibrations in the audi-

tory nerves, and perhaps propagate the same onward to that fibre or last substance, whose modification is the idea affecting us with sound.

Colours seem agreed on all hands to be not existing in bodies after the same manner as they appear to our apprehension. The learned tell you they are nothing but a certain configuration in the surfaces of objects adapted to reflect some particular rays of light and absorb the rest: and though the unlearned speak of colours as being in the bodies exhibiting them, I take this to proceed only from the equivocal sense of the word colour, which stands indifferently either for the sensation or the quality of exciting it. For if you question the most illiterate person breathing, you will always find him ascribing the sensation to the mind alone, and the quality of raising it to the object alone, though perhaps he might call both by the name of colour: but he will never fancy the rose has any sensation of its own redness, nor could your mind and sensory be laid open to his view when you look upon a rose, would he ever expect to find any redness there. The like may be said of heat and cold, which signify as well our sensations as the modifications of bodies occasioning them: therefore though we say the fire is hot, and makes us
hot

hot, we do not mean the same thing by the same word in both places. When nurse sets her child's pannikin upon the fire to warm, she does not imagine the fire will infuse a sensation of heat into the pap, but only will communicate a like quality of raising warmth in her, should she thrust her finger or the tip of her tongue into it : and when she feels herself warmed by the fire, she never dreams that this feeling will impart its likeness to the child without application of her warm hands or a double clout having received the like quality of warming from the fire. When we talk of fire melting metals or burning combustibles by the intenseness of its heat, we mean the quality it has of producing the alterations we see made in those bodies ; and this we denominate heat from that best known effect we find it have upon ourselves in raising a burning smart in our flesh whenever we approach near enough. Therefore those who would find fault with us for attributing colour, heat and cold, to inanimate bodies, take us up before we were down ; for by such expressions we do not understand the sensations but the qualities giving rise to them, which qualities really belong to the bodies : so that I shall stand by my plain neighbours in maintaining snow to be white, fire hot, ice cold, lillies sweet, poppies stinking, pork savoury,

wormwood bitter, and the like, which they may justly do without offence either to propriety of speech or to sound philosophy.

4. We are not troubled with the like shrewd objections against pleasure and pain, satisfaction and uneasiness, because those are commonly appropriated to the perceptions of the mind and not spoken of as residing in bodies without us. Yet we lay ourselves open to criticism here too as often as we talk of a pain in our toes or a tickling in the palms of our hands, for it might be alledged the limbs are incapable of feeling either, and can only raise sensations of them in the mind. And we might as justly be charged with incorrectness in complaining of our mind being uneasy and our bed being uneasy; but our defence shall be, that the term carries a different force in the two parts of this sentence: for every child knows that if the bed becomes uneasy by the feathers clotting together into hard knobs, it is not because the lumps give uneasiness to the bed itself, but because they will make any one uneasy that shall lie upon them. But tho' pleasure and pain be perceptions, yet we may have an idea of them in their absence, or even in the presence of their contraries: for we often remember past pleasures when gone from us with regret, and think of an evil we have escap'd with joy.

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at the deliverance; and this regret or joy encreases in proportion to the strength and clearness we have of the enjoyment or suffering we now expect to feel no more.

Magnitude, figure and motion, are reputed both by learned and vulgar to reside in the bodies wherein we observe them: yet it cannot be denied that they suffer alterations in their conveyance to the mind, whether that be made through the sight or the touch; they being all motion in the rays of light, the organs or other channels wherealong they pass, and that a different kind of motion from any in the bodies themselves. Nor on arriving at the seat of the mind, can we say they reassume the same form they had at first setting out: magnitude assuredly does not, for when we look upon the cupola of St. Paul's, we cannot suppose anything within us of equal size with the object it represents; nor do we know whether there be anything of similar figure: and when we see a chariot drive swiftly before us, it is hardly probable that the ends of our fibres imitate that whirling motion we discern in the wheels. But since it is the received opinion that magnitude, figure and motion, are in the bodies such as we apprehend them to be, I shall take it for granted, nor shall I urge the changes they may receive in their passage to the
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the mind as an argument to the contrary, because I know that in other cases, ideas may be conveyed by mediums very dissimilar to themselves: when we read or hear read the description of a palace or a garden, a battle or a procession, there is nothing in the letters we look upon or the sounds we hear utter'd at all resembling the scenes they describe, nevertheless we have a full and clear conception of all the circumstances relating to them conveyed either way to our understanding. As for solidity when distinguished from hardness, I apprehend we have no direct sensation of that, but gather it from our observation of the resistance of bodies against one another, and of their constantly thrusting them away before they can enter into their places.

5. Sensations from external objects come to us ordinarily thro' certain mediums either of light, air or effluvia, feeling only excepted, which for the most part requires that the substance exciting it should lie in contact with some part of our body; yet things intensely hot or cold we can feel at a distance. But when the causes of sensation have reached the surface of our body, we must not think they have done their business there, for perception lies not at the eyes or the ears or the nose or the tongue or the fingers ends: there-

therefore the influences of objects, after entering the body, have several stages to pass thro' in their progress towards the seat of perception. How many of these stages there may be I shall not pretend to reckon up, but I suspect them to be very numerous, and that the parts of our machine, like the wheels of a clock, transmit their influence to one another successively through a long series of motions. But it seems convenient to divide them into two classes, which I shall call the bodily and the mental organs, as this division tallies well enough with our usual manner of expressing ourselves concerning what passes within us. For we have many ideas arising involuntarily to our imagination, besides others we call up to our remembrance by our own activity; and upon all these occasions the whole transaction is esteemed to be carried on by the mind alone without intervention of the body, without impulse of external objects and by the sole working of our thoughts. But we have shown in a former place that the idea perceived must be something numerically distinct from the thing perceiving it, and that there are certain mediums employed in exhibiting it to our view, as well when it comes of its own accord as upon call; for which reason we find particular ideas more or less easily introduced according

cording as our mind stands disposed to entertain them. Whence it follows that there is an organization in the mind itself, which throws up objects to our thought, or which we use to bring them there, when nothing external interferes and the senses remain inactive : and this is what I understand by the mental organs.

6. But since I have spoken of mental organs and extended the machinery of our frame quite into the mind itself, it is necessary, for avoiding the scandal that might be taken hereat, to observe that the word *Mind*, as used in our ordinary discourses, is an equivocal term : for we suppose our knowledge of all kinds to be contained in the mind, and yet speak of incidents bringing particular things to our mind which we knew before : but if *Mind* were the same in both places, it were absurd to talk of bringing a thing to mind which was there already. Therefore *Mind* sometimes stands in the philosophical fence for that part of us which acts and perceives, or as Tully expresses it, which wills, which lives, which has vigour, and to this mind I ascribe no organization : for I conceive perception to be what it is at once, unchangeable and momentary, having no progress from one place to another, like the influence of objects transmitted from channel to channel along our organs.

gans. In like manner I apprehend action while exerted by the mind to be instantaneous and invariable, until reaching the first subject whereon the mind acts, where it becomes impulse, and continues such during its passage to the extremities of our limbs, in the same manner as motion propagated from body to body impelling one another. Now whether this philosophical mind be still a compound or a pure and simple substance, whether material or immaterial, I have hitherto forbore to examine: I may one time or other do my best towards discussing this very point fully, when whatever I may prove to others my own opinion thereon will appear sufficiently manifested; though at present I choose to leave the question undecided as being too early to take in hand.

But we frequently use Mind in the vulgar sense for the repository of our ideas, as when we talk of storing up knowledge in the mind, of enriching her with learning or adorning her with accomplishments: for those stores and treasures are certainly not in the mind spoken of in the former paragraph, because then we must actually perceive them all so long as they remain in our possession; but I defy any man with his utmost efforts to call to mind the thousandth part of all the knowledge he has in store; where then is that stock

stock of knowledge which lies dormant and unperceived? If you understand something of mathematics and something of agriculture; while busy in giving orders to your bailiff for the management of your grounds, your mind continues wholly intent upon the latter, nor do you perceive any one mathematical truth. What then is become of your mathematical knowledge in the interim? You have not lost it, you still retain it in possession, but where shall we seek for its residence? It is not in your closet, it is not in your hand, yet it lies somewhere within your custody: and where else can we place it with any propriety of speech, unless in your mind, which you have improved with the acquisition of that science? But this mind, which discerns not what it possesses, must be something different from that whereby you perceive whatever you have under immediate contemplation. Now concerning the vulgar mind I shall not scruple to pronounce, because I may do it without offence to anybody, that it is a compound consisting of parts; one vigorous and percipient, which is strictly the mind, the other inert and insensible furnishing objects for the former to perceive: which latter I would call the repository of ideas, containing under parts in all probability of a corporeal nature, distributed into channels, filaments or organs; and ~~that~~

our knowledge, that is, our ideas or the causes of them, lie here ready for use, and proceed mechanically from organ to organ untill their last operation whereby they raise in us perceptions. In short I take the ambiguity of the word Mind to arise from the grossness of our conceptions: for though the mind alone be properly ourselves, and all else of the man an adjunct or instrument employed thereby, yet in our ordinary conversations we consider the body, the limbs, the flesh and the skin, as parts of ourselves, nay sometimes even our cloaths, it being usual to say You have dirted me, or have wetted me, when somebody has happened to splash either upon one's coat. And when we go to distinguish between the body and the mind, we do not separate them carefully enough in our thoughts, but take some of the finer parts of the former into our idea of the latter.

7. This imperfect division of man into his two constituent parts has introduced an inaccuracy and contrariety into our expressions, which whoever shall try to escape in discoursing upon human nature, will perhaps find it impracticable: for though we may model our thoughts for ourselves, we must take our language from other people. I had intended at first setting out to appropriate Mind to the percipient part, but have found myself insensibly

fibly drawn in to employ it in another signification upon several occasions : nor could I avoid doing so without coining new terms and new phrases, which might have looked uncouth, abstruse and obscure, and formed a language not current in any country upon earth. But to deliver oneself intelligibly one must adopt the conceptions and idioms common among mankind : and we find talents, qualifications and accomplishments, generally ascribed to the mind, which I conceive depends upon the difference of our organization. This led me into the notion of mental organs, which I beg leave still to pursue, and to speak indifferently of Mind in the philosophical or vulgar sense as either shall best suit my purpose. If anybody shall think me worth a little carefull attention, he may quickly perceive, by the context or occasion, in which signification I employ the term at any particular time : but it was necessary to warn him of the double meaning, because without such caution I might have been grossly misunderstood, and thought to advance doctrines the farthest in the world from my sentiments.

Sensations from bodies we are conversant with come to us mostly through external mediums first, then thro' our bodily, and lastly thro' our mental organs ; and the workings
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of our thoughts require no other conveyance than the latter : therefore these in all cases are the immediate causes exhibiting ideas to our perception. For the mind sits retired in kingly state, nothing external, nothing bodily being admitted to her presence : and tho' in sensation the notice be received from things without us, they only deliver their message to the mental organs which by them is carried into the royal cabinet. Thus whether we see and hear, or whether we remember what we have formerly seen and heard, the mind receives her perception directly by the same hand : and howmuchsoever sensible objects may give us information remotely, the pictures of them in our imagination are what we immediately discern, as well as when they arise there without any apparent external cause, nor do we ordinarily distinguish them any otherwise than by finding the former more lively and vigorous than the latter : for which reason in dreams and strong impressions of fancy we sometimes mistake them for real sensations.

C H A P. VIII.

R E F L E C T I O N.

AS we have all been children before we were men, we have I doubt not amused ourselves at that season with many childish diversions; one of which we may remember was that of burning a small stick at the end to a live coal and whisking it round to make gold lace, as we called it. We little thought then of making experiments in philosophy, but we may turn this innocent amusement to that use in our riper years by gathering from thence that our organs can continue sensation after the impulse of objects exciting it is over. For the coal is in one point only at one instant of time, and can be seen no where else than where it is; yet there appears an entire circle of fire, which could not happen unless the light, coming from it at every point, put the optic nerves into a motion that lasted until the object returned unto the same point again, nor unless this motion raised the same perception in the mind as it did upon the first striking of the light. For if the stick be not twirled swiftly enough, so as that it cannot make a second impression from the same point before the motion

excited in the optics by the first is over, you will not see a whole fiery ring but a lucid spot passing successively through every part of the circle. He that has been in a great mob and dinned with incessant noise, clamour and shouting, if he can get suddenly into a close place and shut himself up from their hearing, will still have the sound ring for a while in his ears. So likewise upon receiving the blow of a stick, we feel the stroke when the stick touches us no more. From all which instances it is manifest that our organs, being once put in motion by external objects, can excite sensations of the same kind for some little time after the objects have ceased to act.

2. But beyond this little time and after all sensation is quite over, there will often remain an idea of what we have seen or heard or felt, and this I call an idea of reflection. From hence it appears that our mental organs have a like quality with the bodily of conveying perception to the mind when the causes setting them at work no longer operate. For what the impulse of objects is to the optic or auditory nerves, that the impulse of these latter is to the mental organs: yet we see the idea of an object may be retained after both those impulses are over. How long these mental organs may continue their

play by themselves I shall not pretend to ascertain, but certainly much longer than the bodily, and probably until thrown into a new course by fresh impulses or until quieted by sleep. But we know from experience that objects sometimes make so strong an impression upon our senses that the idea of them will remain a considerable while beyond the power of all other ideas to efface or of our utmost endeavours to exclude it. Which to me seems a sufficient evidence to prove the existence of these mental organs, and to show that whatever throws our ideas of reflection upon us, has a force and motion of its own independent of the mind.

Let any man look steadily against the window when there is a bright sky behind it, and then shutting his eyes clap his hand close over them: I would not have him repeat the experiment often, it being hurtful to the eyes, but he may try for once without any great damage; and he will still see an image of the window distinguished into frame and panes. This image will grow languid by degrees and then vivid again at intervals, the glass will change into various colours, red, yellow, blue and green, succeeding one another; the bars of the sash will encroach upon the panes, throwing them out of their square into an irregular form; sometimes the frame will

will appear luminous and the glass dark, and after the whole image has vanished, it will return again several times before it takes its final leave.

In like manner any scene we have beheld earnestly for a while will hang afterwards upon the fancy, and while we contemplate it there, we shall find the objects varying their forms, their colours fading and glowing by turns; from whence proceeds that fluctuation of ideas I have often spoken of before: and after having been quite gone out of our thoughts, they will frequently return again with the same vigour as at first. But there is this difference between the play of our sensitive and our reflective organs, that in a few minutes the image above mentioned will totally fly off, never to appear more unless you renew it by taking another look at the window: but an object we have once seen may recur again to our reflection after days, months and years, without any fresh application to the senses: and that the ideas of things we are frequently conversant with, thereby grow gradually more fixed and steady. Were one to mark out the space of a yard from the edge of a long table, he would touch some particular spot with his pencil, then he would shift it to another farther off or nearer, and then perhaps to one between both; nor

would he be able to satisfy himself presently, because his idea of a yard would lengthen, shorten and dance to and fro ; and when at last he had made his mark, tis ten to one but upon applying a rule he would find himself mistaken. Or were he to match a silk for a lady without carrying a pattern to the shop, when he had several pieces of different hues spread before him upon the counter, he would be a good while before he could fix upon the right : for his idea of the colour would fluctuate in his imagination, corresponding sometimes with those of a darker shade and sometimes with those of a lighter, or appearing by turns to have more of the green mixture or of the red : and after all his care, he would run a great hazard of being chid when he came home for bringing a colour that would not suit. But the mercer, who does nothing all day long but measure and tumble about his silks, upon seeing the lady's gown can run home and fetch a piece that shall match it exactly, and can cut off her quantity by guess without the trouble of taking his ell to measure it.

3. Reflection then, as hitherto considered, is only a continuation or repetition of sensations ; and thus it is that our senses furnish us with the first stock of materials we have to work upon in the absence of external objects.

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For we conceive ourselves as having these ideas in store deposited somewhere in what is vulgarly called the mind, even when we do not actually perceive them. We commonly say a blind man has no knowledge of colours, but a man with his eye-sight perfect has, altho perhaps at the time of speaking he has no colour under contemplation ; and we esteem it a part of the stock of knowledge he possesses : but this knowledge, while lying dormant and unperceived, I take to be nothing else besides the disposition of his internal organs to receive such forms and motions from other causes as they have been first put into by visible objects striking upon ^{the} optics.

I have before declared that by the term ideas I do not understand the very perceptions of the mind, but the figure, motion or other modification, of some interior fibres, animal spirits or other substances, immediately causing perception ; which substances I have since called the mental organs. Now I do not apprehend that from our seeing any strange creature, as an elephant or rhinoceros, to our reflecting on it again a year afterwards, the same modification remains within us during the whole interval : for then our internal organs must be as numerous as the ideas we possess, which considering the prodigious multitude of them we have in

store, seems inconceivable. But one substance may be susceptible of various modifications at different times; and as the same optic nerves serve to convey red, yellow or green, according to the rays striking upon them, so the same internal organs may exhibit various ideas, according to the impulse they receive from elsewhere. Therefore it was that I ascribed our whole stock of dormant knowledge to the disposition of the latter. For the ideas composing that stock strictly speaking exist no where, but our possession of them is none other than our having a disposition in the mental organs to fall readily into them; which disposition they first acquired from the action of the senses: for Mr. Locke has sufficiently proved that no colour or other simple sensible idea ever occurs to the thought until it has been once introduced by sensation.

4. But those ideas before mentioned having gained admittance thro' the avenues of sensation, do by their mutual action upon one another and by their operation upon the mind or of the mind upon them, generate new ideas which the senses were not capable of conveying: such as willing, discerning, remembering, comparison, relation, power and innumerable others. And this proves a second fund for supplying us with materials for our knowledge, which materials so stored up
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in the understanding, as well as those of the former sort, I conceive to be, when appearing to view, none other than modifications of our internal organs, and when dormant, dispositions of the same organs. Not that I look upon actual volition or perception as nothing else besides the motion, figure or other modification of some organ, but the ideas of those acts are different from the acts themselves, as remaining with us often in their absence. One may have the idea of comparing without actually making comparisons, of remembering what one has now forgot, and of willing or discerning things one does not at present will or discern. And one may have the idea of the operations of another person's mind, the original whereof we certainly cannot immediately perceive, but apprehend them by representations of them formed in our own imagination. So on the other hand we sometimes act and discern without reflecting or perceiving that we do so, and it often costs great pains to carry with us an idea of our operations even at the time of performing them.

5. If any one shall desire me to explain how the play of an organ can affect us with the perception of remembrance, volition, discernment and the like, let him first explain how external objects, which he must acknowledge to act by their figure, motion and impulse,

impulse, excite perceptions of colour, sound, taste, and other sensations; and when he has given a thorough and clear account of this matter, I shall not despair from the lights he shall therein suggest as clearly to explain the other: but while such lights are wanting, I must own them both inexplicable. Nevertheless the fact is too notorious to be denied, how little soever we may be able to account for it; continual experience testifying that nature has established such a connection between the motions of matter and perceptions of mind that one frequently begets the other. We reason and discourse every day of the past and future operations of our own mind and those of other people, and when we do so, we must undoubtedly perceive the terms concerning which we affirm or deny, any thing: but there can be no perceiving without an object to be perceived numerically and substantially distinct from that which perceives, and what is more likely to be this object than some modification of our internal organs? But when sound sleep or a fainting fit has cut off the communication between our animal motions and the mind, we can no more raise ideas of our own acts than we can of sensations. Both sorts start up involuntarily as well in dreams as in our waking hours; both occur more or less readily according to the
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the health, fulness or emptiness, or other disposition of the body; and both sometimes force themselves upon us against our strongest endeavours to remove them. From whence it seems undeniably to follow, that whatever throws up ideas of all kinds to our reflection, has a force of its own independent of the mind and belonging to something else: and therefore their repository is not in the mind unless understood in that vulgar sense wherein it comprehends a mixture and organization of corporeal parts. At least this approaches nearer towards an explication than what men generally satisfy themselves with, to wit, That by reason of our vital union, there is so close a connection between the mind and the body, that according as the latter stands disposed, she can more or less easily perform those acts which they esteem her to perform by herself alone without aid or instrumentality of the body.

6. This second class of ideas alone is what Mr. Locke understands by ideas of reflection, but I have extended the term to the other class too which we receive originally by the senses, as judging it most convenient for my purpose so to do. For I may have frequent occasion to speak of ideas of all kinds not coming immediately from sensation by one general name, and could not find a properer
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for them than that of reflection. If I use the term a little differently from what has been done before me, 'tis no more than common among persons who treat on these subjects: for every man has a way of modelling his thoughts peculiar to himself, and must necessarily accommodate his language to his manner of thinking. Nor can any uncertainty or perplexity ensue from such liberty, provided it be taken sparingly and proper warning given whenever it is taken. And I have the better excuse in the present instance because Mr. Locke himself has a little departed from the common language. For Reflection in ordinary discourse denotes a voluntary act whereby we turn back our thoughts upon some past occurrence, or hold something under contemplation in the mind, or draw consequences from what has been so contemplated: whereas ideas of reflection many times start up of themselves and vanish, without our reflecting on them at all or doing anything to introduce or procure them.

C H A P. IX.

COMBINATION OF IDEAS.

FROM the ideas thus received by sensation and reflection, there grows a new stock framed up of these as of so many materials

terials by their uniting together in various assemblages and connections. This their junction I choose to call by the name of Combination, as being more comprehensive than Composition, the term usually employed. For our ideas combine together in two several manners: one by composition, when they so mix and as I may say melt together as to form one single complex idea, generally denoted by one name, as a man, a table, a dozen; the other by association, when they appear in couples strongly adhering to each other but not blended into the same mass, as darkness and apparitions, the burst of a cannon or push of a drawn sword and the dread of mischief accompanying them. For when we think of a man we conceive him to be one thing, and his body, limbs, rationality, with other ingredients of his essence, as parts of the same whole: but when we reflect on a naked sword we do not consider that and the terror occasioned thereby as parts of any compound, altho' the one constantly attends the other beyond all possibility of separating them in the mind of a fearfull person.

2. To begin with composition, wherein I shall not attempt to reckon up how many sorts of complex ideas we have, that having been done already by Mr. Locke much better than

than I can pretend to, but shall examine how composition itself is effected, which it did not fall in his way directly to consider: tho' if it had I am apt to think he would have ascribed more to the ministry and organization of our corporeal parts than has usually been done, as one may gather from the hint he gives in his chapter of association, (§ 6), where he says, " That habits of thinking in
 " the understanding, as well as of deter-
 " mining in the Will, seem to be but trains
 " of motion in the animal spirits, which
 " once set a going continue in the same steps
 " they have been used to, which by often
 " treading are worn into a smooth path, and
 " the motion in it becomes easy and as it
 " were natural. As far as we can compre-
 " hend thinking, thus ideas seem to be pro-
 " duced in our minds."

3. Composition I apprehend is preceeded by a selection of some ideas from the rest exhibited at the same time to our view, as a necessary preparative thereto. For as a lady, who would make a curious piece of shell-work, must first pick out the proper shells from the drawers wherein they lie before she can dispose them into figures: so there can be no compound formed
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 be disengaged from

company with them. This separation is partly made by the objects themselves striking more strongly upon the senses and appearing eminently above their fellows; but I conceive the mind has a principal share in the business by turning her notice upon some particular objects preferably to others standing together before her.

Nature at first presents her objects in a chaos or confused multitude, wherein there is nothing distinct, nothing connected. When the new born babe comes into the world, the sight of things in the chamber, the gabblings and handlings of the gossips, and perhaps some smells and tastes, rush in at all the five avenues of sensation and accost the mind in one act of perception. The nurse's arms appear no more belonging to her body than the wainscot seen on each side of them: and the midwife's voice has no more relation to the person than to the bedpost. But as objects do not strike with equal force, the more glaring and striking give a stronger impulse to the organs, which continue the motion imparted therefrom after that of the feebler impulses have entirely ceased: and thus the former become selected in the reflection of the rest entering in company with and as our organs acquire a disposition readily into modifications they

they have been thrown into before, hence frequency of appearance produces the same effect with vigour of impression, and sensations continually repeated become distinguished from others received more rarely:

4. Both those causes, strength of impression and frequency of appearance, are greatly assisted by the operation of the mind: for some objects affecting us agreeably and others appearing indifferent, she fixes her notice upon the former for sake of the satisfaction received therefrom, which gives them an advantage above their fellows. Every one remarks how constantly the eyes of a young child follow the candle about the room whithersoever you carry it: and when we come to man's estate, we often pursue particular objects through all the motions and turnings they make before us. We have not indeed quite the same command over our ears and other senses, yet among variety of sounds, smells, tastes or touches accosting us at the same time, we can pick out some in disregard to the rest; and we can do the like with respect to different senses. A man who reads in a room where there is company talking may mind his book without taking notice or may listen to the singing a word of whi

This culling of particular objects from the whole number exhibited to view, I call turning the mental eye or directing the notice; by which I would not be understood as exactly describing the operation of the mind herein (for I do not ascribe to her a blind side and a light, nor suppose her actually turning to the right or the left by a loco-motion), but as using a figurative expression borrowed from the motion of the bodily eye producing the same effect. For how wide soever the circle of our vision may extend, whatever lies in the center against which the eye is levelled directly, affects the sense more strongly than other things equally lucid lying nearer the circumference. Wherefore the notice we take of particular objects not only occasions their leaving a stronger impression, but their agreeableness makes this application of the notice to be more frequently repeated upon them than upon others less engaging. But when I speak of the notice which conduces so much to the first selection of our ideas, I do not mean that thought and reflection we apply in our riper years to things we contemplate, for such a careful exercise of the faculties little children can scarce be supposed capable of; but that transient and cursory observation makes upon certain conspicuous or is passing in review before her,

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without designing it a moment beforehand or reflecting on it a moment afterwards.

5. But objects that shine eminently above their fellows, or on which the notice fixes, are not always single objects; for two or more may appear equally conspicuous, or may give a pleasure jointly which each of them separately could not have afforded: this happening often, cements them together and makes them coalesce into one assemblage. Another cause of coalescence arises from objects constantly presenting themselves together: most of the bodies we are conversant amongst being compound bodies, the parts of them preserve their contiguity to one another while they move from place to place, altho' they change their situation with respect to other bodies surrounding them; hence the ideas of those parts uniting together form an assemblage. When nurse walks about the room she carries her arms along with her, but not the wainscot seen on each side of them: when she goes out every part of her disappears, and when she returns the whole of her figure presents again to the eye. By frequent use becomes apprehended that the whole is a complex idea. Nor can it be resisted efficacy the combination of objects to compound ideas. We scarce know

usual dress, and how surprizing alteration a different coloured wig makes in a man's person: so that the cloaths we have been accustomed to see worn seem to enter into our complex idea of the wearer. So likewise ideas that use or conveniency has led us to consider frequently together become a compound, as a yoke of oxen, a flock of sheep, a city, a county.

We have seen how sensations, after their disappearance, leave ideas of themselves behind in the reflection, and if other sensations follow immediately and constantly while those ideas are fresh, they unite into an assemblage. Thus the taste of sugar in our mouths joins with the colour we saw before putting it in and the hardness we felt while we held it in our hands, and the ideas of a certain colour, consistency and sweetness, make the complex of sugar. By degrees we add more ingredients to the compound, further experience informing us of other qualities constantly attending what we have already comprehended under the idea of sugar whenever they have an opportunity of showing themselves, and hence we learn that sugar is brittle, dissolvable, clammy and astringent. For the complex or essence of bodies is made up of the qualities we have of affecting us in several manner, changes in other bodies, or from them.

6. Composition makes us esteem the things united therein as one, for how many soever present themselves to our thought in one assemblage we look upon as one thing, and that although they may be actually disunited. Thus if a bed be taken to pieces for convenience of carriage, upon being asked where it is, we say in the great chest, and if the chest contain nothing else, we conclude it was filled with that one piece of furniture. But having frequent occasion to consider things so compounded separately, we then see them different and distinct from one another, as the curtain, the tester, the head-board, and so forth: at other times we view them under both considerations at once and thence get the idea of whole and parts, for we call the several things forming an assemblage parts of the same compound; thus by a kind of contradiction conceiving them at the same time as one and many.

With regard to the species of things, we are greatly determined in our notions by the names affixed to them: for ice, although nothing but water congealed, is esteemed a different kind of thing from water; but lead, whether cold or melted, still retains its name and is reckoned the same metal. Were we to define lead or water, I suppose we should call one a solid and the other a fluid sub-

stance, esteeming these their natural states altho' we may have seen them put into the contrary by violence: but when we reflect that cold is no more than a privation of heat, I don't know why we should look upon fluidity as the natural state of water, which unless acted upon by a certain degree of warmth will of itself form into a consistency. But we call that the natural state which falls most commonly under our observation, therefore if we had lived in Saturn, we should doubtless have given but one name to ice and water, and defined it a solid body, although we might now and then have seen it liquified in a furnace: as on the other hand had we been born in Mercury, we should have deemed lead a fluid body, although by keeping it a long while at the bottom of a deep well, we might have found it sometimes coagulate.

7. We get a stock of ideas of the second class pretty early, those I mean strictly called ideas of reflection; and they run into assemblages in the same manner and from the same causes already spoken of, sometimes with one another only, but more commonly in conjunction with those of the other class derived originally from sensation: being often either thrown upon the notice by the workings of imagination, or the mind being

invited to turn her notice upon them by use and convenience, which always carries some degree of satisfaction.

Few of our assemblages are without some reflective ideas of the one sort or the other, not excepting those which are reckoned to come immediately by sensation. We talk of seeing cubes and globes, but in reality our sense exhibits no such objects to the mind: we can at most see only three sides of the former and one hemisphere of the latter, but imagination supplies what is wanting to complete their figures. It has been said that all things strike upon the eyes in a flat surface, and that our former acquaintance with the objects makes them appear standing out one before another: thus much is certain that the figures lie level in a picture, wherefore the roundness and protuberance we discern in them cannot come from the sense but must be drawn from our internal fund. Whenever we hear a noise, there enters instantly with it an idea of some instrument or string or animal or clashing bodies we apprehend making the sound. We can scarce look a stranger in the face without entertaining some notion of his character and temper of mind, which we conceive conveyed by sensation, for we think he looks morose or heavy or courteous or sensible: tis true we are often out in our
guess

guess and change it upon further observation, but some conjecture constantly occurs at first sight, and together with his outward figure forms our complex idea of his person. And though the characters of our familiar acquaintance are too well known to depend upon a single view, yet their present disposition may appear visible upon their countenance, and we may see them dejected or joyfull, serious or frolicsome, in the same glance wherewith we behold their features.

8. In process of time when we become capable of care and attention, we join many ideas that would not have conformed of themselves, nor occurred to that common notice we are led to take of things by their present agreeableness. And our conversation and intercourse with other people daily furnish us with new assemblages: for by perpetually communicating our ideas to one another, we become possessed of multitudes that our own experience would never have exhibited, nor our own sagacity worked out. In short whatever cause occupies the mind strongly or frequently with any set of ideas, thereby joins them into one compound.

Here we see the benefit of industry and society, as they tend greatly to enlarge our stock of complex ideas which are the principal basis of knowledge: for were it confined

to simple ideas alone, it would be very scanty and of little service to us in the conduct of life. We could not tell what to apply for satisfying our appetites of hunger and thirst, were not the sight of aliments connected with the idea of their palatableness; and in general, our ideal causes of action perhaps are all of them compounds; as are undoubtedly all our final causes, they containing an idea of satisfactory joined to whatever we apprehend possessing that quality.

9. There being multitudes of the same things subservient to us all for our uses and pleasures, causes a great similitude in the assemblages of all men. The common complex ideas of a chair, a table, of fire, water, victuals, drink, of honesty, gratitude, obligation and other things we have frequent occasion to take notice of in the daily course of our lives, are much the same in every one. But as we divide into various professions and fall upon different ways of observation, there is likewise a great diversity in men's ideas; so that the same collection of materials, presented to several imaginations, shall run surprizingly into various assortments according as they have been respectively accustomed. Carry a number of persons equally clear sighted upon a hill from whence they have an extensive prospect with a variety of
objects

objects before them : the farmer sees turnep and corn grounds, meadow, pasture and copse; the soldier observes eminencies, valleys, morasses and defiles; the mathematician describes parallelograms, triangles and scale-nums, in the fields and hedges; the country attorney distinguishes parishes, hamlets, manors and boundaries of estates; the poet beholds shady groves, sportfull flocks and verdant lawns; the painter discerns variety of colours, contrasts of light and shades; the religious man discovers materials for building, provisions for eating, for drinking, for cloathing, for the necessities and conveniences of life, accompanied with a thought of the giver of those blessings; and all this instantly without any endeavour of their own; on the contrary were they to try to form one another's compositions they would find great trouble and difficulty in the undertaking, and perhaps could not do it compleatly at last.

10. As our acquaintance with objects encreases, we add fresh ingredients to the compounds formed of them in our imagination; therefore those we have occasion the most frequently and carefully to consider become the most comprehensive assemblages. By this means manufacturers, artisans, scholars and others following any particular occupation

tion, have a fuller idea of the things belonging to their respective trades or sciences than other persons. The idea of the Iliad in the vulgar perhaps contains no more than an old story of a siege wrote in Greek verse: but together with this there arises in the mind of the poet or critic ideas of the fable, the characters, the sentiments, the figures, the diction, any of which being altered they would not acknowledge it to be the work of Homer. Yellowness, hardness and valuableness in commerce, seem to constitute the whole complex of gold in common persons, to which the goldsmith, refiner and naturalist, add malleability, ductility, specific gravity, dissolubility in aqua regia and indissolubility in all other menstruums, besides other qualities which never enter into the head of an ordinary man.

By thus adding daily to our compositions, they grow so bulky that we cannot take them in at one glance, but are forced to turn them about as we would some very complicated piece of workmanship in order to view them a side at a time. He that knows the properties of gold most compleatly cannot bring them all into his thought at once, he may run through them successively in a very short space of time, but can never make them all appear together at the same instant: nay
should

should he go to give a full and accurate definition, 'tis odds but another person may suggest something that he has overlooked. But however this be admitted or not, certain it is we do not always think of every particular belonging to the compounds under our consideration; nor can it be supposed that every time we tell over a few guineas we have a thought of ductility and many other qualities we know residing in them. Yet upon every idea being excited, some part at least of the assemblage whereto it belongs almost constantly occurs: we cannot see the face of a man, hear the barking of a dog or smell the sweetness of a rose, without thought of something more than the bare sight or sound or smell: and how many soever ideas thus start up in company, we find them closely connected together and apprehend them as component parts of one complex.

11. This partial appearance of our compounds suits extremely well with the narrowness of our conception. The ideas of things most familiar to us contain a multitude of particulars, and were the whole tribe to rush in upon us at once, they would so fill the mind as to leave room for nothing else, at least we should find them too unwieldy and unmanageable to do us any service. For a single idea, how complicated soever, can at most

most afford us only a present amusement; it is necessary for use that we should have two or more together in view: without this we could neither compare nor distinguish them, could discern neither their resemblance nor difference, nor relations, nor effects, neither could we affirm, deny or reason concerning them; wherein the whole benefit we may expect to reap from them consists.

On the other hand no small inconvenience arises from their not presenting before us entire: for by this means our ideas continually fluctuate, not only by their colours fading and glowing alternately, but by varying their shapes; our assemblages turning about perpetually and presenting different faces, or their component parts slipping away and others supplying their places, so that we can scarce ever hold anything steady in our contemplation. Hence we are led to reason erroneously or misunderstand one another, to discern resemblances and draw consequences upon one view of the same things which we do not find holding good upon another.

To remedy this mischief logicians take the method of definition, but then if the definition descend too minutely into particulars it will perplex instead of helping: therefore when we would settle the idea of an object,
we

we need bear in mind only so much of what belongs to it as may be sufficient for the occasion. What good would it do the gold-beater to think of the fusibility of his gold, or that it will not evaporate in the furnace like lead or mercury? the colour, malleability, weight and thickness, are all that he has any concern with. Rhetoricians and poets employ figures and copiousness of expression to bring that side of objects forward which they would have to strike fullest upon our notice: they often use epithets contained in the things whereto they are applied, as just properties, verdant lawns, living men, not that such epithets add anything to the signification, but because they strike that part of the assemblage more strongly upon the mental eye, which might otherwise have been unobserved.

12. The circumstance or situation things appear in joins to make a temporary assemblage together with the things, but does not coalesce so as to remain always in their company. A man running exhibits one complex idea wherein his motion is contained, the same man standing or sitting presents another: yet if we were to describe him to a stranger, we should hardly take his running or sitting into our description of his person. Nevertheless we cannot call those circumstances, whenever they occur, distinct ideas from

from the man, but parts of the same compound, because they present instantly in the same glance, and may be suggested where they are not; as in statues and drawings of animals in a moving posture, which strike us with ideas of motion in figures really quiescent. Much less can we suppose them distinct when joined by that main bond of composition a name, as in the terms, wind, rain, a river, a torrent, a horse race, which severally express one complex idea whereof motion is a necessary ingredient; for strike that out and the remainder will be esteemed another thing and deserving another appellation.

13. I shall have the less to say upon Association because of the near affinity it bears to Composition, depending upon the same causes and subject to the same variations: and perhaps composition is nothing more than an association of the several ideas entering into a complex. What shall be the one or the other, seems to depend generally upon the use of language: for if things arising to the thought constantly in company have a name given them we deem them compounded, if none we can only call them associated. Names being a receptacle in great measure necessary for gathering our ideas and holding them together in a complex: like those
cushions

cushions your gossips stick with pins in hearts, lozenges and various forms, against a lying in; the cushion is no part of the figure, yet if that should chance to fall into the fire and be consumed, the pins must all tumble down in disorder and the figures composed of them vanish. It is not always easy to determine when ideas combined together belong to the class of compounds or associates: perhaps the connection between the looks and sentiments of persons, which I have mentioned under composition, others might call association: nor is it very material to ascertain the limits between the two classes exactly. But since there are combinations which cannot with any propriety be stiled complex ideas, I thought proper to take some notice of them apart.

The principal of these, because the most universally prevailing and having the greatest influence upon our thoughts and transactions, is the association between words and their signification. Nobody will deny that sounds and characters are meer arbitrary signs bearing no relation in nature to the things they express, yet they become so strongly connected by custom with our ideas of the things that they constantly start up in the mind together and mutually introduce one another. For words heard or read instantly

stantly convey the meaning couched under them, and our thoughts upon common occasions find a ready utterance when we would communicate them either by speaking or writing. Nor does the junction between words and their meaning depend upon the Will whether it shall take place or no. Were a man unluckily obliged to sit and hear himself abused, he would be glad I suppose to dissociate the grating words from the scandal they contain and reduce them to their primitive state of empty sounds, but will find it impracticable: whence it appears that the seat of association lies in the organs, which seem to conspire in this case to throw a displeasure upon the mind, that she would exert all her power if she had any to escape.

14. And as our most compounded ideas turn different sides of themselves to view, so ideas linked to a variety of others, usher in different associates, according to the occasion introducing them. For besides the combination there is likewise a kind of attraction between our ideas, so that those preceeding generally determine what associates shall make their appearance; because our organs fall more easily into motions nearly the same with those they have been already put into than they can strike out different ones. Hence it comes to pass that many words,
having

having various significations, always suggest that sense which the context requires. The word Man is used for one of the human species, for a male, for a full grown person, a corpse, a statue, a picture, or a piece of wood upon a chessboard, yet we never mistake the meaning, being directed thereto by what gave occasion for its being employed. Nor do single words only carry a different force according to the sentence wherein they stand, but whole expressions too cast a lustre upon one another, and the very structure of the phrase gives a different aspect to the contents from what they would have had if placed in another order: in the due management of all which consists a great part of the arts of oratory and poetry.

I don't know how it is with other people, but I find that upon coming home after an absence of some months, I have a fuller and clearer idea of the scenes, persons and places, in the neighbourhood, immediately upon coming into the house and before I have seen any of them again, than I could have raised in the morning while at a distance: as if the bare removal from place to place gave a turn to the imagination, like the stop of an organ that brings another set of pipes into play.

15. Upon this quality of cohering in our ideas was founded that art of memory men-

tioned by Cicero, and as he tells us generally ascribed to the invention of Simonides who hit upon it by an accident. For being at an entertainment where there was a great number of guests, a message came that somebody wanted earnestly to speak with him in the street: in the interim while he was gone out the house fell down, and so crushed the company within, that when their relations came to bury them they could not possibly distinguish the bodies from one another, until Simonides pointed them out by remembering exactly where every man had sat. From hence observing the connection between objects and their stations, he took the hint of his artificial memory, wherein he taught his scholars to choose some spacious place, as a town, a park or large garden, with which and all the turnings, corners, plan, buildings and parts belonging to it, they should be perfectly familiar; and then to fancy certain images resembling the things they would remember, disposed regularly in the several parts of that place. Having done this carefully, when afterwards they cast their thoughts upon the place, it would appear replete with the images, each in its proper order and situation wherein it had been disposed. But the same place was to be employed upon all occasions, for the figures might be wiped away at pleasure by substituting

tuting a new set in their room, which would remain there so long as were wanting or until displaced by having successors assigned them. Thus the association between images and their stations was only temporary, not perpetual like that of man and wife, but occasional like that of travellers in a stage coach, who look upon themselves as one society during their journey, but when that is ended separate perhaps never to meet again: their places being supplied the next day by another company, and the same coach serving successively as a cement for different societies. Something like this artificial memory our ladies practise every day; for when they are afraid of forgetting any thing they purpose to do by and by, they put their ring upon the wrong finger, or pin a scrap of ribbon upon their stomacher: when afterwards they chance to cast their eye upon the ring or ribbon, they find the purpose for which they put it there associated therewith and occurring instantly to their memory.

16. There are many other sorts of association, which whoever desires to know, may consult Mr. Locke's chapter upon that article, to which he may add others from his own observation if he thinks it worth while to take the pains. But tho' our ideas are often made to cement by our bringing them together, yet

the association once formed, they continue joined without any act of ours to preserve their coherence. Like the diamonds which a jeweller sticks in wax in order to show you the form he proposes to set them in: they are held together by the tenacity of wax, that is, by the properties of matter, tho' it were the act of a man that pressed them down so as to make them fasten.

C H A P. X.

T R A I N S.

OUR combinations, being most of them too large to be taken in at one glance, turn up their different sides or introduce their several associates successively to the thought, exhibiting so much at a time as can easily find entrance. Thus when we think of man, there occurs first perhaps the whole outward human figure; then the inward composition of bowels, muscles, bones and veins, then the faculties of digestion, loco-motion, sense and reason. Or if we read a passage in Virgil, the plain meaning of the words starts up foremost to view; afterwards the turn of phrase, the grammar, the elegance of diction, sen-

sentiment, figures and harmony. And as some of the same materials obtain a place in several combinations, one complex idea gives rise to another by means of some particular ingredient possessed in common by them both. Thus it often happens that two things very different in themselves introduce one another by the intervention of some medium bearing an affinity to both tho' in different respects, which serves as a link by which the former draws in the latter. On hearing the report of a gun one's thoughts may run upon soldiers, upon their exercises, upon battles particularly that before Quebec; this may put one in mind of Canada, of the fur trade, of surprising stories told of the beavers, their contrivance in building themselves houses, of the sagacity of animals, of the difference between instinct and reason, and abundance of other speculations widely remote from the sound of a gun.

2. Nobody but must ^{have} observed an aptness in the fancy, and even the tongue in common chit chat, to roam and ramble when left to itself without controul. Yet in our most incoherent sallies there is generally a coherence between single ideas and the next immediately preceeding and following, altho' they contain nothing similar to one another as our imagination would rove

always in this desultory manner, were it to contain only one combination at a time without a mixture of anything else: but an idea, on being displaced by another, does not wholly vanish, but leaves a spice and tincture of itself behind, by which it operates with a kind of attraction upon the subsequent ideas, determining which of their associates they shall introduce, namely, such as carry some conformity with itself. Thus if on going to market to buy oats for your horse, you meet a waggon on the way, it might suggest the idea of other carriages, of turnpike roads, of commerce; or of the axis in peritrochio and five mechanical powers; or of the materials composing it, of the several sorts of timber, the principles of vegetation: but that your horse's wants, being already in your thoughts, confine them to take a course relative thereto: so the waggon puts you in mind of the owner being a considerable farmer who may supply you more conveniently and cheaper than the market, the idea of the man suggests, not that of his wife and children nor of the country he came from, which have nothing to do with your first thought, but that of his house, of the way thither, what you shall say to him, whether he shall deliver the corn home or you shall fetch it. This regular succession of ideas all bearing a
reference

reference to some one purpose retained in view, is what we call a train: and daily experience testifies how readily they follow one another in this manner of themselves without any pains or endeavour of ours to introduce them.

3. What first links ideas into trains, I take to be the succession of objects causing or leading to our satisfactions: for having observed that things agreeable come to us thro' several steps, whenever the first of them is made, it carries the thought on to all the rest, and having perceived that our desires cannot be gratified without using some means to obtain them, imagination runs back to all that is necessary to be done for that purpose. The sight or smell of victuals, putting into the child's mouth, constantly preceeding the taste of them, excites an idea of that taste before the palate can convey it; in a little while the sight of the nurse coming in to bring the pap becomes another link in the chain, to which is afterwards added the sound of her steps on entering the room, and the creaking of the door when she opens it. In process of time the child, making various noises, perceives that some of them have an influence upon the nurse's motions; hence it gets an imperfect notion of language, of cause, and effect, and when hunger presses, the little imagination

tion runs backward to the ministry of the nurse and the sounds using to procure it, which the child accordingly makes in order to obtain a relief of its wants.

Desire, curiosity, amusement, voluntary attention or whatever else carries the notice frequently thro' a number of ideas always in the same series, links them into a train. When we would learn anything by heart we read it over and over again, and find the words fixed thereby in our memory in the same order as they lay in the page: but if we had read inattentively, so that the notice had rambled elsewhere, we should never have got our lesson. Were the same scrap of a song to be chanted in our ears for a month together, I suppose we could not fail of learning it exactly without any desire or endeavour so to do: but if when the finger came it always happened that we were so earnestly intent upon something else as to take no notice of him, he would not work the like effect.

4. But tho' the mind by her notice begins the formation of a train, there is something in our internal mechanism that strengthens and compleats the concatenation. It has been generally remarked by schoolboys that after having laboured the whole evening before a repetition day to get their lesson by heart but to very little purpose, when they rise in the morning

morning they shall have it current at their tongue's end without any further trouble. Nor is it unusual with persons of riper years, upon being asked for a determination which they cannot form without a number of things to be previously considered, to desire time to sleep upon it: because with all their care to digest their materials they cannot do it completely, but after a nights rest, or some recreation, or the mind being turned for a while into a different course of thinking, upon her return to the former ideas she finds they have ranged themselves anew during her absence, and in such manner as exhibits almost at one view all their mutual relations, dependencies and consequences. Which shows that our organs do not stand idle the moment we cease to employ them, but continue the motions we put them into after they have gone out of our sight, thereby working themselves to a glibness and smoothness, and falling into a more regular and orderly posture, than we could have placed them in with all our skill and industry.

Our trains once well formed, whatever suggests the first link the rest follow readily of their own accord: but as practice joins them more firmly, so you find them hanging closer or looser together according to the degree of strength they have acquired. There are some who having gotten a thing by rote, can

go thro' it currently at any time without mistake or hesitation, but if you interrupt them they cannot go on without repeating what they had recited before from the beginning. Generally when we are out, a single word prompted will draw up the remainder of the chain and set us in our career again : but what we are extremely perfect in we can leave off and resume of ourselves, begin in the middle or take up any part at pleasure. There have been persons who have acquired a surprizing perfectness of this kind : I remember formerly to have seen a poor fellow in Moorfields, who used to stand there all the day long and get his living by repeating the Bible : whoever gave him a halfpenny might name a text anywhere in the old or new Testament, which he would repeat directly and proceed to the next verse, the next chapter, the next book, and so on without stopping until another customer gave him another cue.

5. But trains of this enormous length are few and wanted only upon extraordinary occasions ; those which serve us for common use are innumerable and extremely short, nor should we find them commodious if they were not so. For objects continually changing before us and sensations of various kinds accosting us incessantly, there is very little scope

scope for reflection to range in before the notice is engaged by something else : and the purposes directing our observation from time to time being various, if our trains were not very numerous, we should not so readily as we do, find enow of them suited for carrying on the course of thought we desire. By continual use, our trains multiply and open into one another, which gives a facility to our motions, and makes the imagination like a wilderness cut into a multitude of short alleys communicating together by gentle and almost imperceptible windings ; where one may pursue an object seen at a distance without much deviating from the strait line, or take a compass without losing our way. Besides, the smallness of our trains and their being mutually interwoven furnishes more play for the fancy : for a thread stretched out lengthwise you can view only two ways, either backward or forward, but the same being worked up into a curious cypher, presents an abundance of mazes wherein the eye can wander with an endless variety.

How helpfull these little involuntary trains are to us upon all occasions, may appear manifest without much consideration. What is the difference between a number of words as they lie in a dictionary or in some well wrote

page? for in both we know their several meaning, but in the former they represent a succession of loose incoherent assemblages, whereas in the latter they appear linked in trains familiar to our imagination. Nor let it be objected that the author may lead us into a course of thinking we never travelled in before; for though the course may be new, the component parts of it, that is, the phrases, the structure and idiom of language, must be of our old acquaintance or we shall not understand him.

The learned languages are taught at school by rules, but we may remember how tediously we proceed while forced to have recourse every foot to our rules either in construing or composing: wherefore their use is only to bring our ideas of words into trains corresponding with the concords and other rules of grammar; when this is done compleatly by long practice we may forget our rules, as I believe most of us do, and yet without them we find the nominative or the adjective, at the beginning of a sentence, lead naturally and of its own accord to the verb or substantive at the further end. And though we learn our mother tongue without rule, only by hearing it continually chimed in our ears, yet until it be sufficiently formed into
child express itself im

sentences. In a language we are masters of, while we read currently on, the sense of what we read seems wholly to occupy the imagination, yet for all that the mind can find room for something of her own: how quick soever the eye may pass along, the thought flies still quicker, and will make little excursions between one word and the next, or pursue reflections of its own at the same time it attends to the reading. Hence arises the difference so necessary to be taken notice of between the letter and the spirit, for whoever stops at the former will be very little the better for what he reads: but this spirit must be drawn from our trains, which the author excites but does not infuse. It has been remarked as one quality of the sublime and of fine humour, that they convey a great deal more than they express, but this More must be something the mind has already in store and they only draw it up to view: therefore sublimity of stile and delicacy of wit are lost upon the vulgar, who having no proper trains to be excited, descry nothing beyond the obvious meaning of the words, and for that reason are more taken with plain language and broad jokes, as leading into ~~turns~~ *trains* of thought to which they have been accustomed. Wit depends chiefly upon allusion for its suppletion, and metaphor and many other figures

figures of speech derive from the same source ; but what is allusion besides the suggesting ideas already familiar to the imagination ? Transition is the art of leading the mind by gentle and easy turnings, so that she finds herself unawares in a new field without perceiving when she quitted that she was engaged in before.

6. What has been remarked just now concerning the manner of learning languages, may as justly be applied to all the arts and sciences in general, and to the common actions of life : for in our first attempts upon them, while we are forced to dig up every thing by dint of application, how slowly and awkwardly and imperfectly do we proceed ! but when we have furnished ourselves with proper trains that will spring up of their own accord upon touching a link of them, then we can go on expeditiously, readily and perfectly. For it has been shown in the chapter of Action that those commonly called so consist of many single acts, each of which must have its idea directing to perform it : but our thought and care reach no further than to the main action, the particular parts of it must be thrown up by imagination. Therefore the machinery of our organs bears at least an equal share with the mind in all our transactions, for she only chooses what shall be done

done next, but the several means and minute steps necessary for executing it occur without our seeking. Nor yet would they so occur unless they had been enured by practice to follow one another successively : from whence it appears that the disposition of our organs to fall into little series of motions spontaneously, is the thing that gives us all our dexterity and expertness in every kind of action.

Trains are most commonly taken notice of in the memory because there are the longest and consequently the most visible : and those little trains, which serve us upon ordinary occasions, depend upon the same disposition of our organs, though we do not usually call them Remembrance unless they occur with that additional circumstance of their having been in our thought before. Yet we can often discern their reference to memory, as appears from our usually justifying ourselves upon being criticized at any time for speaking or acting improperly, by alledging that we remember others saying or doing the same upon the like occasion. Wherefore the ancients made Mnemosyne the mother of the Muses, supposing memory the groundwork and foundation of all skill and learning : nor is it improbable that the structure of a man's organs, which enables him to remember well, may

may render him equally capable of any other accomplishment with proper cultivation.

7. As much a paradox as it may seem I shall not scruple to assert, that if it were not for our trains, we could not have that entertainment we receive from novelty : for things so far out of the way of all former experience as that we cannot tell what to think of them appear strange and uncouth, but there is a difference between strangeness and novelty : the latter belongs to objects that work new openings into old trains and so give them a play that was not common to them before ; or else renew a former course of thought that has been long intermitted. For we may observe that a new play, a new pattern of flowered silk, or a new anything, does not please if it does not in any respect resemble what we have seen of the kind before, or does not suggest some little trains of reflection besides the bare sight : and after we have forgotten it for a time it may give us the pleasure of novelty again. If objects engage us in trains that will not readily coincide, they raise our wonder : but the trains, by being often brought together, open into one another at last, whence comes the vulgar saying, that a wonder lasts but nine days. I shall leave it to the critics to settle the precise limits between wonder, admiration, amazement and astonishment ;

nishment; and only observe that in all of them there is a stoppage of the thought, which being unable to remain entirely motionless, makes little excursions, but finds the trains abrupt and crossing one another, being perpetually checked and diverted from its usual courses by the object that holds it engaged.

As letters united together compose words, words compose sentences, and sentences discourses, so our ideas run into assemblages and associations, these link in trains, and a texture of trains makes larger trains or courses of thinking: and each species of junction opens a wider field for the mind to expatiate in; for composition greatly encreases variety; eight bells tolled singly can give only eight sounds, but above forty thousand changes may be rung upon them. But as the occasions of life and objects surrounding us perpetually require us to alter our course of attention, our trains branch out into several others and we are easily diverted into a new track, provided it be done by gentle turnings and through openings to which we have been accustomed.

8. This disposal of ideas into trains, and their being interwoven together in a manner suitable to our occasions, gives birth to Order; which consists, not in any number or species

of ideas, but in their introducing one another in such successions as shall readily answer our purposes. There are persons who have laid in vast heaps of knowledge, which lie confusedly and are of no service to them for want of proper clues to guide into every spot and corner of their imagination : but when a man has worked up his ideas into trains and taught them by custom to communicate easily with one another, then arises order, and then he may reap all the benefit they are capable of conveying ; for he may travel over any series of them without losing his thread, and find anything he wants without difficulty. Nor is it material for his own private use in what manner his trains lie, provided they be wrought into some uniform plan : but with respect to his intercourse amongst other people, it is very material that he should range his ideas in a manner conformable to their ways of thinking, or they will find nothing regular in them. Were the methodical schoolman and polite pretty fellow to mix in the same company, the discourses of each would appear easy, clear and pertinent, to those of his own class, but perplexed, dry and unengaging, to those of the opposite ; for your close deductions of reason seem a heap of rubbish to the man of the world ; and the conversations of the latter, while he keeps up the
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ball of discourse for a whole evening with smart expressions that come in always pat upon the occasion; are a meer volubility of words with no more coherence than a rope of sand, to one that has immured himself in a college. The discourses of either present the same succession of ideas to the hearer that was in the mind of the speaker, but that succession exhibits nothing regular or coherent to the former because it does not run in trains familiar to his apprehension. For what is regularity to one man may be all confusion to another: which proves order to be relative and to derive its existence from the cast of our imagination.

Objects stand in order when their situation corresponds with that of our ideas: and as the moulds of all imaginations are similar in some respects, hence we term things regular or irregular as they tally or not with the trains which the ideas of mankind most generally fall into. Strait lines and easy curves the notice can readily run along, and by travelling frequently in those tracks they become familiar: wherefore figures consisting of them, such as squares, triangles, circles, spirals, serpentine lines, parallel rows and rays diverging at equal angles from one center, are esteemed regular, because objects placed in them link of their own accord into lines.

and the mind has but a few parts to put together in order to form the whole figure, and can range over them by paths to which it has been accustomed: whereas the same objects being jumbled together promiscuously, each of them becomes a separate part unconnected with the rest, and the whole is too numerous for the mind to manage, nor can she find any passage leading to them successively one after another. For the same reason, symmetry and proportion contribute greatly to order, because the one gives dispatch to the eye by enabling it to take in objects by pairs, and the other smooths the passage over them by the mutual dependance of parts. But the mind must have been enured to observe proportion, or it will lose the benefit resulting therefrom; therefore we see that common persons do not discern half the regularity in a fine building, or other piece of well proportioned workmanship, that is obvious to connoisseurs; and that they do discern any, is owing to the degree of skill in proportion which few men are without.

9. Order may be produced without changing the position of things, only by removing whatever would obstruct the eye in its passage along them. When a young lady cuts a curious figure out of paper, she gives no new position to the several parts of her figure,

figure, for they had the same situation with respect to one another while they lay in the whole paper as after they had^{ve} passed through her hands. And indeed every sheet of paper contains all the figures that any clean-fingered damsel can cut out of it: therefore the operatrix is so far from creating the figure that she spoils all others that might have been formed out of the same sheet, so that for one she seems to make she really destroys a thousand. Nevertheless she produces order and regularity where there was none before, only by snipping away the superfluities of the paper from her figure, and thereby leading the eye along all the mazes and windings comprehended therein.

As order consists in the correspondence of objects with our ideas, it is all one whether the former be placed in figures familiar to our apprehension, or whether the latter be worked into trains conformable to the position of things we behold: order will ensue alike in both cases. New prospects generally appear irregular until by frequent contemplating they grow into form without any real alteration in the scenes: nor is there anything so irregular but by pains and long acquaintance may be brought to lie in order in our imagination. What can be more a wilderness than the great town of London to

strangers? they can scarce stir a hundred yards without losing themselves. But the penny postman finds no perplexity in his walks to any part of it: he reads only the name of the street or court or alley in his superscription, and instantly the way thither occurs to his thought. Were some Fairy while he sleeps to dispose the houses into strait lines crossing each other at right angles like the streets of Babylon, he might not perhaps at first find his way about the town so readily as he does at present.

10. Whatever situation men have accustomed themselves to place things in is order to them, tho' perhaps nothing like it to any body else. When one steps into the shop of a country chandler or haberdasher of small wares, one is apt to wonder how they find every thing so readily as they do: but custom has brought their ideas into a conformity with the position of their wares, so that upon any particular thing being asked for, their thought runs in train to the proper drawer; and were we to place their goods otherwise, though in a manner we should think more regular, they might justly complain we had put them out of order. We studious folks generally have each of us a way of placing our implements peculiar to ourselves, the ink-glass must stand just in this spot,

spot, the penknife in that, the pens in another, and the books and papers have their several stations allotted them, so that we may presently reach what we want without loss of time or interruption of our studies. As soon as our back is turned, in comes the maid to clean the room: she cannot dust the table while it remains covered, so she removes all our things, and never replaces them as they were before. Not but that the wench is carefull enough to set all to rights again, but her idea of order being different from ours, she lays the folio underneath, then the papers upon it blank or written as they come to hand and the smaller things on top of all: so that on our return we find every thing at the same time in the neatest order and the utmost confusion, for we are forced to tumble over the whole parcel to come at any individual we want.

Thus order often respects convenience, for we say things are in their places when they lie handy for our purposes so that we can execute them without interrupting or deviating from the plan of action we had laid down. Nor does use give occasion to order less frequently than convenience: when things stand in such a situation as to produce some advantage that would not have accrued from them in any other, we say they are in order,

and the want of that situation we call disorder. Thus disorders of the body, of the air or the elements, are nothing but such commixtures of their parts as destroy the soundness of health, disturb the animal functions or stop the progress of vegetation; and without a reference to some such consequences as these we should not term them disorders. And this kind of order, resulting from use and convenience, refers either to the disposition of things we have usually beheld them in, or to the train of thought of some agent placing them in that manner. For tho' chance might once in a while dispose matters very cleverly for our purpose, we should not conceive them the more orderly upon that account. If a traveller upon perceiving himself thirsty, should immediately espy a bough of ripe apples hanging over his head, and wanting a stone to beat them down should find one lying just before him, and a little further a knife to pare them dropped by some careless passenger; all this would suggest nothing of order unless he supposed them laid there on purpose.

What we call the order of nature does not consist only in the position of things considered in themselves, but either in their being so disposed as to produce the uses derived from them, or their moving in rotation
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by constant returns of the same changes. Under the former view we see the bodies of this vast fabric of the world, minute and large, the fibres of plants, the vessels of animals, the luminaries of heaven, contributing in their several stations to the support and conveniencies of life and other purposes in a manner we could not in any degree imitate in things under our own management without design and contrivance : which therefore leads our thoughts into trains composing the plan exhibited thereby. Under the latter view we observe the stated successions of night and day, the vicissitudes of seasons, the progress of vegetation from the seed to the blade, the bud, the flower and the seed again, the stages of growth in animals, the circumvolutions of the firmament; and having joined our observations into a system, there springs up order therefrom, which encreases in proportion as we can add new branches to our scheme. In ancient times the fixed stars only were esteemed regular, as rising and setting always at equal intervals, and keeping their positions with respect to one another, while the other seven being thought reducible to no certain rule were stiled Planets or Wanderers : but later discoveries having brought their motions too into

a system, we now admire the wonderful regularity of their courses.

Nor let it be said there was an order in all these particulars before men took notice of it: for if we place order in the position of things taken absolutely without reference to our ideas, there will be no such thing as disorder in nature. Every number of things, not excepting the wildest productions of chance, must lie in some position or other: and were there an understanding pliable and comprehensive enough to strike out trains immediately among any collection of objects, and discern their respective situations as clearly as we do in scenes the most familiar to our acquaintance, it would not know what irregularity was. Therefore if we make a distinction between orderly and disorderly, or the latter term has any meaning in language, it must belong to such positions of things as do not correspond in their parts with any courses our ideas usually fall into, nor are reducible to any system in our imagination.

11. Did order exist in things, there could not be an order of time and of causes: for there exists no more than one point of time and one step of causation in every moment; but this single object is not capable of order unless in conjunction with the series of events preceeding or to follow after, which being
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never existent together cannot be the residence of any quality. Therefore it is the ideas of past and future occurrences brought together in the mind that renders them capable of order, which they then receive when she can discern their connections and dependencies upon one another. If we consider objects co-existing together in the same scene, we shall find, that though they can have no more than one position at once, they may contain a variety of orders. The spots of a chess board lie in eight equal rows with their flat sides turned towards each other; they lie likewise in fifteen unequal rows of lozenges, touching at the angles, the middlemost having eight spots in length, the next on each side seven a piece, and so falling off until you come to single ones at the corners: and they lie also in squares enclosed within one another, the innermost consisting of four spots, the next of twelve or four on a side, the third of twenty or six on a side, and the outermost of twenty-eight or eight on a side. These three forms of order, besides others that might be traced out, are generated in the imagination, and may be changed or cast into one another at pleasure successively without making any alteration in the chess board, only by the eye compounding

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its objects variously and running along in different courses of observation.

12. But those courses, or the component parts of them, must be such as were familiar to us before, or we must render them familiar by practice and application. And what is more remarkable, after we have brought our thoughts to run currently along a train of ideas, they cannot always run back again the contrary way although in the same track. Take a sheet of paper written on one side in a fair legible hand, an easy stile and familiar language, turn it upside down or hold it against a strong light with the back part towards you, and though you have a full and clear view of the writing, you see nothing but perplexity and confusion : you must pick out letter by letter and spell every word as you go along. If any particular form of objects or their situation with respect to one another constituted the essence of order this could not happen, for the form of things does not depend upon their postures ; a man does not lose his human shape by being set upon his head, nor does a horse undergo a metamorphosis every time he rolls upon his back, neither do the words lose their places nor the letters their joinings by a different manner of holding the paper : but the mind has always been used to read them from left to right

right, and therefore cannot follow in any other course. What then, is there a right hand and a left in the mind itself? or have her perceptions a loco-motion which can proceed only in one particular direction? Let us rather attribute the cause to the motion of our internal organs running mechanically in the courses to which they have been accustomed. For as the blood circulates from the heart to the arteries and returns back again through the veins, but cannot take a contrary round beginning first at the veins and thence proceeding to the arteries: so the channels of our ideas give them a free passage in that course they have been used to, but close against them upon their return. Our mental organs indeed are of so soft and pliable temper as that they may be brought to admit trains passing through them either way, for there are some figures we comprehend presently whichever part of them first catches the eye: but then this must be effected by long practice, by frequently running them over backwards and forwards in our thoughts, or by having been used to see them in all aspects wherein they can be placed.

But though order subsists only in the conformity of our trains with the position of objects, yet is it not produced by a voluntary act of the mind: for we cannot see order
wherever

wherever we please, nor can we avoid seeing it in some subjects if we will contemplate them at all: which I suppose has made it be imagined that things were essentially and absolutely regular or irregular in themselves. The mind as we have shown before, may by painful application bring any set of objects how confused soever to lie in trains, or the same may be brought to pass without industry by long and intimate acquaintance: but when the organs have once acquired a habit of throwing up ideas in that manner corresponding with the situation of objects, they will afterwards exhibit order upon sight of them without aid of the mind and solely by virtue of their own machinery.

13. I have but one or two observations more to make upon trains, which are that they grow quicker by continual use, and if short, unite at last into combinations; or if long, the middle links frequently drop out or pass so swiftly as not to touch the notice. When children learn to read, they join the letters and syllables in trains to form words and the words to form sentences. By degrees they do this faster, and in process of time the whole word or sentence arises to their view in one assemblage. When we would recollect the members of a family where we are tolerably well acquainted, we find the ideas of them

them introduce one another in trains, but after having lived or conversed daily among them for some time, upon hearing the name of the house the whole association of persons belonging to it starts up instantly to our fancy. And when the channels of our ideas are worn smooth by constant use, the current runs too rapid for the notice to keep pace with it. I have met with persons who could understand more of what they read in latin or french than in english, because their mother tongue affording too easy a passage to their thoughts, they skim lightly over the surface and never touch the greater part lying at the bottom.

C H A P. XI.

J U D G E M E N T.

NARROW as we must acknowledge our capacities to be, they can nevertheless give harbour to several ideas and several combinations at the same time. External objects continually pour a variety of sensations upon us, which do not so fill the imagination but that reflection still finds room to throw in other ideas from her own store. And when
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the notice touches upon two or more ideas together, there generally arises another, not compounded or extracted from them, but generated by them, to wit, an idea of comparison, resemblance, identity, difference, relation, distance, number, situation or other circumstance belonging to them : all which in metaphysical language are comprehended under the general term of Judgement, which in common speech we distribute into several species, as knowledge, discernment, opinion and appearance, not indeed very accurately as not always adhering inviolably to that division, but often using them promiscuously for one another.

2. Single ideas may be expressed by single words, as a man, a colour, motion, gratitude, for upon hearing the sound the whole idea associated therewith starts up instantly to the thought : but to express a judgement you must employ a proposition, which always contains three parts at least, namely, the terms and the judgement passed upon them, as *man* is an animal, fire consumes wood, one egg resembles another. For though we have sentences consisting only of two words, as *Peter lives*, *Thomas sleeps*, *the earth moves*, which therefore seem to contain no more than one term, yet that there is another implied appears manifest because we may ex-
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prefs that other without adding anything to the fence : for Peter is alive, Thomas asleep, the earth in motion, convey not a whit more than was conveyed by the shorter sentences above cited. And though many times one of the terms be comprehended within the other as being an ingredient of the assemblage expressed thereby, yet must it be taken out from the assemblage and stand apart before we can judge anything concerning it. The idea of man includes that of life, activity, reason and several other particulars, but this idea contemplated ever so long will make no proposition nor produce any judgement, unless some of those particulars be considered in the abstract and beheld in the same view as it were by the side of the concrete; and then we can discern that man is a living, an active or a rational creature. But this abstract is as much a compleat idea when compared with assemblages comprehending it within them as when compared with others that do not : the idea of sweetness being as distinct from that of sugar whereof it is affirmed as from that of gall whereof it is denied; and he that thinks of the former has no fewer ideas in his mind than he that thinks of the latter.

3. That judgement likewise, although the production of the terms, for we cannot judge without something in our thoughts to judge upon, is nevertheless a distinct idea from the

roots whereout it grows, cannot be doubted when we reflect, that many things occur to our view and affect our notice in some degree without our passing any judgement upon them. We may see leaves falling from the trees, birds flying in the air or cattle grazing upon the ground, without affirming or denying or thinking anything concerning them : and yet perhaps we had taken so much notice of them that, upon being asked a minute afterwards, we could remember what we had seen. A man may have beheld a field from his window a hundred times without ever observing whether it were square or pentangular, and yet the figure was exhibited to his view every time he looked upon it : and we have observations suggested to us sometimes upon things extremely familiar to our acquaintance, which we acknowledge very obvious when put in mind of them, although we never hit upon them ourselves. It is notorious that men judge variously of the same objects, and so do the several faculties of the same man upon many occasions : Appearance, which is the judgement of sense, being opposite to Opinion, or the judgement of understanding. For we believe the Sun to be an immense globe much larger than all the countries we ever travelled over, while it appears at the same time to our eyes but as a
little

little bowl that one might roll about in a bushel. And though the apparent magnitude of objects is supposed to depend upon the angle they subtend at our eye, nevertheless our familiarity with them changes our estimation of their bulk. Why does the Sun look smaller than the house, and yet a man at twenty yards distance does not look smaller than your hand, although you might quite cover him from your sight by holding it up at arms length before you? Unless because we continually see men close by our side, whereas we never saw the Sun so near as to subtend a greater angle than the house.

4. Hence it follows incontestably that judgement is an act of reflection, never thrown upon us by external objects, but something done upon the ideas after their entrance. Therefore the schoolmen reckon it a second act of the mind, distinct from the first, called simple apprehension, whereby we receive the ideas conveyed by sensation or turned up by the workings of imagination. But if it be an act of the mind, it is, as well as apprehension, an act of her perceptive faculty, wherein the mind remains purely passive and only receives what some other agent strikes upon her. For judgement is not a voluntary act, any further than that in many cases we may choose whether we will consider things atten-

tively enough to discern their relations or resemblances: but this we have not always in our option, for sometimes they force upon us whether we will or no; and when we fix our attention voluntarily, the judgement formed thereupon is not the work of the mind, for she cannot discern snow to be green nor twenty to be less than fifteen, but must take such estimation as results of its own accord from the subject she contemplates. 'Tis true we sometimes judge amiss through the fault of our Will when we had materials before us for doing better, but this we do by the power we have over our ideas to overlook or as it were squint upon some and hold others in a steadier view; but what is done by the instrumentality of ideas, although remotely our own act and therefore justly chargeable at our door, is nevertheless the immediate operation of the instrument; just as an impression is made by the seal, although we press it down upon the wax ourselves.

5. Since then the mind is purely passive in the act of judging as well as of apprehending, we must seek for some agent to produce that effect upon her: and what can this be besides the mental organs? I shall not pretend to explain by what particular figure or motion they do their work: for we cannot pry into a man's sensory while he thinks, to discern
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what disposition of the fibres in any case, either of sensation or reflection, affects him with this or that perception: but it seems undeniable that they must have a different modification when they enable us to pass a judgement, from that whereby they exhibit the ideas whereon we judge. For else why do not all objects when clearly discerned suggest all the relations they stand in to one another, or all the comparisons that may be drawn between them, or why do men judge so variously upon the same subject? The papist thinks persecution a duty, the protestant thinks it none: they both have the same terms in their thought and therefore so far their organs are modified alike, but they judge of them differently and that judgement is not of their own making, but something they discern in their view of the objects they contemplate; consequently the modification exhibiting this part of their view, being different in one from what it was in the other, cannot be the same with that which was alike in both. One may read the words, Persecution, Duty, without any connecting verb between them, and in that state they convey the ideas of the things expressed by them compleat; if we proceed to affirm or deny the one of the other, we may perceive our prospect enlarged beyond the bare sense

of those two disjointed terms ; but there can be no encrease of prospect without the accession of another object to behold, which must be some new modification superadded to the former or generated thereby.

6. As judgement seems an act subsequent to the apprehension of the subject whereon it is pronounced, one would expect there should be some time intervening between the one and the other, and so in fact we often find there is, for we sometimes hold objects a considerable while in contemplation before we can decide concerning them : but in things familiar to our knowledge the judgement rises instantaneously and in the same view with the objects, by that quality we have observed belonging to ideas following in train, of quickening their pace by degrees until at last they coincide into one combination. A man knows his own horse, his own house, his bosom friend, immediately upon sight without waiting for any further operation to be made upon the ideas presented by his optics. And this is what we call the evidence of sense, which we abuse without reason for perpetually deceiving us : whereas the senses cannot well deceive, because strictly speaking they never inform us of anything, they throw in their ideas but the opinion entertained thereupon is generated by the reflection. At least

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we make them depose things of which they cannot give us sufficient information. Is it not thought vouching the testimony of the senses when, upon being asked how you know that alderman Punctual sits in Guild-hall, you answer, Because I see him there? That John is in the kitchen, Because I hear him talking? That there is such a passage in Virgil, Because I read it there? An utter stranger to John and the Alderman, or one who had not learned to read, would know this never the more for anything he should see or hear, but if his senses are as acute as yours, they throw in the very same sensations upon him as they do upon you : therefore if they furnish you with an evidence he has not, they must fetch that evidence from some other quarter than the eyes or the ears. When we talk of seeing tables, chairs and such like common objects, we ascribe more to the senses than properly belongs to them ; for we see only colours, tis our former knowledge of things that informs us what they are. Nor let it be said, that though we may attribute too much to the senses, yet something remains justly their due, because upon being shown a thing we never saw before, though we cannot tell particularly what it is nor what name to call it by, we may nevertheless see that it is made of wood or steel, that it is soft or

hard, stiff or limber : for this partial knowledge arises from the former acquaintance we have had with wood or steel, or ~~of~~ the usual look of things upon their hardning or softning, or the posture they fall into by their flexibility. Therefore if a statue of exquisite workmanship has the same look in the limbs and drapery that we have never used to see in stone but see continually in flesh and garments, we say it looks soft and pliant.

7. Even distance and figure, which seem to bid the fairest for being judgements of sense, do not come solely from thence ; for we find people judge very differently of distances anything remote according as they have used themselves to observe them : and though we judge a little better of things near us, because we have perpetual occasion to take notice of their situation, yet there are few persons who can always tell whether two shelves of a book-case standing just before them lie further apart than any other two until they measure them. I have read a printed account of a boy who being born blind was brought to his sight by couching at the age of fourteen : after being permitted to go abroad some time, one evening he was lost, and upon searching they found him upon the leads of the house. It seems he had been in the street and upon seeing the

Moon

Moon peep a little over the roof he was going to climb up the tiles in order to catch her: which shews he had no idea of the remoteness either of the Moon or of the pavement from the gutter where he stood, or else he would have been afraid as much as any of us of venturing for fear of breaking his neck. I will not vouch for the truth of this story, but it seems very probable if we may believe what has been held by many learned men, that a person on coming to the use of his sight would imagine every thing lying close to his eye: and that our knowledge of distance is an art we acquire by degrees as we grow more and more familiar with objects surrounding us; and therefore cannot be infused by our optics, which transmit no fewer nor other rays of light from objects the first time we behold them than the thousandth.

8. Neither does the idea of figure come entirely from the senses. Three of them have no pretence to make the conveyance, and one of the two claiming that privilege, I mean the touch, cannot be applied at once to bodies of any magnitude; but we must run our finger over the surface and judge of them by piecemeal, not only upon what we feel but upon what we have felt the moment before; so that our evidence results from the joint testimony of sense and memory. And

for things that we may grasp within our hands, we turn them round and round before we determine, nor then can do it exactly if they be a little irregular. Clap a flat iron sensibly hot or cold upon a man's naked back, and let him describe if he can the exact shape of the piece, or whether the angles be obtuse or acute: perhaps he might guess nearer if laid upon his hand, because the hand has been more exercised in judgements of this kind, not that it has a quicker sense of feeling than many other parts of our flesh. Nobody can tell the shape of the gout or cholic he feels, which yet he might be expected to do if the figure were included in the sensation of feeling: neither can one determine the shape of a bruise by the smart, though one may by pressing the parts of it successively with a finger. And that we gather the form of things from sight as well as touch, seems to indicate that they are not ideas of sensation, for the senses all have their distinct provinces allotted them, sensations entering at one avenue cannot find a passage through the others. But waving this argument, if the two senses gave evidence of figure, they ought always to agree in their testimony immediately upon examination, which whether they do or no let the works of painting and sculpture determine.

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In the letters between Locke and Molyneux we find both those gentlemen, and they tell us all others upon maturely considering the question, agreed that a blind man perfectly well acquainted with globes and cubes would not, upon being suddenly endued with sight, be able to distinguish thereby which was the globe and which the cube. And I may propose another question, whether a man having often seen globes and cubes but never touched anything of ^{either} ~~any~~ form, would not be as much puzzled to know them apart upon being put into his hands in the dark. Whoever resolves these questions in the negative must acknowledge that neither sense, without some previous acquaintance, can give evidences of figures very well known to us by the other: and they cannot be said to agree in their testimony when the old sense prompted by experience deposes positively, while the new, although conveying all that meer sensation can convey, professes to ^{know} nothing of the matter.

9. Did the eyes transmit the idea of figure by immediate sensation, they would exhibit one and the same in all prospects, to wit, the circle or ellipsis bounding the scene before us, for all objects lying within that compass strike upon the optics promiscuously, the chairs together with the wain-

scot around them and the floor seen between their frames, the books close to one another and touching the shelves whereon they stand: wherefore it is the notice, not the eye, that runs the lines of separation between one thing and another, without which their figures could not be ascertained. We have shown in speaking of order, how fancy may cast objects into various forms while the sensations excited by them remain exactly the same: the marshalling the spots of a chess-board into parallel rows or lozenges or enveloping squares, still holding the board in ~~the~~ one position, was not the work of our optics, but of some more internal cause. Even colours, although conveyed directly by vision, are not distinguished from one another by the sight alone, for we may see cattle in the fields without regarding their difference of colour: and when we do regard it afterwards, it is by an act of reflection, no new sensation being obtained upon the second view which we had not in the former. From whence we may conclude that sensation operates no further than to throw materials into the imagination to be worked up there: and that the business of selection, composition, association, comparison, distinction and judgement, belongs to other powers operating after the senses have done their office.

10. Nevertheless the evidence of sense being an expression current among mankind, I am very far from desiring to discard it, on the contrary I shall employ and may lay great stress upon it myself as occasion shall offer : all I meant by the foregoing observations was to explain my sentiments of what is to be understood by the expression, which I conceive to denote, not anything thrown in upon us from external objects, but that judgement occurring to the thought instantly and involuntarily, without deduction of reason or chain of consequences, upon ideas being exhibited by our senses. And I so little undervalue this evidence that in my present opinion I think it never ought to be, and perhaps never is rejected, unless when overpowered by other evidence of the same kind or by reasonings grounded thereupon. Why do we believe a stick to be strait although appearing crooked in water, but because upon drawing it out we see the crookedness vanish; or running our finger along we feel no bend where there seemed to be one? Why do we believe the Sun an immense body notwithstanding its apparent smallness, but for reasons drawn from the phenomena of that and other objects we have seen at various distances and from various situations?

11. Our internal sense or reflection furnishes us with an evidence of the like kind, for we judge as commonly, as instantaneously and as necessarily upon subjects we remember as upon those we have before our eyes. These judgements are often weaker and less steady than those of immediate sensation, our ideas continually fluctuating and varying both in colour and shape: but if we can fix them by contemplation or habitude, the judgements resulting from them strike as vigorously as those of the senses. And even in their unsettled state, although we cannot judge critically and fully, yet we may discern something clearly concerning them, because their fluctuation keeps within certain limits sufficient to answer our purpose. The idea of an elephant never contracts so small as to come within the compass of that of a mouse, therefore we can always tell which has the greater bulk: yet perhaps our ideas of both are so variable that we could not determine between two elephants or two mice upon the pictures of them in our memory, without seeing the creatures stand together side by side. Nor are confused ideas utterly incapable of suggesting any clear conception concerning them: Mr. Locke says we have a very confused idea of substance, yet who does not know the difference between substance

stance and shadow? which latter too seems to lie a little confused in the minds of many learned men, for they think they have done notably when they define shadow the absence of light: but the words of this definition contain an idea of light, for you must have the thing in your thought whereof you predicate the absence, and I appeal to every man whether he finds the idea either of light or absence occur whenever he looks upon a shadow: nevertheless we can think currently and talk intelligibly of shadows, their figures, magnitudes and motions, and so we can of substances, their qualities and modifications, without perhaps having a quite clear and adequate idea of either.

12. Ideas of reflection strictly so called generate judgements no less than those derived originally from sensation: justice, mercy, approbation, virtue, duty and other abstracted ideas, being as frequently made the terms of a proposition both in our thoughts and discourses as colours, sounds or touches, and their relations, similitudes and differences, as obviously discerned when we are gotten as well acquainted with them. For let us observe that the internal sense, as well as the external, only exhibits objects to our apprehension, and they generate the judgements: now though the child be born some time after the
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first entrance of the father, yet when grown to strength and maturity it may accompany him hand in hand and come together into our presence. Wherefore the faculty of judging, both in the mental sense and the bodily, is an art acquired by time and practice, not an essential quality of the objects to make an impression of conformity or disagreement upon us as soon as apprehended.

13. The schoolmen make a third act of the mind which they call Ratiocination, and we may stile the generation of a judgement from others actually in our understanding: for what is reasoning but discerning the agreement of two ideas between themselves by their agreement with some third? and what is the fruit of reasoning but to beget an assent to some proposition we were ignorant of before? While assent depends upon our view of the premises, the new judgement is yet in embryo, but when perfectly formed, when it can stand alone and still adhere to the conclusion after the premises drop out of sight, then it becomes of the same nature and has the same force upon us with the evidence of sense. For we hold many things assuredly for truth, and that perhaps upon very good foundation, although we have absolutely forgotten the reasons first inducing us to believe them. And this assurance we gain sometimes

times very quickly, if we did not we could make but little dispatch in business, it being impossible to retain the whole chain of reasoning in our thoughts when it runs to any considerable length : therefore if we could not rest satisfied in the conviction left by the premisses upon a short view of them, we should never arrive at the conclusion desired.

14. There are various degrees of strength in judgements from the lowest surmise to notion, opinion, persuasion and the highest assurance which we call certainty : for we do not believe what weather it will be tomorrow, or what we read in a news paper, with the same force of conviction as what objects we see before our eyes, or what we have done ourselves a quarter of an hour ago. If our premisses are uncertain, they can throw no stronger light upon the conclusion than they had themselves, or rather than belonged to the weaker if they happen to differ in lustre : nevertheless where there are many conspiring to illustrate one point, they may supply by number what they want in vigour ; as one may make a prodigious glare with rush candles provided one lights up enow of them. This we commonly find the case in public rumours, which though perhaps little heeded the first time we hear them, yet when current in every body's mouth seldom fail of

gaining our assent. So likewise experiments made for discovering the properties of bodies do not always satisfy immediately, until by repeated trials we find them constantly producing the same effect. Repetition likewise of the same evidence sometimes will answer the purpose equally with multitude of witnesses: many people taking up an opinion slender at first and upon slight grounds, have by meer habitude of assenting worked it up at last into a firm persuasion without any additional proof. Nay a bare assertion frequently reiterated may supply the place of evidence: scarce anybody but has found occasion to remark how the tenets of a sect or party continually chimed in men's ears without any argument to support them, have been at length received as articles of faith, sometimes even in spite of the most opposite sentiments entertained before. And archbishop Tillotson assures us there have been persons who have told a lie so often till they have actually believed it themselves.

15. And as opinions generate so they die away again by degrees, not only by the force of opposite evidence overpowering them, but by a kind of natural decay. Facts we have read in history, problems we have seen demonstrated in Euclid, having been long out of our thoughts, sink into slight opinions; we
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think they are so as we conceive but we are not sure; and upon further difuse the evidence of them may be actually forgot, so that tho' the terms be suggested or we remember such matters have been treated of, we can give no assent to them at all. Besides, any one who will take pains may observe that his judgement upon the same point is not always steady, but varies according to the humour or disposition of his spirits: nay if he holds the same proposition under contemplation a considerable time, he will find the judgement fluctuate while the terms remain unaltered, it will strike sometimes fuller and sometimes fainter by intervals without any apparent cause or argument occurring to occasion the change. A man in liquor judges diversly from what he does in his sober senses: passion notoriously perverts the judgement, warping it this way or that according as best suits its purposes, and giving a stronger or a weaker bias in proportion to the violence whereto it rises: when we wish a thing to be true we therefore believe it so, desire performing the office of evidence. I grant this most frequently happens through a partial consideration, the notice fixes^{ing} upon such ideas as make for the favourite opinion, and turning away from all others that might overthrow it; but one may perceive that in-

clination sometimes operates upon the judgement alone without making any alteration either in the number or colour of the terms whereon it is passed. The very same arguments attended to carefully and impartially do not always make an equal impression, in times of joy or melancholy, in vigorous health, or upon a death bed, when relating to things near or remote, in laying a plan of future operations or entring upon the execution: and this not only by new thoughts occurring which we had overlooked before, but by a new estimation of the same objects casting a different light upon one another.

16. Let us now look back upon the several changes a judgement may pass through according as time or other causes encrease or abate or suspend its vigour. A man's own thoughts may suggest, or he may have suggested by another person, a matter of fact, a theorem of mathematics, an axiom of natural philosophy, or a maxim of morality, whereof he may clearly apprehend the terms without giving any assent to it; he may then be brought to a full conviction of it by setting proper proofs before him, which conviction may remain after the proofs are quite slipped out of his memory: if he thinks no more of it for a considerable while, his persuasion may dwindle into a vague opinion, and in further

further time wholly vanish away, so that he may now view the same terms with no spark of assent more than he did at the beginning. At all these times the mind does no more than observe the ideas in her thoughts, and if she judges variously, that diversity is not owing to any act of hers but to the different state of her imagination: she plays the spectator only, discerning the prospect before her, and whether she shall see a full or a faint evidence or none at all, depends upon what her organs of reflection shall exhibit. This we readily acknowledge in memory, which is one species of judgement, for what is remembering but having the idea of a thing we know we had seen before? every body will allow that we remember past events according to the traces of them remaining in our memory, and when those traces sometimes happen to be altered we remember wrong: nor has remembrance been unfrequently compared to reading a written memorandum, which being obliterated gives us imperfect information or none at all, or being erased or interlined in our absence leads us into mistakes. And one might as aptly apply the comparison to all other kinds of knowledge, which being nothing but the perception of what lies in our understanding, may be called reading the characters exhibited by our men-

tal organs, and whatever changes the inscription there, must of course produce a like alteration in our perceptions.

17. From hence arises a curious question, Whether if it were possible for two men to transport their minds suddenly into one anothers seats, each would not instantly lose his own ideas and acquire those of the other. I think it cannot be doubted the exchange would be compleat with respect to sensation, for the senses must convey all their notices to the present inhabitant, not being able to reach the former occupier now removed to a distance. It seems probable that each would be able to repeat whatever the other had learned by heart and remember occurrences happening to him; and if arts and sciences have their foundation in memory, he would slide at once into possession of all the others accomplishments. Perhaps it may be thought going too far to suppose they would adopt each others sentiments, opinions and consciousness, but it would be hard to demonstrate there would not be a thorough exchange in these respects too: so that the papist might laugh at all revealed religion as being a thing ridiculous in itself, and the freethinker contend tooth and nail for the pope's infallibility: the methodist might clearly discern at one glance the absolute impossibility

possibility of miracles, and the rationalist hear revelations conveyed in a whisper with an evidence greater than that of sense: the philosopher might see there is no enjoyment but in the hurry of company or a round of fashionable diversions, and the giddy girl discern the vanity of all sensual gratifications and find herself never less alone than when alone: the saint might tremble at the dread of punishment being conscious of villanies he never committed, and the murderer look back with joy upon a life of innocence and feel the comforts of a conscience void of offence.

18. These and such like speculations have put some persons quite out of conceit with their understandings, which they say are incapable of certainty, having no mark to distinguish between that and full assurance, representing the same things variously at different times, and therefore not to be depended upon: for who would credit a witness that should contradict in one breath what he had deposed in another? And indeed if we will consider the matter impartially, we must needs lay aside all claim to absolute certainty of external objects, of past occurrences or the success of our most common endeavours: for our knowledge of all these depends upon sense, memory or experience, which we

have sometimes found fallacious, and this fixes such a blemish upon their characters that we can never be certain they are not so. The utmost that we can know of them is, that in some instances they have constantly agreed in the same story, but for this we must trust our memory: and yet even this amounts no higher than to a negative evidence that we have never been able to detect them, tho' what we may do in time to come remains still unknown. Even mathematical demonstration depends upon the faithfulness of our memory to preserve the evidence thrown from the principles in every step of our progress. Therefore it is possible there may be no pictures in the room though I see them before mine eyes, that I was never in my garden though I remember walking there this morning, that sugar will not melt in warm water though I have seen it melted a thousand times, that the angles of a triangle are not equal to two right angles though I have read it demonstrated in Euclid. For who has seen through all the compass of nature, so as to know without possibility of a mistake what powers there are, yet undiscovered by any man, which may alter the properties of bodies and vary their operations upon one another, make impressions upon our senses in the manner of external objects,
work

work traces in our memory, draw pictures in our imagination, or stamp judgements upon our understanding, without any of those causes to which we currently ascribe them.

19. Our knowledge never surpasses the degree of assurance we have in our minds, and constantly keeps even pace with it: for whatever other folks may think of us, we always think ourselves that we know for certain what we are firmly persuaded of. The highest pitch to which assurance ever rises is, when we can form no conception how things can possibly be otherwise than as we apprehend them: thus we rest assured the fruit grows out of the earth through the tree, because we cannot conceive how it should come there any other way: but do we certainly know there are no possibilities of which we cannot form any conception? Nor does assurance mount to a less height when we do not than when we cannot conceive anything to bring it lower: we often persuade ourselves things must be so or so because we cannot account for their phenomena otherwise, yet perhaps another person may suggest an account that shall satisfy us of the contrary. A man in his sleep entertains as full persuasion of the reality of his dreams as he does of anything else at other times; when he wakes he sees they were meer delusion, not by discovering
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ing any defect in the persuasion itself, but by other knowledge derived from former experience; and when this is withdrawn by the return of sleep, he falls into the like delusion again. If you convince a man of an error he was strongly possessed of, you do it, not by showing the insufficiency of his former appearances to beget assent, but by suggesting new ones from arguments not occurring to him before. Nobody will deny we have some assurances that are fallacious, others that are true, but we can see no difference in the countenance of the one or the other while they remain our persuasion; when they have been driven out by opposite evidence, like servants whose faults you seldom hear of till they are turned away, then indeed we may discover their delusiveness, but then they are no longer our judgement; every judgement, while it is our present judgement, carries the same face of veracity. For let us remember that a judgement is a different modification of the organs from those which represented the bare terms whereon it was passed to our apprehension; therefore if I believed a thing yesterday but am convinced of the contrary to day, though I may recall at pleasure the ideas of the terms, I shall not find the same character of judgement with them that accompanied them then: so I see my mistake
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by having a different representation of the matter now in my mind, but whatever characters of a judgement we read in the understanding, we have no test to try whether it be genuine or counterfeit. Therefore for ought I can demonstrate to the contrary Bishop Berkeley may be in the right, and that infinite variety of objects nature seems to present us may be purely imaginary, and life one continued scene of delusion from the cradle to the grave.

20. But then have we no certainty of the judgements we pass upon ideas in our own minds, though we should have none of external objects? What tho' our senses, our memory, our experience may deceive us, yet surely we may know what their representations are, and judge of their similitude or diversity without any possibility of mistake: for the ideas present before us we see directly and intuitively, not through any medium which might falsify their appearance, nor by footsteps of them left behind which might alter in shape. If I hold no real pen in my hand nor see any real table before me, have I not an absolute knowledge of the appearance of both being in my imagination? and may not I pass an unerring judgement upon those appearances? Cannot I discern certainly that my idea of the pen differs from that of the table
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in colour, shape, position, contexture of parts, flexibility and other particulars? If I never learned my mother tongue but had it inspired into me just now by the organs of my reflection being made to fall suddenly into their present modifications, do not I understand the meaning of words now in my thought and see clearly what sense is associated respectively to each of them? Though there should be neither lines nor angles in nature have we not distinct notions of either, and may we not pronounce safely, that a line drawn between two others from their point of contact, forms two angles both together equal to the angle formed by the two outermost lines? Thus while the judgement keeps within the compass of ideas immediately exhibited, it seems possessed of absolute certainty: but when confined to these narrow limits it can be of little use to us more than bare amusement, nor answer any of our purposes in life. How unerring judgements soever we may pass upon our ideas of the pen and the ink-glass, yet if those ideas happen not to correspond with the things themselves, we may puzzle about for ever without getting up a drop of ink to write with. And if experience has deceived us in the properties of wood and fire, though we reason ever so justly upon the ideas we have of them, we shall
never

never be able to warm ourselves by throwing a load of billets upon the hearth.

21. But our present enquiry regards only the certainty, not the usefulness, of our knowledge : let us therefore examine whether we have that absolute certainty we are in quest of, even in our judgements upon ideas actually in our thoughts. In the first place let us call to mind that the judgement, even in this case as well as in all others, is something distinct from the terms whereon it is passed ; therefore there is one step at least between our apprehension of the terms and the judgement resulting from them, and who can even tell what causes may possibly intervene to give that step a wrong direction, or create a judgement which we suppose to be the genuine offspring of the terms ? In the next place if we had absolute certainty in our ideas, we must be so well acquainted with it as to know perfectly what it is, and should have a standard in our minds whereby to try all other judgements, nor even after repose an entire confidence in any where the proper characteristic were wanting. In the third place our knowledge here too rises no higher than to the fullest assurance built upon this foundation, that we cannot conceive any possibility how we should mistake concerning ideas actually before us : but we have shown
before

before that inability of conception is not an unexceptionable evidence. But lastly the judgements we make upon our ideas sometimes contradict and overthrow one another, nor can we always satisfy ourselves whether we really have those ideas in our minds upon which we reason very currently. After the discredit I have brought upon our senses I must not say that we have seen two billiard balls lying close to one another, and upon pushing one of them with a stick they have both moved along; but be it a meer delusion, nobody will deny we have had an idea of seeing such an event in our time. Let us consider what judgements occur upon this little phenomenon, That the hindmost ball moves the foremost, That it cannot give motion before it has any, That it cannot have motion before the other ball has moved away to make room for it. These are judgements made upon ideas actually in our understanding, yet we see how inconsistent they are with each other: therefore there must be some false brother among them though we know not how to discover him, for they all appear with an equal air of certainty. Let us now examine the terms of our mental propositions; and satisfy ourselves whether we have an idea of mathematical points and mathematical lines, before we presume to determine anything

thing for certain concerning them : for if we can form no conception of a line without thickness nor a point without any dimensions, what certainty can we have of things whereof we can form no conception? An angle does not lie where we commonly measure it by applying a graduated circle, but at the very point of contact between the two lines, and therefore is itself a point, and all points being destitute of dimensions we cannot conceive one greater or less than another : yet when we affirm a difference in size between two angles, the terms of our proposition are a larger and a smaller point, which we confidently pass our judgement upon without having an idea of them in our imagination. Thus upon the whole I believe we had best not pretend to be wiser than Socrates, and quit claim to all certain knowledge except of one thing, which is that we know nothing. But then again when we reflect that these arguments against our having an absolute knowledge of anything must necessarily destroy themselves, we can lay no more stress upon them than they have taught us to lay upon those they overthrow : for if our judgements upon ideas present in our imagination may deceive us, the proofs of this very lability to deceive, being drawn from ideas in our imagination, may deceive us too ; so there still remains

remains a possibility that we may certainly know some things, notwithstanding all the evidence that can be produced to the contrary. Thus we find that single certain truth left us a little before, to wit, That we know nothing, now wrested out of our hands and ourselves driven into arrant pyrrhonism, as being wholly uncertain whether we know anything or not.

22. We now find ourselves reduced to a state of utter darkness and confusion, the most uncomfortable and mortifying imaginable, therefore it is no wonder if we are willing to try all means for extricating ourselves out of it : and for that purpose let us review the thesis proposed at first entering upon this question, which was, That our understandings are incapable of absolute certainty, and therefore not to be depended upon. I fear we must admit the assumption, but I think we may deny the consequence : for though our knowledge never rise to certainty, it does not therefore follow that we may never depend upon such knowledge as we have. Nor indeed could we avoid it if we had a mind ; the active powers of man cannot stand idle, we must be doing something or other every moment of our waking hours, at least upon every action proposed we must resolve either to do or forbear it : but all the
deter-

determinations of the Will contain a judgement that the action or forbearance will prove beneficial or satisfactory, and this upon less information in cases requiring haste than we might have had if there had been time to consider ; which kind of judgements prevail upon us all without exception, the thoughtful and the giddy, the wise and the foolish. Therefore I can by no means agree with those of the ancients who laid down that the perfect wiseman would never assent without absolute certainty : for I suppose they would not have him a lumpish indolent creature, one should rather expect to find him more active and busy than other people, but without assent there can be no action, and a certain knowledge in the expedience of measures is not always to be had where nevertheless it is necessary to pursue some measures or other. If the wiseman upon a journey enquires the road of a stranger, will he never assent to what is told him until he can assuredly know the character of the informant ? or must he not believe he shall get home in good time while there remains a possibility that an earthquake, an inundation or an insurrection, may have barred up all the passages ? Besides there are some cases wherein the fulness of assent conduces much to the success of an enterprise ; we may remember what Virgil

said, They can because they think they can: a soldier fights the better for believing he shall conquer, and any man might walk on top of a wall as safely as along a board in his chamber floor, if he could persuade himself he was in no danger of falling. Therefore in these cases the wiseman, who disposes all things even ~~in~~ the ideas in his own imagination for the best, would exert himself, or at least recommend to others as the wisest thing they could do, to banish all thoughts that might abate the fulness of their persuasion, though he might see at the same time there were very good grounds for them.

23. If we examine into the nature of the mind, we shall find that all evidence begets a proportionable assent where there is no contrary evidence to oppose it: we may observe children extremely credulous and trusting to the representations of their senses: if they grow more diffident afterwards, it is because experience informs them of the fallaciousness of men and deceitfulness of the senses. And when we come to riper years we proceed upon the same rule, yielding to any evidence where we see no reason drawn from our former experience to the contrary, nor do I imagine the wisest among us would do otherwise. It is a stated maxim both in law and common practice, that we should esteem every man honest and
fin-

sincere until something appears to impeach his character, and our judgements are entitled to the same candid presumption : if the first person we meet in the street tells us of something happening in the next, we believe him without reserve, unless the thing appear unlikely, or contradict some other information, or that we discern an archness in his look that raises a suspicion he meant to banter us.

24. It seems almost a self-evident proposition that there must be assurance where there is no doubt ; but dubitation in the nature of it implies an assent to something, if not to the thing doubted of, at least to the reasons occurring for and against it : for if you see none on ~~either~~^{one} side, what can you doubt about ? Hence we find ourselves sometimes wavering in our doubts, for as ideas fluctuate in our imagination, if the evidence on one side drops out of our thought or loses its brightness for a moment, we find a temporary persuasion of the other, and vice versa ; which shows that even uncertain evidence (for both cannot be true) naturally gains credit upon the mind when appearing without a competitor. Doubts indeed may sometimes seem to arise from the weakness of evidence without needing an antagonist to overthrow it : as upon seeing a person at some distance in the dusk of evening, you doubt whether it be

your friend or somebody else, meerly from the imperfection of the appearance without having any particular reason to think it cannot be him. But let us examine whether there be not an opposition of evidence even in cases of this kind: if you were upon a desert island inhabited only by you two and could just distinguish something walking upright, I suppose you would make no doubt what it was: therefore this imperfect appearance is sufficient alone to work assurance when it has nothing to stand in competition with it. Perhaps you will say that your reflection of there being no other inhabitant corroborates the testimony of your sight, and both together do the business by their united strength: but should you always stay for that reflection before you gave your assent? nay do not you give it sometimes when you have no such reflection to make? For let us now change the scene to the crowded streets of London: when you see something in Cheapside that looks like a particular person, you take it to be him at first glance, nor do you begin to doubt until a second thought suggests that hundreds of people pass along there, many of whom may resemble as much as you can see of him by such an imperfect light. Sometimes indeed this suggestion occurs with the first thought, and then the doubt will be as early

early as the appearance: but this takes nothing from what I have been saying, for it is no proof that an appearance is not sufficient alone to work assurance, because it fails of working it when not alone but confronted with something else. Nor is the case different in our most careful deliberations from ~~whatever~~ we have found it in sudden and temporary assents: for what avails consideration unless to discover the evidences on each side the question and weigh the merits between them? Let a man consider ever so long, he will never reject the first judgement of sense, until he finds it inconsistent with some other appearance, or with his former observations, or with some judgement of his understanding: even when we suspend our assent only to think further of the matter, though we may not have any particular reason occurring to create a doubt, we have that general reason of having experienced the danger of hasty determinations; so that we trust our understanding or our experience in the very act of distrusting our senses.

25. Much the same may be said of probability that has been spoken above concerning doubt, for we reckon a thing probable when we discern reasons why it should be and others why it should not be; but if we lose our assent to the reasons on one side, the other will

no longer remain a probability but will gain our fullest assurance. And even when we seem to deem it probable only for want of better evidence, still it is because we have had experience of things being otherwise under the like appearances. Perhaps there is no other difference between doubt and probability than that in the former our ideas fluctuate, whereas in the latter they continue steady: therefore we cannot estimate the quantity of our doubts, at least only in the gross as when we talk of doubting much or doubting a little of a thing, but how much or how little we can never ascertain exactly; but we can often calculate probabilities, as in chances upon cards and dice, with a mathematical nicety. And tho' we cannot do this with equal precision in matters of morality, yet many times we can discern clearly on which side the probability lies: when we have once gotten this discernment, after having satisfied ourselves that we had examined all the lights in our power relative to the matter in hand, we generally dismiss those hanging on the weaker side out of our thoughts, as being of no further service but tending rather to disturb us in the vigorous pursuit of our measures, and thereby turn the probability into an unre-served assurance; until some new light occurring, or some change of circumstances hap-pening

pening, shall make us judge it expedient to resume the consultation afresh. Nor can you ever unsettle a man in a determination he has fixed upon, without at least suggesting some suspicion that he may have determined wrong, to which suspicion he must assent or he will never hearken to your remonstrance. Thus we find the mind never totally without an assent to some judgement either of her senses or understanding, as well in times of doubt and probability as in those of firm persuasion, as well in contrariety as uniformity of evidence, as well at the beginning and throughout the course of an enquiry as upon the final determination.

26. How idle then is it to talk of the wiseman's forbearing to do what all men must do continually? For though wisdom may perfect our nature, it cannot change it nor transform us into other creatures: therefore the wiseman, as a man, must always assent to something, and if so must assent sometimes to uncertainties, unless you will suppose him to have a full view of all the lights that can fall upon every subject the instant it starts up in his thoughts. Does he never alter his judgement upon better information? Does he never profit by consideration so as to discern things otherwise than he apprehended them? Do no arguments

raise a scruple in him upon matters he had no doubt of before? If any of these cases happen, then he once assented to an uncertainty, or which is as bad, he afterwards doubts or dissents from a certainty. I suppose he may be allowed to dream sometimes in his sleep, and to take his dreams for realities as much as the rest of us half witted mortals: therefore that noted liar Fancy gains undoubted credit with him when the judgements of his understanding are shut out from his sight. Thus we see the giving or withholding assent does not depend upon the mind itself, but upon the ideas she has to read in the organization: she cannot lose her perceptive faculty, tho' she may lose the use of it for want of objects to exercise it upon; not does her eye grow dim and strong alternately by night and by day: it may be obscured not impaired by darkness, nor do the vapours of sleep make any change in the sight but only in the prospect, and it is in the nature of the mind to assent to whatever appearances that exhibits when all other evidence that might correct them is removed out of her reach. Therefore the difference between a sleeping and a waking man does not lie in the mind, unless understood in that vulgar sense of the term comprehending a corporeal organization, that which presents ideas being differently disposed not that which
per-

perceives them. And the same causes make the difference between one man and another : the wiseman having many judgements in his understanding which the foolish wants, and being exempt from many appearances which mislead the other : nor does this derogate at all from his merit, provided he have brought his understanding into a better state by his own good management and industry.

27. What then are we to understand when we hear it asserted that the wiseman never assents to things uncertain? Is it that he will not assent without absolute certainty? This we have proved to be false in fact. Is it that he will not assent where he discerns their uncertainty? This is saying nothing, for no man assents to a thing at the same time while it appears doubtful to him. The expression then can mean nothing more than that he will not assent rashly, like the common herd of mankind, before he has examined the matter as fully as opportunity will permit or the lights of his understanding enable him. If he has canvassed the point to his satisfaction formerly, he will still rest satisfied in the consciousness of having done so, unless some fresh information or suggestion not thought of before should require a re-hearing. By following this practice often, he will become acquainted with the degrees of evidence, so as to measure

measure them almost upon inspection and judge of the weight or frivolousness of objections, and will lay up a stock of principles in his understanding which he may trust to, so as to be able to make his decisions quicker and surer tho' less hastily than other people.

28. Look into Tully's Academics and other sceptical treatises, and you will find arguments to invalidate the judgement of the senses and understanding, drawn from examples wherein they have deceived us : but how shall we know the truth of those instances, unless we give credit to our experience informing us of them ? or what conclusion can we draw from the facts, if we may not depend upon any judgement of our understanding ? If those who produce the arguments and cite the examples, do not assent to the force of the one or truth of the other, they trifle with us and deserve no regard ; if they do assent, they practise the very thing they labour to prove unreasonable. What their real sentiments may be I shall not pretend to guess, for they are an unfathomable sort of people, but I think it impossible that one of these two should not be the case with them : either they assent without reserve to the judgements they dispute against only to show their skill in disputation, or if they really doubt, they assent with as little reserve to the grounds

grounds they have for their doubting. - Therefore we need not make a scruple of assenting, after having found that the wiseman assents who knows best what is proper, and the sceptic assents in spite of all the pains he can take or contrivances he can devise to avoid it.

29. Thus this disquisition upon the fallibility of our judgement, which at the beginning perhaps might seem an attempt to unsettle the minds of men, will I hope upon taking the whole together appear to have a direct contrary tendency, and in that prospect I entered upon it: for I look upon this as one of those sources of disputation which must not be dabbled with, we must drink deep or had better not taste at all, for we shall find at bottom what may remedy any disorder brought upon us by the surface. Men commonly please themselves with a notion of absolute certainty, and may enjoy that pleasure so long as they remain unmolested in the notion: but when a subtle enemy approaches, they will find it an untenable post, and must inevitably be ruined unless they have another fortress to retire to behind. Therefore I conceive nothing conduces more to ensure a tranquillity of mind against all attacks than establishing these two maxims, That knowledge, that is, absolute cer-

certainty was not made for man, But that man is so constituted as to do very well without it. The former may mortify or disturb us a little at first, but the other will set all to rights again and put us upon a firmer footing than we stood on before : for while placing our dependance solely upon certainty, we could never be secure that our own imagination in some melancholy mood or the arts of an adversary, might not start objections to wrest our idea of certainty from us, and then we should be left in a state of doubt and despondency as having nothing to trust to : but being possessed of these maxims, we may allow the objections their full weight without abating of our confidence in the measures we proceed upon.

30. Hence arises that so much used distinction between absolute and moral certainty : it is not in the nature of the latter to exclude all possibility of mistake, and therefore it is not destroyed by the suggestion of such a possibility ; but it is in the nature of man to repose an entire acquiescence in it to the exclusion of all doubt. And for the attainableness of such certainty I appeal to every man's experience, excepting those who set all their wits at work to undervalue it, nor should I except them could they be depended upon to give an honest answer : but I

refer it to all others, whether they believe them entertaining the least doubt of the force of those arguments they bring to persuade us out of our senses. I shall not undertake to give an exact definition of moral certainty which may comprize every thing belonging to the term, but I think a man may be said to possess it when he is conscious of having had all opportunities of examining a thing, has considered it thoroughly and impartially, and upon the issue finds a clear judgement remaining in his understanding of its being true with no probability of the contrary. This I believe all men confide in, and I do not see what the wisest of us can have better to rest his assurance upon. 'Tis true every man is liable to mistakes notwithstanding all his care to escape them; but if the error be invincible you will not blame him for assenting to it as a truth, because nobody could have avoided doing so under the like circumstances; and if it were owing to prejudice or hastiness, still the fault does not lie in his adhering to what appears to him as a certainty, but in his negligence or partiality while he had the matter under examination.

31. Constant and uniform experience produces the like certainty, and this gives us
dence in the evidence of sense, of memory,

memory, and in the judgements of our understanding, upon having found them testify the same thing upon repeated trials. Nor will any man distrust his senses unless in those instances wherein he has experienced their giving fallacious appearances, as in a stick seen crooked in water or a square tower seen round at a distance. Neither will he distrust his memory or his understanding when clear and positive without some very strong reasons suggested to the contrary, which his understanding must approve of and his senses or his memory bear witness to the facts whereon they are grounded. Therefore we may without imputation of folly, rest assured that the tables, chairs and other objects, really exist in such figures and places as we see them, that stone is hard and wood combustible, that occurrences have really happened to us as we remember, that two and two make four, that a part cannot contain the whole, that the principles of arts and sciences are true, the conclusions appearing necessarily to flow from them just, and our established rules of conduct and argumentation right, until we shall find sufficient cause to doubt of them.

32. For every thing, that may seem to contradict an opinion, is not a sufficient cause for doubting: the mind though compared to

an exceeding fine balance in that it will turn with the slightest hair when nothing lies in counterpoize, yet does not resemble it in all respects; for where the weights are greatly disproportionate, the heavy scale will press down with as strong a force of assurance as if the opposite scale had been absolutely empty. Were a man whom you know little of to relate a fact not improbable in itself, you would believe him, therefore he has some weight with you: but if twenty persons of undoubted veracity should assert the contrary, you would not give a jot the less credit to them than if the first man had said nothing. So upon hearing a thing reported that we judge utterly improbable, we give no heed the first time nor the second, but if repeated in many companies we begin to doubt whether it may not be true: then each report must have some weight singly, for a multitude of nothings can make nothing, yet these small weights have no effect at all until they consolidate and by their number grow into a great one.

33. The vulgar are commonly very positive, thinking themselves possessed of absolute certainty in almost everything they know: this happens from their weighing their evidences singly, which will naturally produce that effect; for we can judge of weights only
by

by their opposition, because any one thrown in alone drives down the scale forcibly. But the contemplative use themselves to compare the judgements as well of their senses as of their understanding, which they frequently find contradictory ; therefore they abound in doubts that never enter the head of a common man, which has occasioned doubting to be reckoned the avenue to philosophy : but if it be the avenue, it is no more, nor can one arrive at the thing itself until one has passed it, and he that sticks in the passage had better not have attempted it. The use of doubting is to prevent hasty decisions, and lead to something more sure and certain than we could have attained without it : for the first notices of our understanding direct to many things for our benefit, therefore we suffer damage by parting with them, unless we supply their places by something else more effectual for the purpose.

There is a moderation in all things ; a man may as well doubt too much as too little : nor let us run away with a notion that a propensity to doubting shows a sagacity of parts, for it may as well proceed from the contrary quality. We have shown already that in every doubt there is an assent to the validity of opposite evidences, for if the evidence on either side appear invalid the doubt vanishes ;

vanishes ; and we have observed that our assent is according to the character we read of the judgement engraven upon the understanding ; but the understanding is most perfect when it represents the characters of judgements in the truest colours, neither stronger nor weaker than they deserve. If it be faulty, it may show the thing doubted of in too faint and the cause of doubting in too glaring a light, in which case the doubt will be owing to the dulness not the quickness of the organs. Perhaps a man of more sagacity may have discerned the objection as soon as the doubter, but discerned at the same time that there was nothing in it. He whose views are confined to one narrow point of evidence, will think himself certain because he sees nothing to oppose it ; if he can widen them a little, he may discover something to stagger his confidence ; but if he can open them still further, he may discern what will bring him again to a fixed determination ; and in the clearness and extensiveness of our views sagacity chiefly consists, which gives stronger marks of itself in a quickness of resolving doubts than a readiness of starting them. We can measure evidences no otherwise than by the weight we feel them have upon us ; while the weights bear a near proportion to one another, the doubtful beam

still nods from side to side : but the excellency of a balance lies, not in having large scales that will hold a number of weights, but in turning upon the smallest difference. Therefore there is a common sense or discretion infinitely preferable to brightness of parts, which indeed has no other value than to furnish weights for it to examine. Whoever is possessed of this quality will steer equally clear of doubt and positiveness, tho' his scale may be small it will weigh things exactly, he will distinguish the glare of tinsel from the ponderancy of gold, he will reject whatever makes nothing to the purpose and take into consideration every thing pertinent that he has room for, and will be steady in his opinions but not tenacious. Whereas your men of large capacities, if wanting in this quality, get rid of vulgar errors only in exchange for others peculiar to themselves ; they are quick at seeing things but not at comparing them, they argue strongly but cannot determine justly, and amidst all their caution and reserve you may find them obstinate in some absurdity that every body else clearly discerns to be such with half an eye.

34. When we reflect on our utter incapacity of attaining to absolute certainty, this is enough, though not to make us doubt of the clear

clear judgements of our understanding, yet to make us acknowledge a possibility of their being erroneous : and this if not overlooked, must prevent every man from being so wedded to an opinion as to turn a deaf ear upon all evidence that can be offered against it. Wherefore I must look upon those bigots in religion or reason, for there are of both sorts, as very little skilled in human nature, who lay so great a stress upon one kind of evidence as to think no other worth regarding in competition with it. Some ascribe so much to faith, built nevertheless upon human testimony and tradition, as to set it above the strongest contradiction of the senses or the understanding : others conceiving a thing impossible in itself according to their abstract notions, reject all evidence that can be brought in support of it without hearing. Whereas if we consult experience, it will testify that all species of evidence have their turns in prevailing upon us : generally we accommodate our theory to the success we find it have upon trial, but sometimes we correct our senses by our theory, as in the seeming annihilation of water over a fire, in the beginning of motion by matter upon attraction, repulsion, explosion of gunpowder, fermentation and the like. Sometimes we discover the falsehood of a currently received

opinion by reason, at others are convinced of things we thought impossible in nature by concurrence of testimony. Why then should we reject any means of information put into our power? For no channel can pour it in so fully, but that another may convey more of a kind we could not have expected.

A prudent man indeed will decline enquiry when he has room to think there is a design and ability to impose upon him by sophistry, or on the other hand when the motives alledged for entering upon it appear trifling; and it must be left to his discretion to determine when either of these is or is not the case: but he will never think himself so sure of any point as to render all further examination needless upon whatever grounds or by whatever persons recommended. For my part as well persuaded as I am that two and two make four, if I were to meet with a person of credit, candour and understanding, who should seriously call it in question, I would give him the hearing: for I am not more certain of that than of the whole being greater than a part, and yet I could myself suggest some considerations that might seem to controvert this point. The time that has passed from all eternity before building the tower of Belus, was but a part of that time which has passed to this day, and that still to
come

come is a part only of that which was to come in the days of Nimrod ; and the time before and after any moment you can assign are component parts of all time : yet one cannot say whether either of these parts be less than their wholes. Yet for all this and notwithstanding my acknowledging the fallibility of our clearest judgements, I cannot find the least shadow of doubt in my mind whether two and two make four nor whether the whole be greater than a part, but build anything I can upon them as upon sure and certain principles. Nor am I singular in this respect, for I observe that other people as well of great as small capacities do the same, and sometimes give an unreserved assent to things even in cases where they themselves acknowledge a possibility of mistake. For we all acknowledge the uncertainty of life, and that a man under the strongest appearances of health may be cut off in a moment by an apoplexy or other sudden disorder, yet we depend without reserve upon our common actions of the day and upon other persons keeping their appointments : much more do we hold without scruple such maxims as the two abovementioned, whereof we cannot conceive any possibility how they can be otherwise than true, although there may be possibilities which we cannot conceive.

35. This moral certainty then, which is the portion of man, we must be understood to mean when we speak of knowledge: for whoever has all the information the nature of the thing will admit of, with a clear judgement of its being true and no scruple of doubt to the contrary, may be said in propriety of speech, to know it. Therefore those who would prove that we know nothing because we have no absolute certainty, are guilty of a gross abuse of language, ascribing another sense to the term than the general consent of mankind has allotted it. For no man who asks whether you know that Mr. Such a one is in town, means to enquire whether he may not be dropped down dead since you saw him, or sent for away upon some pressing occasion which you could not foresee: nor if he asks any other point of knowledge, will he understand any more by your answer than that you have a reasonable assurance without any mixture of doubt of the truth of what you tell him. And he that should say he does not know where he breakfasted this morning, what it is he holds in his hand, what he shall do this afternoon, or when the Moon will be at the full, when he has this reasonable assurance, would speak an untruth, because he would convey other
ideas

ideas to the hearer than the expressions carry in his own mind.

Therefore we may lawfully claim to know or be certain of some things, for the common use and propriety of language will justify us in so speaking ; and may place a full reliance on those deductions which appear to flow necessarily from them after examining every corner that might contain a latent fallacy, for it is in our nature so to do. All sound reasoning must rest upon this basis, and what has this basis to rest upon will never fail to satisfy: this entire acquiescence then is the utmost I aim at in the course of my present enquiries, for I pretend not to absolute certainty. I endeavour to collect such particular exercises of the faculties as I conceive every man's experience will bear witness to be fact when put in mind of them, and suggest such observations as appear naturally resulting therefrom. I make no new weights, nor expect to be helpfull any otherwise than by handing those into the scale that lay neglected, or sorting them together in a manner not done before ; but I leave it to every one, who shall vouchsafe me the hearing, to hold the balance himself: if I should be so fortunate as to procure a moral certainty, it is all I desire, and all I need, for I do not fear its having a proper effect.

One inconvenience happens from acquiescence being our only mark of certainty, for it gives us an unlucky bias and makes us partial in our judgement, because when evidence offers in support of the thing we wish to be true, the mind receives it with pleasure and mistakes that complacence for an acquiescence in the weight of the evidence. And perhaps we should always labour under this infirmity, if the mischiefs, frequently consequent upon such mistakes, did not teach us better caution. Therefore we see children and persons of little consideration very apt to judge according to their desires, until experience and proper observation upon that experience in some measure remedy the evil: but we can never get rid of it entirely, wherefore the laws will not allow a man to be judge or witness in his own cause, nor can the most judicious persons ever trust their judgement so securely as in matters wherein their own interest or inclination have no concern.

36. It has been currently held that there were certain truths imprinted upon the mind by nature, but since Mr. Locke has fully refuted the doctrine of innate ideas, another opinion has been taken up, of the mind having a particular faculty to judge between her ideas, distinct from that whereby she apprehends them: therefore we find three
kinds

kinds of operation ascribed to her, simple Apprehension, Judgement and Ratiocination, and it is supposed there are some truths and conclusions necessarily obvious to every man as soon as the ideas or the premisses are clearly apprehended. But for my part I can see no foundation for such a triple capacity, the single faculty of perception seeming to me sufficient for all those operations, according to the prospect lying before us in the understanding. Nobody will deny that we acquire the knowledge of some truths long after being made acquainted with the terms whereof they are affirmed, and learn rules of argumentation by which we can make a use of premisses that we could not do before; and in process of time we retain those truths and practise that manner of reasoning after having utterly forgotten the evidences and rules that taught us them. Wherein then lies the difference between a man before and after he has attained this knowledge? Is it in his faculty which receives an additional strength? or is it only in the objects he has to behold? He could look back upon his thoughts before and clearly discern whatever they represented, but found there only the naked terms: and now he does no more than look back in the same manner, but finds, besides the terms, a judgement concerning them, which he does not

not create by any act of his, but discerns by inspection upon the traces of his understanding. Even the most obvious truths may be overlooked while the ideas they belong to are in our thoughts; a man may see two pair of horses without ever considering that they make four; but if the mind had several faculties which were severally affected by the same ideas, since they must all be passive faculties, one would expect that whatever is present and operates upon the mind should equally affect them all. If it be said we overlook the judgement for want of reflecting, I would ask what else is reflecting besides turning the mental eye inwards, which is the same act in looking for judgements as for naked ideas of terms, and differs only in being directed to different objects. Therefore while we speak of the mind and not of the man comprehending his body or finer organization, I can see no more reason to suppose one faculty for apprehending, another for judging and another for reasoning, than to suppose one faculty for seeing blue, another for yellow and another for scarlet.

37. When I make judgement a distinct idea from that of the terms, I do not mean that it may be separated from them so as to be discerned apart by itself, for one cannot judge without some ideas to judge upon, but
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this does not hinder its adding to the prospect exhibited by the terms alone: for there are ideas received by sensation which cannot subsist without others, and nevertheless are really distinct from those whereon their subsistence depends. We cannot see motion without seeing some body move, yet none will pretend our idea of motion is contained in that of the body, which we had compleat while we saw it at rest, but when put in motion it presents a new idea it did not before, and we discern this new circumstance of motion by the same sense of vision where-with we discern the body itself. So we may reflect on a cow and a sheep without thinking whether one be larger than the other, and when we make this second reflection, though it cannot subsist without the former, it has something more for its object, nor does there need any other faculty to apprehend this additional object of the judgement than that whereby we apprehend the subjects whereon it is passed.

38. But improvements in knowledge, as well by reason as experience, arise from the transferrable nature of judgement: for the premisses transfer their certainty to the conclusion, and particular facts transfer their degree of evidence to the opinion they tend to establish until they grow into a certain experience.

rience. I do not reckon the translation made while we cannot assent to the conclusion without contemplating the proofs ; but when we can use it as a principle, and whenever we reflect upon it find the characteristic of truth associated with it in the same combination. Thus we very frequently do, for we have many judgements to which we give an unreserved assent ; we are sensible we learned them though we cannot tell where or when or how we learned them. Nay sometimes when we cannot recollect who told us of a thing, we know we must have heard it somewhere and not dreamed it, by the strength of persuasion we find accompanying our idea.

Yet our judgements cannot all come to us this way, because we must have had some previously to our entering upon it : experience must have a beginning, and reason must have some principles to build upon, already known and assented to before she goes to work upon them. We begin to judge very early, as early or rather a moment earlier than we begin to act, for we never act without an apprehension of expedience in the action : therefore the first judgement we ever made must preceed the first action we ever performed, and consequently must preceed all experience we could have of our own power

or

or the effects of it. The child does not try to throw off its swaddling cloaths without a judgement that the pressure it feels comes from them and that it may remove them by struggling. I do not propose this as the very earliest act of human life, but whatever you will suppose the earliest, was done for some end which the fancy represented as desirable and attainable. This first judgement then arose without any manner of proof, not even of prior experience, but was owing to the ideas springing up spontaneously in the infant fancy. Thus we see that that state of our finer organization, or whatever else one can assign for the mind to look upon in the suggestions of fancy, has a natural efficacy to excite a perception of judgements as well as of other ideas. One modification affects us with colours, another with sounds, another with remembrance, another with assent: and whatever, whether mechanical or other causes, bring the organs into this disposition, they will have the like effect. Wherefore there is no absurdity in conceiving it possible in theory that a man, by an immediate operation upon his organs disposing them into a proper state, may be brought to understand what he never learned, to remember what he never saw, to ~~discover~~ truths instantaneously discoverable only by long investigations of reason, and to discern

discern others clearly which no reason can investigate.

39. But how consistent soever this may appear in speculation, the possibility of a thing does not prove it actually true, and if we consult experience we shall find the contrary to be fact; all our knowledge being derived from those sources to which we commonly ascribe it, our senses, our memory, our reason, or the testimony and instruction of others. Therefore I am so far from imagining our judgements to proceed from any sudden irregular configuration of our organs, that perhaps I may be blamed for running into an opposite extreme: for I conceive that all our stores of knowledge and skill in discerning between one thing and another was acquired, not born with us, but learned by practice: if we had judgements any other way than those above mentioned in our infancy, we have lost them and possess nothing now which was not once a new acquisition. I have already declared my opinion concerning the judgement of the senses, that a grown person, on first coming to the use of any of them, would not receive the same information therefrom that we do; and that we attain our ideas of magnitude, figure, distance and many other particulars, by having frequent intercourse among objects. And
for

for judgements of the understanding, besides that they cannot be had before we arrive at the use of understanding, they for the most part consist in generals which can be known only by experience of particulars founded on the evidence of the senses. There are some truths esteemed self-evident because supposed to be assented to as soon as proposed: but I question the fact, for I fancy one might meet with children who do not know that two and two make four or that the whole cannot be contained in a part, after they clearly understand the meaning of the terms. We call them self-evident because we discern them upon inspection, but so we do the figures and distances of bodies, which has been shown the effect of a skill attained by use. There is as necessary a connection between nine times four and thirty six as between twice two and four, and we find that butchers or market women, who have constantly used themselves to reckon by groats, judge of their several amounts upon inspection without staying to compute: therefore those ideas operate upon them in the manner of self-evident truths, which speak for themselves as soon as admitted into the reflection. They do not the like upon other persons who have not accustomed themselves to the like train of thinking: but all men have had some experience

ence and made some observation upon things daily occurring to their senses or reflection, from whence they gather that knowledge we stile self-evident because we know not its original nor remember the time when we were without it.

40. From what has been observed above, it may be justly doubted whether strictly speaking we have any such thing as first principles of reason, but what we deem so are accessions of knowledge derived from some channel whose source we cannot discover. I do not remark this with a view to depreciate such knowledge or lessen our dependence upon it in all the uses of life: for I think where we find a thing command our assent as soon as proposed, agreed to by mankind in general, and we can see nothing in all our stores of experience suggesting a possibility of its being untrue, we may build upon it as upon a sure foundation as well of our conduct as of our reasonings. But my design tends to show that nothing is above being made the subject of examination when an opening offers: for those commonly esteemed first principles may be often traced to some higher origin, and several of them not unfrequently to one and the same. Therefore the more a man thinks, especially upon points of morality, he will find his principles the fewer, but
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of more extensive influence; for many of those he looked upon as such at first, will resolve themselves into conclusions from the few that remain. By this means his reasonings will grow more clear and uniform and his improvements greater, for by tracing points of knowledge, generally received, up their channels, he may discern how they came to prevail with mankind, and thence learn to deduce others from the same stream with equal effect and certainty. May I then be permitted, in the sequel of these enquiries, to question whether several things be evident in themselves or good or right in themselves which are commonly reputed such? Not with an intention to overthrow them, but with an endeavour to discover why they are evident and why they are good or right: nor shall I do this wantonly, or unless I apprehend some advantage will accrue from the attempt. But as I do not pretend always to penetrate quite to the fountain head, shall content myself with stopping at postulata which I apprehend nobody will deny me, whenever finding it impracticable or needless to go further.

C H A P. XII.

IMAGINATION and UNDERSTANDING.

WE have observed at our entrance upon these enquiries, that a compound may have properties resulting from the composition which do not belong to the parts singly whereof it consists. Therefore though the mind, taken in the strict and philosophical sense, possesses only two faculties, the active and the perceptive, this does not hinder but that the mind, in the vulgar and grosser acceptation, may possess a greater variety of faculties, such as discerning, remembling, thinking, studying, contemplating and a multitude of others; which are but different modes or species of perception, varying according to the state of the ideas there are to be perceived, and are all reducible under two general classes, Imagination and Understanding; neither of them born with us, but acquired by use and practice; and the latter growing out of the former. We come into the world a mere blank, void of all inscription whatsoever. Sensation first begins the writing, and our internal sense or reflection encreases the stock, which runs into various assortments, and produces other ideas different from

from the root whereout they spring ; whence we quickly become provided with store of assemblages, affociations, trains and judgements.

These stores, together with the repository containing them, we may stile the Imagination, the very word implying so much ; for being derived from image, which is the same as idea, it imports the receptacle of ideas. And whatever number of them is excited by external objects, or presented by the mechanical workings of our animal spirits or other causes, I call an Act of imagination or Scene exhibited thereby. I know that imagination is applied in common discourse to ideas purely imaginary having no existence in truth and nature, such as a Cyclops, a Chimera, the enchanted island of Circe, or whimsical adventures of Pantagruel. But we find rhetoricians and critics extending the term to pictures of real originals, drawn in the mind by descriptions of scenes actually existing or occurrences actually happening. Mr. Addison in his essay on the pleasures of imagination treats of those conveyed by the works of art and nature. Therefore I shall not offend against propriety by taking the word in the largest sense, as comprehending every representation to the mind, whether of things real or fantastical, either brought into

view by some sensation or starting up of their own accord.

Among these ideas some, being more engaging than the rest, attract the notice particularly to ^{them} ~~ourselves~~: the mental eye singles them out from the whole scene exhibited before it, sees them in a stronger light, holds them longer in view, and thereby gives occasion to their introducing more of their own associates than they could have done in the rapidity of their natural course. This operation of the notice being frequently repeated, at length becomes itself an object of our observation, and thus we discover a power we have of heightning the colour of our ideas, of changing or directing their course by the application of our notice: and the exercise of this power I take to be what is commonly meant by an Act of the Understanding.

2. Thus there are three ways in which ideas are made to affect us: by mechanical causes, when either sensible objects excite them or the working of our animal spirits throws them up; by the notice being drawn to fix upon some appearing eminently inviting above their fellows; and by exerting this power of the notice purposely in order to discern them more fully or bring in others that do not occur of themselves. The two first
belong

belong to imagination and the last to understanding.

To render my notion of this division the clearer I shall endeavour to illustrate it by an example. Suppose a servant wench in London, after being fatigued with several hours hard labour, can get up stairs to repose herself a while in indolence. She squats down upon a chair, shuts her eyes, and falls into a state between sleeping and waking; but her fancy roves upon the work she has been doing, the utensils employed therein, and the chit chat of her fellow servants. If the cat mews at the door, this changes the scene to puss's exploits in catching mice, or her fondling tricks while she lay purring in somebody's lap; until some other sensation or turn of fancy leads on a new train of ideas. Hitherto all proceeds mechanically: volition remains wholly inactive, there being nothing alluring enough to raise a desire of retaining it in view; but the images pass lightly and nimbly along according to the impulse received from the causes exciting them, without leaving any trace of themselves behind. Presently there arises a great noise and hubbub in the street. This rouses up the girl and carries her in all haste to the window. She sees a crowd of people, and in the midst of them Mylord Mayor going by in procession. She minds nothing of

the houses before her nor the mob jostling one another below, for the prancing horses with their gorgeous trappings engage her whole attention, until drawn from them by the great coach all glorious with sculpture, gold and paintings, which she follows with her eye as far as it can be discerned distinctly. Then the sheriffs, and whatever else appear remarkable in the train, have their share in her notice: which impresses the objects whereon it fixes, so strongly that the traces of them remain in her reflection after the objects themselves have been removed, and perhaps raise a curiosity of knowing what could be the occasion of this parade. Thus far imagination only is employed: but curiosity puts her upon searching for the means of gratifying it, which not occurring readily, she must use her understanding to discover and pursue them. So she examines the sheet almanac pasted up behind the door to see what holiday it might be, but finding none she casts about in her thoughts for some other way of accounting for the coach of state being brought out; when at last it may be she recollects that somebody had told her there was to be an address presented to day to his Majesty.

3. Although in the second article of the division abovementioned, our active power be employed as well as in the third, yet it is manifest

manifest we proceed in a different manner. In the former we act inadvertently, heedlessly and without thinking, drawn only to pursue certain objects that happen to strike upon our fancy: in the other we act knowingly and designedly with a view to introduce some other idea not already within our prospect, and with a consciousness and reflection upon what we are ~~a~~ doing. For there is a reflex act whereby the mind turns inward upon herself to observe what ideas arise in her view, or what effect her activity has upon them or the bodily members, distinct from that whereby she produces those effects. The one is commonly called reflecting and the other acting, and both may be performed at the same time, or the latter singly without the former. The beginning of our lives I apprehend passes wholly without this reflection, which we acquire in time and by degrees. When we have discovered our power of directing the notice and attained some expertness in the management of that power, we may be said to have arrived at the use of our understanding.

The degrees of exertion in both faculties are very various, from the intensest study, down to that common reflection we make in the ordinary transactions of life; and from ^e that steady attention ^{given} to very engaging scenes.

to the^{2d} transient notice we take of objects moderately alluring when they pass swiftly in succession before us. All strong efforts of the understanding are laborious and fatiguing, visibly wasting the spirits and affecting the head and stomach if continued long, nor have the most abstracted reasonings less of that effect than others: which seems an undeniable evidence that when the mind is thought to be most retired and to converse solely with herself, she nevertheless uses some instrument or organ, and employs the bodily forces in carrying on her work.

It is common to stile those actions mechanical that are performed without thought or forecast, especially if we cannot discover any inducement that led us into them, for we ascribe them to the force of habit or impulse of passion or fancy: but howmuchsoever habit or fancy may have thrown up the ideas, The motions ensuing thereupon could not have been produced without the agency of the mind. This was proper to be remarked, because if we take the microscope and examine the minute constituent parts of action, we shall find that far the greater number of them, although certainly performed by our active power, are yet directed by sudden transient ideas starting up from time to time spontaneously. But those ideas skim so
lightly

lightly as to leave no print of their foot in the memory, therefore if we look for them the moment after, we cannot find them, and so persuade ourselves there were none. When a man walks he moves his legs himself, yet they seem to move habitually and involuntarily without any care of his to make them step right and left alternately or to ascertain the length of their paces : nor is it an easy matter for him with his utmost attention to discern the ideas that occasion this regularity of their motions.

4. To this inadvertent action of the mind we owe that dexterity in the use of our powers which is supposed to be an immediate gift of nature : for we are not born with the faculty of walking or handling or speaking. When little children go to put their coral into their mouths, they do not know how to get it thither, but hit it against their chin or rub it about their cheek : when you would set them to walk, they jump with both legs at once or lift up their foot as if they were to step over a stile : and the first sounds they make are none other than those of grunting and crying. But the ideas formed daily in their imagination lead them on step by step to the management of their limbs and first rudiments of speech, before they are capable of anything that can be called learning or application.

cation. And afterwards we catch many little habits by accident or imitation, or fall into ways of acting by the force of example, or grow more perfect in our manner of proceeding meerly by dint of practice. Nor does imagination stand idle even in those seasons wherein we most employ our understanding, but makes many bye motions of her own or acts an under part assisting to execute the plan laid by her partner.

For understanding endeavours to extend her prospect as far and wide as she can stretch: she aims at distant ends, considers remote consequences, joins the past and future with the present, and contemplates imperfect ideas in order to strike out from thence something that may be a surer ground of our proceeding. Therefore she can direct only our larger actions, drawing the outlines of them or giving the main turns to our courses of behaviour, but leaves the intermediate spaces to be filled up by habit or the transient ideas starting up in train to our notice. She moves too slowly to give constant employment to our active power, which while she is deliberating must take its directions elsewhere.

5. Thus it appears that imagination actuates most of our motions and serves us perpetually in all the purposes of life, which under-

understanding recommends, but the habitual and spontaneous rising of ideas prompts and directs us to complete. To this belongs all that expertness we have in any art or business or accomplishment whatsoever; nor can even science proceed to good effect without it, as containing something of art in the due management of our thoughts and proper application of our enquiries. We have observed above that many useful attainments are made in our infancy and afterwards without any thought or pains of ours: and even those we acquire by care and industry will stand in little stead until the trains we have hammered out by long labour have gotten a facility of springing up upon touch of a single link. Herein lies the difference between theory and practice; for there are many things we cannot do long after we know well enough how they are to be done, not because our active powers are insufficient for the work, but because the ideas, necessary for conducting them along the minute parts of it, are not enured to rise currently and in their proper order.

The beginner in music must learn his notes one by one, then he must associate them with the keys or stops of his instrument, and these again with their correspondent sounds: next he must join the notes into bars, and by a proper

proper composition of these form a tune. All this he must work out at first with painful application, and while such application is necessary he proceeds slowly and awkwardly, making frequent mistakes and taking up an hour to go thro' his tune, with much trouble to himself and very little entertainment to the hearer. But when by long practice he has taught imagination to throw up her associations and trains spontaneously, he has no other use for thought than just to choose the tune and give some slight directions now and then as they may be wanted: for his eye will run along the lines and his fingers along the keys mechanically, and it would require more attention to put them out of their course than suffer them to proceed.

6. Hence we may judge of how great importance it is to have a well regulated and well exercised imagination, which if we could possess compleatly it would answer all our occasions better, with more ease and dispatch, than we could compass them in any other way. But as nature has not given us this faculty in perfection nor will it grow up to full stature of its own accord, she has endued us with the privilege of understanding its form and improve it. Therefore it is ~~the~~ business to range our ideas into such ~~as~~ trains as are best adapted.

purposes; to bring them under command so as that they may be ready for any services to be required of them; and continually to keep a watchfull eye over them while at work to prevent their deviating into wrong channels.

Nor would understanding herself find so constant employment as she does, were it not for some principles and views laid up in store which start up occasionally to set her at work. For who would consider or study or contrive, unless to attain some purpose suggested to his reflection? Thus understanding often begins and terminates in imagination, which nevertheless does not derogate from its excellency, because very few of our most necessary and usefull purposes could ever be attained without it. And indeed understanding may justly claim the merit of those very exploits performed by habit or expertness, when it was owing to her care and diligence that they were acquired, or to her command and contrivance that they had their proper cues given and proper tasks assigned them.

7. For the most part both faculties go hand in hand co-operating in the same work, one sketching out the design and the other executing the performance: but sometimes we find them acting at once in different employments. When two persons engage earnestly toge-

together in discourse as they walk, their thoughts are wholly intent upon the subject of their conversation : but the transient notices of their senses, and their habitual dexterity in the management of their limbs, guide them in the mean while through all the turnings of their path. And thus they may go currently on while the path lies smooth and open : but should anything unusual happen in the way, and attention be so fully taken up as not to spare a glance away from the object that holds it, they may chance to run against a post or stumble over a stone. Your profound thinkers are sometimes absent in company, and commit strange mistakes for want of attending to the objects around them ; or perhaps set out for one place and strike into the way leading to another. Which shows that the slightest and most common matters cannot be carried on safely without some degree of thought and observation : not that habit and imagination cannot find employment for our active powers of themselves, but it is a great chance they wander from the plan assigned them unless kept in order by frequent directions from understanding.

Thus the mind may be said to have two eyes, in their situation rather resembling those of a hare or a bird than a human creature, as being placed on opposite sides and pointed

pointed towards different sets of objects. Or may be more aptly compared to a man looking at a common field through a telescope with one eye, still holding the other open : with the naked eye he sees the several lands, their length and shape and the crops growing on each ; with the glass he sees only one little spot, but in that he distinguishes the ears of corn, discerns butterflies fluttering about and swallows shooting athwart him. Sometimes both eyes turn upon the same prospect, one tracing the larger and tother the minuter parts : at other times they take different courses, one pursuing a train of little objects that have no relation to the scenes contemplated by the other.

8. Whatever knowledge we receive from sensation, or fall upon by experience, or grow into by habit and custom, may be counted the produce of imagination : and to this we may refer the evidence of the senses, the notices of appetite, our common notions and conceptions of things, and all that rises up spontaneously in our memory. Whatever has been infused into us by careful instruction, or worked out by thought and industry, or gained by attentive observation, may be stiled the attainments of understanding : among which may be reckoned what skill we have in any art or science, or in language,

guage, or in conducting the common affairs of life, or what we bring to our remembrance by recollection. Our tastes, sentiments, opinions and moral senses, I apprehend, belong partly to one class and partly to the other : their seat lies in the imagination, but they are introduced there sometimes by an industrious use of the understanding, and sometimes by the mechanical influence of example and custom.

Understanding commonly draws imagination after it, but not always nor immediately. Men seen from a great height look no bigger than pigmies, though we judge them to be of ordinary stature ; but seen at the same distance upon a level they appear as they should do, because we see them continually in the latter situation and but rarely in the former. Then again objects beheld over water or other uniform surface, which deceives us in the distance, seem smaller than their real dimensions, because the scenes we are commonly conversant with contain a variety of distinguishable parts. For imagination gets her appearances by use, but use must come by time and degrees. A discovery that we have worked out by a consideration of various particulars, often loses its force as soon as the proofs whereon it depended have slipped out of our sight.

next time we employ our thoughts upon it we arrive at the conclusion sooner, and upon every repeated trial our process grows shorter and shorter, until in time we learn to discern the thing so discovered to be true upon a very little reflection without the suggestion of any proof: upon further acquaintance it takes the nature of a self-evident truth, the judgement arising instantaneously in the same assemblage with the terms, and then becomes a property of imagination. Thus these two faculties contribute to enlarge one another's stores: imagination suggests principles and inducements to set understanding in motion, or furnishes her with materials to work upon; and the judgements of the latter, either by the strong glare of their evidence, or more commonly by long familiarity, grow into appearances of the former.

9. From this last consideration it appears that understanding may transfer over some part of her treasures to imagination, that is, by making us so compleatly masters of them as that they shall always lie ready at hand without requiring any time or trouble to rummage for them: the other part which she reserves to herself is such as will not occur without seeking, but must be drawn up into view by thought and voluntary reflection. For how perfect soever any person

may be in architecture, sculpture or painting, though upon the bare inspection of things belonging to those arts he will discern more than the ignorant, yet by considering them attentively he will strike out further observations that had escaped him at the first view. This then is the distinction I would make between the stores of knowledge contained in our mind. Those that have an aptness to rise up spontaneously or be introduced instantly by sensation, whether originally deposited by custom, experience or our own industry, I would assign to imagination; and their rising in such manner I should deem a movement of imagination. On the other hand, those which lie below the surface and require some thought and reflection, be it ever so little, to fetch them up, I conceive belonging to the understanding; and that operation whereby they are so brought to light I call an act of understanding.

Perhaps this allotment of the boundaries between the two faculties may be thought arbitrary and not warranted by any lawfull authority, but I do not apprehend authority has yet interfered in the case: for though we often distinguish between understanding and imagination in our discourses, yet we as often use them promiscuously, and assign the same territories and operations to the one or the other.

other, according to the humour we are in or according to the light in which we happen to take things. Therefore in a matter so unsettled every one is at liberty to do as he pleases, and I have chosen that partition which I think will be most convenient for the course I am following in bringing ourselves acquainted with the nature of the human mind.

10. It is customary with most persons in handling this subject to throw in some conjectures concerning the capacity of brute creatures: and indeed all we can say of them amounts to little more than conjecture, for we cannot penetrate into their sensories, nor receive information of anything passing there from themselves, but can only guess at their ideas by observing their motions. It seems generally agreed among learned and simple to exclude them from all share of reason and understanding, which is esteemed the peculiar privilege of man and thought to constitute the essential difference between him and his fellow animals. But many judicious persons look upon this as a vulgar error, and hold that several other creatures possess a degree of understanding of the same kind with our own. Now the determination of this point seems to depend greatly upon what notion we entertain of

understanding : if the description I have endeavoured to give of that faculty be admitted, I do not conceive the brutes have any portion of it belonging to them. For I cannot discover in them anything of thinking or observing or meditating or what is called labour of brain. Ideas of reflection cannot well be denied them, nor assemblages, associations, trains and judgements, but such only as are impressed by external objects or formed by accident, not by their own care and application. They remember but do not recollect, nor seem capable of that reflex act whereby we turn inwards upon ourselves to call up any thoughts we want, but are continually employed by such ideas as their senses or their fancy suggest. They fix a strong attention upon things, but it is of the mechanical kind described before, where the notice is drawn by the glare of present objects and not directed for the discovery of something unknown. They sometimes persevere a long while in pursuit of one design, as in hunting for their prey, which they prosecute by motions of their limbs and application of their senses, not their reflection, and retain no longer than while appetite continues to solicit : for tho' the hound when at fault may take as much pains to recover the scent as the huntsman to put him upon it, yet
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when returned home after the chase is over, he does not, like his master, ruminate upon the transactions of the day, endeavouring to find out his miscarriages and draw rules from thence to conduct him better for the future. Their views seem confined to the present without reflection upon yesterday or regard for tomorrow : and though some of them lay in provision for a distant time, it will appear upon examination that they are led into what they do by a present impulse. For the knowledge of future wants can arise only from experience of the past : but ants, bees and squirrels, hatched in the spring, who never knew the scarcities of winter, do not fail to lay up their stores of corn or honey or nuts the first summer of their lives. Or if without any evidence you will suppose them instructed herein by their elders, what will you say to canary birds taken young from their parents and kept in a separate cage by themselves? who yet, if you supply them with suitable materials, will build a nest as dextrously as the most experienced of their species.

11. This sagacity, in many instances surpassing the contrivance of man and discerning things undiscoverable by human reason, is usually stiled instinct : of which the world seems to have a very confused idea, esteeming it a kind of sixth sense, or a particular species of un-

derstanding different from our own. But I do not see why it may not be ascribed to the five senses or to that internal feeling called appetite, which we find variously affected by objects in different creatures, and which may prompt them to take prudent measures unknowingly and without foresight of the good effects resulting therefrom. Nor shall we be so much at a loss to know what instinct is when we are shewn some footsteps of it or at least something very like it in ourselves. If cattle, ants and other animals, prognosticate the changes of weather, a shooting corn or an old strain will enable a man to do the like: the same cause producing the same effect operates upon both, namely, the various degrees of moisture in the air exciting a particular feel in their flesh. What shall we say to the nauseas preceeding fevers, or those longings one now and then hears of in sick persons pointing out to them an effectual cure for their distempers after having been given over by their physicians? I knew a person troubled with indigestion for which he had three several remedies, each of which would give him relief at times when the others would not: and he used always to know which of them to apply only by the strong appetite and propensity he found in himself towards that particular

ticular thing. Now why may not this be called instinct as well as that which every one has observed inclines a dog to gnaw the grass by way of medicine when he finds himself out of order? Perhaps I should not aim much beside the mark if I were to define instinct Those notices of sensation or appetite and those untaught arts of exercising the active powers which we do not usually experience in ourselves.

12 According to the division made in this chapter, sense, appetite and instinct fall under the class of imagination as so many different species contained within that general term. Nor need we wonder that imagination in brutes should have the advantage of ours in many respects, since there may be several causes assigned why it should be so. In the first place nature makes greater haste in the perfecting their limbs, which are ^{the} instruments employed by the mind in the exercise of her active powers. The chicken breaks forth from the egg compleatly formed with beak and legs and other members fitted for immediate use: but man comes into the world the most unfinished creature breathing and arrives the latest to maturity, therefore cannot acquire expertness in the use of his limbs while they continue imperfect and unsuited for action. In the next place many

animals have acuter senses and more distinguishing appetites to direct them in their choice between things noxious and wholesome. Then as they have nothing beside imagination to employ them, they attend constantly to that; which of course therefore must strike out longer trains and connect them stronger and work them smoother than it can be expected to do in us, where it is perpetually disturbed and interrupted by being called off to assist in the services of reason. For the fewer ways we have to practise in, we shall grow the more perfect in them: thus persons deprived of any one sense make a greater proficiency in improving the others, and he that should be obliged to walk in the dark would do wisely to take a blind man for his guide. Besides this we corrupt imagination by the perverse use of our understanding: for we contract depraved appetites, immoderate cravings, vitiated tastes and pernicious fancies, which stifle many salutary admonitions we might have received from sense and instinct, if preserved in their natural state.

But on the other hand understanding, as we have already observed, makes over a part of her purchases to imagination, who thereby becomes seized of territories she could not have acquired herself. Among these I think may
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be reckoned principally the faculty of speech, which by constant practice we grow so current in, that we exercise it, like Peter when he proposed making the three tabernacles, while we wist not what we say. But the use of speech, although universal among mankind, is not to be found elsewhere, notwithstanding that the apprehensions of some men seem duller and their stores of knowledge scantier upon the whole than those of some animals: which one would think an evidence that the human faculties differ from all others in kind as well as in degree. And I apprehend the difference lies in this, that other creatures have fewer mental organs, being particularly void of those whereby we turn our attention inwards or call up ideas to our reflection, so that we may be said to have two mental eyes and they only one: by which means their circle of vision must necessarily be smaller than ours, although the objects within it may shine as clear or clearer than they do to us.

Upon the whole the dispute concerning this matter seems to turn upon words more than upon things. For if anybody shall look upon every deduction of consequences, how spontaneously soever occurring, to be reason; and every portion of knowledge, through what channel soever flowing in, that man could
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not attain without thought and application, to be understanding ; I shall not refuse either of them to many birds and beasts and insects. And if he shall think them entitled still to further privileges, I will not contend with him : conceiving it enough just to offer my conjecture and pass on ; for my business lies with the human mind, not the brutal.

C H A P. XIII.

CONVICTION AND PERSUASION.

THESE are commonly used as synonymous terms, or if any difference be made between them it lies in this, that conviction denotes the beginning, and persuasion the continuance, of assent : for we are said to be convinced when brought by fresh evidence to the belief of a proposition we did not hold for truth before, but remain persuaded of what we have formerly seen sufficient grounds to gain our credit. I shall here take the liberty to employ them in a sense not exactly the same with that wherein they are ordinarily understood, using them as appellations of two things really distinct in themselves, one for those decisions made by our reason, and

and the other for those notions starting up in our fancy or reflection; wherein I shall not depart much from the distinction abovementioned: for as understanding requires some little consideration to bring up her judgements to the thought, this may be regarded in the nature of a new conviction which we had not the moment before; and imagination always follows the train that former custom has led her into.

Nor let it be thought I am only resuming the subjects already treated of in the two last chapters under the names of Judgement and Appearance: for we do not always fully confide even in the judgements of our understanding, but many times suspect some latent error where we cannot discern any, or opposite evidences occur which gain a momentary assent by turns as each can catch the mental eye: but I do not call it conviction until we fix upon some one determination of which we rest satisfied with a full assurance. So likewise appearance sometimes varies from persuasion, for when we see a stick thrust into water, we do not imagine it really bent because it seems to be so: nor does a man, who looks at his friend through an inverted telescope, fancy him even for an instant to be of that diminutive size to which he appears contracted: nor does he persuade himself he has

two and twenty hands when by holding up one of his own behind a multiplying glass he sees so many exhibited to his view.

There is sometimes a temporary persuasion we can lay aside at any time, as in reading a poem or a novel, where imagination enters fully into all the scenes of action described, and receives them as real facts recorded in some authentic history. Therefore fictions must be probable to give entertainment, for whatever carries a glaring absurdity or is repugnant to our common notions of things, we cannot even fancy to be true. What are the changes of scene upon the stage but contrivances to transport the audience in imagination into distant countries or companies? What are lively descriptions but representations to the mind which make us ready to cry out that we actually see the things described or hear the discourses related? In all these cases there is no conviction worked, for a very little reflection will make us sensible that all is pure invention: but understanding purposely nods that she may not by her unseasonable reflections interrupt the pleasure received from the soothing deception. Nay she sometimes assists in the delusion, for a man by taking pains may work himself up into an imagination of being in places where he is not and beholding objects no where-existent.

istent. Tully the great master of rhetoric teaches that an orator cannot do justice effectually to his cause unless he makes the case his own, enters thoroughly into the interests of his client, and places himself in his situation. And Horace lays down the like rule, If, says he, you will draw tears from me, you must first be grieved yourself: which one cannot well be, without imagining oneself interested in the misfortune. But these temporary persuasions may become permanent ones where the organs happen to be weak or disordered: and this I take to be the case of madness, which being a distemper often removable by medicines, seems another proof that the judgements of the mind depend upon the disposition of the bodily organs.

2. Conviction and persuasion influence one another reciprocally, the latter often following the former instantaneously, but more commonly in time and by degrees. Where we can have ocular or other sensible demonstration of a mistake we are generally cured of it once for all, but where such evidence is not to be had it will not presently yield, and after being once driven out will many times steal upon us again at unawares. Therefore if we see sufficient reasons to work a compleat conviction but still find a reluctance in
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the mind to lay aside an inveterate error, we shall be more likely to succeed by frequently contemplating the proofs already suggested than by accumulating new ones: for importunity and assiduity prevail more upon imagination than strength of argument, because our judgements as well as other ideas run in train and require repeated efforts to turn them out of the course to which they have been habituated; like a distorted limb that must be brought to rights by continual application, not by violence. On the other hand notions rivetted in the fancy too often debauch the understanding and even overpower the direct evidence of sense: and that among the greatest scholars as well as among the vulgar. For having found the latin words *LEVIS* light and *LÆVIS* smooth, *VENIT* he comes and *VENIT* he came, marked with different quantities in their Gradus, they adjudge them one short and the other long, and would be horribly shocked at the inharmoniousness of a verse wherein they should be introduced in each others places: but as our modern latinists pronounce those words, it would puzzle the nicest ear to distinguish any difference in the sounds. On the contrary they insist upon the first syllables in *TENEO*, *LEVIA*, having the same quantity with those in *TENUI*, *LEVIBUS*, though any body except them-

themselves may discern they pronounce them quicker and shorter in the two latter than the former. And the like cause operates upon their judgement in our own language, where we place the particle A before a consonant and AN before a vowel, for the better founding of our words, not for their better appearance upon paper : but your very learned folks determine the sound by the spelling, for I suppose they would not for the world say AN youthfull fally, or A usefull accomplishment, though both words begin exactly with the same initial sound. The same may be said with respect to the rule of H being no letter, which seems a notion peculiar to the schools and not admitted elsewhere ; for one may converse seven years among the politest companies, provided they be not deeply versed in latin and greek, without hearing anybody talk of buying AN horse or taking AN house.

3. Probably conviction would operate more effectually and constantly if we were capable of absolute certainty, for the force of that one would think must bear down all opposition at a single stroke : but there being always a possibility that our clearest reasonings may deceive us, this lessens the authority of reason and leaves room for a lurking

lurking suspicion of its fallibility in particular instances.

But however this be, certain it is we cannot with our utmost endeavours always bend imagination to that ply which judgement would direct. If you desire your friend to take something out of your eye, that troubles you, with a feather, howmuchsoever you may be convinced of his tenderness and dexterity, yet when the feather approaches close to your eye you cannot help winking, because you cannot exclude the sudden apprehension that he will hurt you. All the arguments in the world avail nothing in this case: yet I doubt not but by repeated trials a man might bring himself to stand such an operation without flinching. Why can bricklayers walk safely along the gutters of a high building, but because they have gained a confidence in their security? Any of us who has the perfect command of his limbs might do the same, if he could once totally throw aside the persuasion of danger. Low cieling, swagging beams appearing below the plaister, and walls standing out of the perpendicular, threaten a downfall: set twenty the most experienced workmen to examine the building, and though they unanimously assure you all is safe this will not entirely remove your ap-
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prehenſions, until by conſtant habitation in the houſe the perſuaſion dies away of itſelf. Fear cannot ſubſiſt without an apprehenſion of miſchief, but it is well known that the ſtrongeſt demonſtration will not always diſſipate our fears. Let a woman take a gun into her hand, examine the barrel and pan as long as ſhe pleaſes until ſhe is fully convinced there is neither charge nor priming, yet if you preſent the muzzle againſt her head with threatening geſtures and expreſſions, you will raiſe in her a ſudden perſuaſion of danger. Some apprehenſions, as of ſeeing ſpirits or apparitions, being grounded early in our childhood, can never be totally eradicated afterwards, neither by reaſon nor example nor ridicule nor time that cureth all things. Nor are the other paſſions void of their ſeveral perſuaſions which they frequently retain againſt evidence. Hope and expectation will continue beyond all probability of ſucceſs: and love ſometimes flatters with an opinion of reciprocal kindneſs notwithstanding the groſſeſt repeated ill uſage. The tenets of a ſect or party ^{deep} ſtrongly inculcated betimes keep their hold in ſpite of the ſtrongeſt conviction: whence the ſaying applied to perſons obſtinately attached to their notions, You ſhall not perſuade them even though you do perſuade them: or as I would rather phraſe the

sentence, You shall not persuade them even though you convince them.

4. We have observed before that imagination actuates most of our motions, and serves us perpetually in all the purposes of life: it often holds the reins of action alone, or at least guides them in those intermediate spaces while understanding looks forward towards the general plan. So that our behaviour depends for the most part upon what persuasions we have, and upon conviction little further than as that may draw the other after it. For how well soever we may be convinced of the reasonableness of our measures, we shall never pursue them heartily and currently while there remains a latent mistrust in their disfavour: nor can we be sure of accomplishing an enterprize so long as any cross apprehensions may rise to interrupt it. Besides we cannot constantly keep a watchfull eye upon our thoughts, but such notions as start up in the fancy will take direction of our active powers while reflection is attentive to something else: and upon sudden emergencies or in the hurry of business, we have not time to reflect, but must follow such persuasions as occur instantaneously. Add to this that in our most carefull deliberations understanding works upon materials supplied her from the storehouse of imagination: nor

is it possible to examine the credit of every evidence giving testimony in the course of a long argumentation.

Hence appears the mighty import of habituating imagination to run in the track marked out by reason: for when we have made any usefull discovery and fully satisfied our judgement of its truth and expedience, the business is but half done; it as yet remains only a matter of speculation, and will not serve us as a principle either of our reasonings or behaviour: but when inculcated into a firm persuasion so that it will arise upon every occasion in full vigour without waiting to be called up by consideration, then it becomes a practical rule and will never fail to influence our conduct.

5. As much a paradox as it may seem, certain it is that people do not always know their own real sentiments, for they are apt to mistake conviction for persuasion. In time of deliberation they are mighty confident of their resolves, and think they will continue in full force beyond all possibility of change; but if imagination has not been brought under due subjection to reason, they will find them fail and give place to other notions at the time of execution. Hence proceeds an inconsistency in men's behaviour according as understanding or imagination gains the a-

scendant, which could never happen if the latter were inured to follow the former. Such deceits as these are taught us in our earliest youth : boys are made to say they love their book, or love to go to church, when in reality they cannot endure either ; and after we grow up it is no unprecedented thing for men to think they believe or disbelieve certain points in religion, philosophy or morality, when in good truth they do not, because they esteem the contrary blamable or ridiculous. This deception may be sometimes practised upon other persons with good effect, for one may chance to bring a man into a useful persuasion by persuading him he has it already, but it is very dangerous to be practised upon ourselves : for perhaps what we fancy blamable or ridiculous may be found otherwise upon a fair examination ; or if we have any wrong turn in our mind, how shall we ever apply a proper remedy or even attempt to rectify it unless we know what it is ? It is a false and mischievous shame that would prompt us to conceal ourselves from ourselves : nor does any thing better show a true freedom and courage of thought than to search out the closest recesses of our heart impartially, and know all the persuasions, good or bad, that find harbour there.

C H A P. XIV.

KNOWLEDGE and CONCEPTION.

ALTHOUGH our knowledge all arises from our conception of things, and generally is more full and compleat according as that is clearer, yet we know some things assuredly for true of which we cannot form any adequate conception. Different persons conceive variously of the same things, of which they all equally acknowledge the existence. Common people cannot easily conceive of opinions, tastes, sentiments or inclinations opposite to their own, though they see them exemplified in others : nor can they conceive the masterly performances of art or science, nor tricks of jugglers, nor anything out of the usual course of their experience : but such as have severally applied themselves to penetrate into those matters find nothing surprizing in them. For it is ^{the} repugnancy of objects to what we have ordinarily seen or known that renders them inconceivable, and therefore familiarity may make them easy to our apprehension. The savage cannot comprehend how men convey their thoughts to one another by writing, and the communica-

tion of them by sounds would appear as wonderfull but that mankind fall into that method before they know what wonder is, that is, before they have gained any experience to which new appearances may seem repugnant,

The studious familiarize themselves to trains of observation peculiar to themselves, therefore as they can clearly apprehend what remains a mystery to others, so on the other hand they find difficulties that nobody else can discern. The plain man makes no boggle at the ideas of creation, annihilation or vacuity: for he thinks he sees instances of them every day, in the production of plants from the ground, the consumption of fuel in the fire, and the emptiness of his pot every time he drinks out the liquor. But the naturalist considers that the materials composing the tree were existing either in the earth, the air or the vapours, before it grew up, that the fire only divides the billet into imperceptible particles, and that after the liquor is all poured out of the pot it may yet remain full of light or air or ether: therefore he conceives no powers in nature that can either give or destroy existence, and disputes incessantly concerning the reality of a vacuum,

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2. There are perhaps few more inexplicable ideas than that of force whereby bodies act upon one another, and which may be divided into two sorts, impulse and resistance. The wheelwright, the milwright and the gunner, can reason about it accurately and effectually to serve the purposes of their several arts: but the philosopher knows not what to make of it. It is neither substance nor form nor quality: as impulse it is something imparted by external agents, as resistance it is a property inherent in the body itself, yet resistance cannot subsist without an impulse received from some other body. It is the immediate cause of motion, nevertheless this cause may operate without producing its effect: for if you lay a dozen huge folios upon the table, they will press it strongly downwards with their weight, but the floor by its resistance presses it as strongly upwards; so the table, though receiving continual supplies of force, remains immoveable.

Some things generally admitted for realities exceed the comprehensions of all men; as the velocity of light travelling fifteen thousand miles in the swing of a clock pendulum, the greater velocity in the vibrations of ether which we learn from Sir Isaac Newton overtake the rays of light, the minuteness of vessels carrying on circulation

and performing secretion in the bodies of scarce visible insects, the eternity of time, immensity of space, and all infinities in general.

As imagination takes her first impression from sensation, therefore I think we cannot form a clear conception of sensible objects whereof we have not had an idea conveyed by the senses. We have not any direct notion of very swift or very slow motions, because properly speaking we do not see either but only gather them from the change of position in the objects moving, which in the former case seem at once to fill the whole space taken up in their passage, and in the latter appear stationary; nor can we frame an idea of very small or very great magnitudes, otherwise than by enlarging the one in our fancy to a discernable size, and supposing the other removed to a distance that will lessen them within the compass of our vision. Neither perhaps can we conceive ideas of reflection whereof we have not experienced something similar passing in our own minds.

3. Things surpass our comprehension upon two accounts, either when they are so unmanageable in themselves as that we cannot form any likeness of them in our imagination, which is the case of all infinitudes; or when we cannot conceive the manner in which they

they should be effected. I can easily conceive Dedalus flying in the air, for I have seen a print of him in Garth's *Metamorphosis*: but when I consider the weight of a man's body, the unwieldiness of wings sufficiently large to buoy him up, and the inability of his arms to flutter them fast enough, I cannot conceive the possibility of his ever practising that manner of travelling. Yet when we consider the small degree of force in rays of light, together with the solidity of glass, it seems as hard to conceive a possibility of their finding their way through so compact a body, as of Dedalus's flying; nevertheless constant experience convinces us of the fact.

When we have not an adequate conception of things themselves, nevertheless we may clearly affirm or deny something concerning them. Mr. Locke says we have a very confused idea of substance, and perhaps not a much better of form considered in the abstract, yet we may rest assured that form is not substance nor substance form, and pronounce many other things concerning them without hesitation. And as imperfect notions as we have of force and impulse or the manner of propagating motion, still we may easily apprehend a difference between the manner of imparting it from body to body
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and from mind to body: for bodies only transmit the force they have received from elsewhere, nor can communicate more than they have themselves, and their re-action is always equal and opposite to action; but the mind produces an impulse she has not herself, nor does she ever feel the limbs re-act against her when she moves them: on the other hand she receives a perception from the organs of sensation which had it not themselves, and returns not their impulse by a re-action whenever they act upon her. Both those productions, of perception by body and of motion by mind, appear alike incomprehensible when we attempt to penetrate into the manner how they are effected.

4. But in order to understand ourselves the better when we would go about to explain the manner in which causes produce their effects, let us consider what we generally mean by explanation. He that would explain the contrivance of a clock being made to strike the hours, begins with showing how the weights pull round the main wheel, how that by its teeth catches hold of the next wheel, and so he points out all the movements successively till he comes to the hammer and the bell. Or if he would explain the manner of nutrition, he tells you of the digestion of the stomach, the secretion of chyle,

chyle, its passage into the heart, the circulation of the blood and thereby its dispersion throughout all parts of the flesh. Here we see that explaining is no more than enumerating the several parts of an operation, and tracing all the steps of its progress through intermediate causes and effects: therefore the manner of a remote effect being produced may be explained, but to call for an explanation of any cause operating immediately is absurd, because it is calling for an account of intermediate steps where there are none. In this case we can only satisfy ourselves from experience, that such and such effects do constantly follow upon the application of particular causes: all we can do further is by remarking some difference in operations seemingly similar, as was attempted just now with respect to the action of mind and body, to prevent our mistaking one thing for another, not with an intent to give that as an explanation of either. To endeavour extending our idea beyond the cause operating and the effect produced, would be to aim at apprehending more than the object really contains.

The quality we find in subjects of producing immediate effects we call a primary property, but we cannot trace every phenomenon to this first source: there are many
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properties observable in bodies which we are well satisfied result from the action of other bodies upon them, though we cannot investigate their operations. Such as the four kinds of attraction, namely, gravity, cohesion, magnetism and electricity, the violence of fire, the sudden hardning of water by intense cold, the fusion of metals by intense heat, the vital circulation and secretion of humours in animals, and a multitude of the like sort which a little reflection will easily suggest.

5. Number itself, whereon we can reason with the greatest accuracy and certainty of any subject, quickly exceeds our comprehension: it is a question with me whether we have a direct idea of any more than four, because beyond that little number we cannot tell how many objects lie before us upon inspection without counting. Higher numbers we cannot ascertain, unless when by ranging them in order, which compounds the individuals into parcels and thereby reduces them to fewer ideas, we can bring them within the compass of our apprehension: therefore we can presently reckon nine disposed into three equal rows, because then we need only consider them as three threes. The regular position of figures in numeration, and the contrivance of expressing the largest numbers by various combinations of a few numerals

numerals, enables us to run those lengths we do in arithmetic. We talk currently of millions and compute them with the utmost exactness, but our knowledge of two millions being double one million is no more than the knowledge of two being the double of one: and we know the value of figures only by the number of places they stand removed to the left. When we cast up the largest accounts we have only three or four names or characters in our view at a time; and by this compendious artifice of drawing multitudes into so narrow a compass, we find means easily to manage objects that would be too cumbersome and extensive for us to conceive of themselves.

Nature abounds in mysteries, of which we may have a certain knowledge but no clear conception: some are too large for imagination to grasp, some too minute for it to discern, others too obscure to be seen distinctly, and others though plainly discernible in themselves, yet remain inexplicable in the manner of production or appear incompatible with one another. Therefore though conception be the groundwork of knowledge, and the inconceivableness of a thing a good argument against its reality, yet is it not an irrefragable one; for it may be overpowered by other proofs drawn from premisses where-
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of we have a clear conception and undoubted knowledge. I suppose it will be allowed that a man born blind can form no conception of light, nor how people can have sensations of objects at a vast distance, so as to determine thereby their magnitudes and situations: yet by conversing daily among mankind, he may find abundant reason to be satisfied of their possessing such a faculty. And as we proceed further in our investigation of nature, we shall find effects that cannot proceed from causes whereof we have had any experience, therefore must ascribe them to powers of which we can know nothing more than their being adequate to those effects; and what we know so imperfectly we may justly pronounce inconceivable.

6. It is one of the most useful points of knowledge to distinguish when the repugnancy of things to our common notions ought to make us reject them, and when not: for men have fallen into gross mistakes both ways. Some have been made to swallow the most palpable absurdities under pretence that sense and reason are not to be trusted; others have denied facts verified by daily experience because they could not conceive the manner wherein they were effected. There have been those who have disputed the reality of motion, of distance, of space, of bodies, of human

human action, upon account of some difficulties they could not reconcile to their ideas. I know of no other rule to go by in this point than that the strongest evidence ought always to prevail: wherefore nothing inconceivable in philosophy deserves credit, unless it necessarily follows from some premises assuredly known and clearly conceived.


But though in some instances we may and must admit things our imagination cannot comprehend, yet it is well worth our care and study to render them as familiar to our comprehension as we can: for we shall find them gain easier persuasion with us and become more serviceable both in our reasonings and practice. For there is a difficulty in the management of inconceivable ideas: wherefore we sometimes suffer conception to run contrary to knowledge, where it can be done without hazard. Everybody now agrees that the Sun constantly keeps his station, and the earth circles round him as an attendant planet: yet we commonly think and speak of his diurnal and annual courses through the heavens, as being more convenient for our ordinary occasions. We may hereafter find it necessary to accommodate our language to the conceptions of mankind, though we should herein a little depart from our real sentiments: this necessity gave rise to the
distin-

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distinction between the esoteric and exoteric
doctrine of the philosophers, the meat for
men and milk for babes of Saint Paul, and
the parabolical and plain, or direct and figu-
rative styles. And we may meet with cases
wherein it would be pernicious to entertain
conceptions of things ourselves, of whose
truth we have abundant reason to be satisfied:
the rules of decency require this sometimes,
and a regard to higher considerations at
others.

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